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This dissertation examines 20th-century Turkic Latinization, the process by which Turkic 
language reformers replaced the Perso-Arabic alphabet with the Latin-based New Turkish 
Alphabet, from a transnational perspective. Focusing on the Turkish and Soviet 
Azerbaijani cases, my work reconstructs the intellectual and nationalist networks that 
were forged across imperial and national boundaries and shaped the debates over 
language, modernization, and national identity in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. 
The ascendancy of Turkic Latinization, I argue, emerged with the rise of the Soviet and 
Kemalist states in the post-WWI period. These revolutionary states enacted far-reaching 
reforms to modernize all areas of life, and remake their respective societies in a Soviet or 
Kemalist mold. At the heart of both states’ political projects was language reform, which 
increasingly equated Latinization with reaching modernity. Though the Soviets and 
Kemalists ultimately envisioned different modernities, their language reforms of the 
Turkic language both drew from the same pool of Turcological and nationalist literature.  
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1. Introduction 
In October 2017, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, issued a 
formal decree that the Kazakh language would replace its current Cyrillic-based alphabet 
with a Latinized script.1 President Nazarbayev legitimized this alphabetic reform using the 
language of modernization (citing the need to prepare Kazakh for the digital age), national 
sovereignty (asserting Kazakhstan’s independence from neighboring Russia), and the 
reinvigoration of Kazakh cultural identity. In power since 1991, Nazarbayev viewed 
Kazakh alphabet reform as vital for maintaining the country’s cultural sovereignty.  This 
was stressed in Nazarbayev’s 2017 speech, entitled “Course Towards the Future: 
Modernization of Kazakhstan’s Identity,” where he stated that Latinization was a 
prerequisite of the government’s “Third Modernization of Kazakhstan” program. Under 
this state-led transformation, Nazarbayev argued that “it is necessary to start working on a 
step-by-step transition of the Kazakh language to the Latin alphabet. We must approach 
this carefully and with sensitivity. It will require a steady and staged approach. And we 
have been preparing for this with caution since independence.”2  
Following the trajectory of other Central Asian Turkic languages and dialects, 
Kazakh has employed different alphabets throughout its history: Old Turkic runes, Perso-
Arabic, Latin in the 1920s and 30s, and finally, Cyrillic after 1939. After two decades of 
independence from Russia, Kazakhstan’s political leadership seeks to replace Cyrillic with 
Latin to carve out a more autonomous cultural identity from Russia. In his 2017 speech, 
 
1 BBC News, “Kazakhstan to Qazaqstan: Why would a country switch its alphabet?” 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41800186.  
2 Nursultan Nazarbayev, “Course Towards the Future: Modernization of Kazakhstan’s Identity,” 
10/16/2017, http://www.ukgu.kz/en/course-towards-future-modernization-kazakhstans-identity.  
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Nazarbayev stated that “It is a change driven by the specific requirements of the modern 
technological environment, of communications and science and education in the 21st 
century.” Furthermore, the president envisioned that a phased and gradual transition from 
Cyrillic to Latin: “In our schools, all children learn English. This uses the Latin alphabet. 
It means that there will be no problems for young people. I believe that by the end of 2017 
it is necessary, with the help of scientists and the general public, to adopt a single standard 
version of the new Kazakh alphabet. In 2018, we should begin training for teaching the 
new alphabet and preparing textbooks for secondary schools.”3 
Should Latinization be successfully adopted, Kazakhstan will follow previous post-
Soviet Turkic states—Turkmenistan in 1991, Uzbekistan in 1992, and Azerbaijan in 
1993—to switch from Cyrillic. Ostensibly, a Latinized Kazakh alphabet will render the 
language more intelligible to these neighboring Turkic states and could provide further 
momentum for Latinization in other Turkic countries, such as Kyrgyzstan. Kazakh’s 
Latinization, therefore, should be viewed as the latest example of a longer history of Turkic 
language reform. This dissertation traces that history, beginning with the collapse of the 
Russian and Ottoman empires after World War I (WWI). This turbulent period witnessed 
the rise of revolutionary states, the Soviet Union and Republic of Turkey, that constructed 
new forms of national identity out of former imperial and religious solidarities.  
In doing so, both the Soviet and Turkish states employed the very reformist 
discourse that future modernizing regimes, such as Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan, have drawn 
from in order to legitimize their own Latinizing alphabet reforms. State discourses inherited 
 
3 Nazarbayev, ibid.   
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from the Soviet and Kemalist periods of which this dissertation is focused all came to center 
on modernization, national sovereignty, and cultural renewal. These three themes are 
prevalent in the writings, speeches, and actions of Soviet and Kemalist language reformers 
in the 1920s and 1930s. This dissertation will examine how Soviet and Kemalist reformist 
discourse in the post-WWI period enabled the shift from the Perso-Arabic script to the 
Latinized New Turkish Alphabets and how post-Soviet Turkic states have coopted previous 
reformers to re-Latinize their Turkic languages after 1991.   
Using a transnational perspective, I will examine the process of twentieth century 
Turkic Latinization by which Soviet and Kemalist reformers replaced the Perso-Arabic 
script with the Latin-based New Turkish Alphabet. Focusing my study mostly on Turkey 
and Azerbaijan, I will reconstruct the intellectual and political networks, forged by 
language reformers across Ottoman-Russian imperial and political boundaries, that played 
a decisive role in shaping the debates over language, modernization, and national identity. 
The ascendancy of Turkic Latinization, my study argues, coincided with the rise of a new 
type of modernizing state from the post-WWI ashes of the Ottoman and Russian empires. 
These revolutionary states, the Soviet Union and Turkish Republic, enacted far-reaching 
reforms to transform the populations under their jurisdiction. Though the Soviet and 
Kemalist reformers envisioned different ends to social engineering, both viewed the 
discourse of modernization as a prerequisite for change. As such, the Bolsheviks and 
Turkish republicans worked to modernize all areas of life and remake their societies using 
Latinization to promote their ideology along the way.  
During the Interwar period (1918-1939), language reformers in both the USSR and 
the Turkish Republic embarked upon parallel reforms to the Turkic languages under their 
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tutelage. In both cases, these reforms aimed to steer the Turkic-speaking communities away 
from Islamic-oriented identity by abolishing the Perso-Arabic alphabet, used by scholars 
and literary figures for over a millennium. Both Turkish and Soviet language reformers 
increasingly scapegoated this script as epitomizing a “stagnant” Islamic past that kept the 
Turkic languages “incomprehensible” and “foreign” to the vast majority of their speakers. 
By arguing that the Perso-Arabic script was both “incomprehensible” and “foreign,” Soviet 
and Kemalist reformers made the case that the Turks were a distinct ethno-linguistic group 
within the Muslim world, and thus, should develop a language, literature, and alphabet 
independent of Arabic and Persian. This push for language reform culminated in the 
adoption of the New Turkish Alphabet (Yeni Türk Elifbası) in both the Soviet Union and 
Turkish Republic in the 1920s. Based on a modified Latin script, the New Turkish Alphabet 
signaled a dramatic departure from written tradition for the Turks in Anatolia, 
Transcaucasia, and Central Asia whereby Islamic unity and history were displaced in favor 
of a “modern” Latin script which would serve as the primary tool for mass education and 
literacy. 
In examining the transnational reformist networks that enabled Turkic Latinization 
in the 1920s and 30s, my work centers the public discourse over Latinization made in the 
1926 Baku Turkological Conference and how the ideas coming from this venue were 
eventually taken up by the Kemalist Latinization project. Thus, I demonstrate how the 
political and ideological rhetoric on language traversed borders and operated within a 
larger geographic and ideological spectrum. Within this wider landscape, both Kemalist 
and Soviet reformers adopted common assumptions and impulses about modernity, 
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nationalism, and the ability of the revolutionary state to implement both through full-scale 
Latinization.  
1a. Literature Review  
This section will outline the scholarly literature and approaches that have informed 
this study’s approach to transnational Turkic Latinization. First, this study adopts some of 
the broader theoretical perspectives on language reform, defining it as a project of modern 
states to legitimize and disseminate their linguistic objectives. Joan Rubin and Bjorn 
Jernudd use the term language planning to designate the state’s deliberate “changes in the 
system of language code or speaking or both.”4 They argue that this type of planning is 
carried “by organizations that are established for such purposes or given a mandate [by the 
state] to fulfill such purposes.”5 Therefore, language planning, in Rubin and Jernudd’s 
conception, places the modernizing state, regardless of its ideological character, at the 
center of the reform process. The goals of language reform, therefore, have as much to do 
with establishing the hegemony of the state as they do with modernizing the society along 
particular ideological lines.  
Language reform, therefore, is inherently tied not only to issues of cultural 
orientation, education, and modernization, but also to the power of the modern state to 
enact and sustain such measures. Latinizing the Turkic idioms was a central component in 
the Soviet and Kemalist efforts at social and cultural change. Writing on the Kemalist 
reform, Yeşim Bayar argues that language reform and Latinization “essentially [became] 
 
4 Joan Rubin and Björn H. Jernudd, “Introduction: Language Planning as an Element in Modernization,” in 
Can Language be Planned? (Honolulu University of Hawaii Press, 1971), xiv.  
5 Rubin & Jernudd, xiv.  
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a question of politics and ideology…tied to the [Kemalist] elite’s concern to solidify their 
nationalist project in the hearts and minds of the people.”6 In both the Soviet and Kemalist 
contexts, the jurisdiction of the state was expanded under new revolutionary principles to 
direct the process of language reform, including Latinization, standardization, and 
dissemination of the new idiom through the education system and media outlets.    
In his study on language reform in Soviet Uzbekistan, William Fierman 
demonstrates that Latinization was enacted by modernizing state elites to consolidate their 
political control over society. Comparing it to Turkey, Iran, Vietnam, Algeria, India, and 
Nigeria, Fierman argues Soviet Uzbekistan established its legitimacy among the population, 
garnered mass participation, and built a unique national identity through language reform.7 
For Fierman, the Soviet experience constitutes merely one example within a larger history 
of modernizing states and regimes that used language reform to reach their political ends. 
In the Soviet and Kemalist cases, the work of planning and managing language fell to 
“language-planner technocrats” who operated in conjunction with the ruling government 
or regime.8  
Though establishing and securing political power was paramount, Fierman 
mentions identity construction as another goal of Soviet Uzbek planners: “A major reason 
that language is more likely than any other phenomenon to become a symbol of identity is 
its role in transmitting history.”9 Ultimately, Fierman argues that the project of language 
 
6 Yeşim Bayar, Formation of the Turkish Nation-State, 1920-1938 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 
38.  
7 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience (Berlin & New 
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 11-26. 
8 Fierman, 16.  
9 Fierman, 21.  
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reform “reflect[s] the preferences and calculations of the elites who control the state 
machinery…Therefore struggles over language quickly turn into struggles for control of 
political institutions.”10 This struggle, however, does not take place at the state level alone, 
nor did the effort to legitimize Latinization. For both the Soviet and Kemalist reformers, 
language reform was meant to coopt the broader population into the state’s ideological 
project and to secure political legitimacy. 
In her study of national development in Soviet Turkmenistan, Adrienne Edgar 
expands further on the role of national elites in constructing new forms of identity: “The 
nation-making efforts of modern states do not, of course, focus solely on elites; they also 
seek to mobilize the masses, turning them from reluctant subjects into active and concerned 
citizens.”11 Examining the case of Soviet Turkmenistan, Adrienne Edgar emphasizes, in 
the vein of Fierman, that Soviet reformers enacted Latinization and purification (tasfiye) 
for the purpose of modernizing the Soviet Turkic republics and their societies. In Tribal 
Nation, Edgar argues that Soviet language reform was a powerful instrument in this 
process:  
As a direct result of Soviet rule, aspects of nation formation that took 
decades or centuries elsewhere—the establishment of a national territory 
and government institutions, the standardization of a national language, and 
the emergence of a mass educational system—were accomplished in 
Turkmenistan and its neighbors [in Central Asia and the Caucasus] in less 
than a decade.12   
Here, Edgar’s emphasizes that language standardization, as well as a mass education 
system, were at the forefront of Soviet efforts to build non-Russian national republics. She 
 
10 Fierman, 16.  
11 Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 4.  
12 Edgar, 3.  
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also highlights one of the major contrasts to Kemalist Turkey in that Soviet language 
reform ultimately sought to construct socialist societies. Unlike Turkey or other nationalist 
movements, Edgar argues, “What is striking about Central Asian nations is not that they 
were constructed from above, but that their architect was a socialist state bent on bringing 
about a global proletarian revolution.”13  
 Despite their ideological differences, I argue that the methods used by the Soviet 
and Kemalist states were striking similar and drew from an inherited set of late nineteenth 
century discourses on the connection of language to national identity. This means that the 
Soviet and Kemalist states, despite operating according to different ideologies, deployed 
similar methods towards reforming the Turkic languages under their jurisdiction. This 
similar approach to linguistic transformation stemmed from the fact that the Soviet and 
Kemalist regimes came to view Latinization as the only method to enact a revolutionary 
transformation of the national tongue, construct modern and secular Turkic identities, and 
expand the revolutionary state’s jurisdiction over linguistic, educational, and media spheres.    
Despite their shared methodological and discursive origins, scholarly studies on 
Soviet and Kemalist Turkic Latinization have largely examined these two movements as 
distinct, arguing that efforts made towards alphabetic reform, such as the 1926 Baku 
Turkological Conference or Turkey’s 1928 Alphabet Reform, were solely the product of 
internal factors and offer few comparative examples. In the historiography of Turkish 
Latinization more specifically, the movement has been understood by scholars as the result 
of the Kemalist consolidation of power through its efforts to transform Turkish society 
 
13 Edgar, 3.  
 
9 
from one based in Ottoman-Islamic orientation into a modern and secular nation-state 
participating in “contemporary civilization” (çağdaş medeniyet seviyesi).14 Scholars of 
Kemalist Latinization have focused on the discursive, ideological, and political climate that 
gradually rendered Latinization the only viable solution in the minds of language 
revolutionaries.  
For example, Diana Spearman and M. Naim Tufan’s article elaborates on the 
Kemalist conception of  “contemporary civilization” and examines how “underlying the 
whole strategy [of alphabet reform] was the concept of ‘contemporaneity,’ which involved 
a knowledge of modern thought and science.”15 Ömer Gündüz and İsmail Fırat’s article 
stresses the ideational factors leading to the 1928 Reform by arguing that Kemalist 
Latinization owed its origins to the Tanzimat and Second Constitutional eras in which 
intellectuals and journalists abandoned identity based on the Islamic ummah (ümmet 
kavramı) and moved towards a nationalist conception of Turkish identity called Turkism 
(Türkçülük).16 Their article, therefore, examines how this shift towards Turkish national 
identity was negotiated in the area of language reform through three language conferences 
hosted by the Turkish Language Association in 1932, 1934, and 1936 respectively.  
 
14 Geoffrey Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); Frank Tachai, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform,” The Review of Politics, 
Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr. 1964), pp. 191-204; Diana Spearman & Naim M. Turfan, “The Turkish Language 
Reform,” History Today, Vol. 29 Issue 2 (February 1979), pp. 88-97; İlker Aytürk, “Turkish Linguists 
Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk’s Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 40, Issue 6 (2004), pp. 1-25; Jale Parla, “The Wounded Tongue: Turkey’s Language Reform and the 
Canonicity of the Novel,” PMLA 123, no. 1 (2008): 27-40; İlker Aytürk, “The First Episode of Language 
Reform in Republican Turkey: The Language Council from 1926 to 1931,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 18, Issue 3 (July, 2008), pp. 275-293; Zeynep Korkmaz, “Alfabe 
Devriminin Türk Toplumu Üzerindeki Sosyal ve Kültürel Etkileri,” International Periodical for the 
Languages, Literature, and History of Turkish or Turkic, Vol. 4/3 (Spring, 2009), pp. 1469-1480; Kaya 
Yılmaz, “Critical Examination of the Alphabet and Language Reforms in the Early Years of the Turkish 
Republic,” Journal of Social Studies Education Research, 2[1], (2011), pp. 59-82. 
15 Diana Spearman & Naim M. Turfan, 90.  
16 Ömer Gündüz and İsmail Fırat, “Dil Devriminin Gerçekleşmesinde Türk Dil Kurumu Rolü” in The 
Journal of International Social Research Vol. 7, No. 34, pp. 59-71, p. 61.  
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Another important study by İlker Aytürk focuses on the work of the Language 
Council (Dil Encümeni) before the 1928 Alphabet Revolution arguing that “the Language 
Council was torn between its professional duties as a learned, semi-academic committee, 
on the one hand, and the politically motivated demands of the Turkish leadership, which 
expected to see quick results [in the area of language reform].”17 In this article, Aytürk 
focuses on the internal political and ideological debates that hampered Turkey’s initial 
attempts at alphabet change. Aytürk’s second article expands on the Kemalist conception 
of modernity and national identity, arguing that Atatürk’s cadre did not intend to merely 
mimic European civilization with their reforms but actually were quite “ambiguous” 
towards the West.  
In this climate, the Kemalists “put the ancient Turks on the highest pedestal possible, 
extolled their contribution to civilization [medeniyet] and reminded Western nations that 
they had to acknowledge the Turks as part of their family, a nation which contributed most 
generously to their civilization.”18 Language reform was central to this process and, as such, 
Kemalists began to interrogate Turkish’s proximity to European languages to “prove” their 
membership in a common European civilization. As Geoffrey Lewis explains, “There was 
a pressing need to raise morale, to make the people see themselves as a nation with a great 
past and a great destiny, who would one day take their place among the civilized nations 
of the West.”19  
 
17 Aytürk, “The First Episode of Language Reform in Republican Turkey: The Language Council from 
1926 to 1931,” 276.  
18 Aytürk, “Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk’s 
Turkey,” 2.  
19Geoffrey Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 41.  
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The adoption of the Latin script, therefore, was a strategy to “prove” that the Turks 
were the harbingers of civilization and that their language would be freed from centuries 
of Islamic stagnation and reach its true civilizational potential through the abolition of the 
Arabic script. Also analyzing the ideological underpinnings of Kemalist alphabet reform, 
Kaya Yılmaz argues that “the Arabic script [was viewed] an undesirable feature of a culture 
that tied Turkish people to Islam and deprived them of a nationality identity” [my italics].20 
Within this conception, Yılmaz argues, “alphabet reform [was] a tool to cut off Turkish 
people’s ties with their Islamic past and the Muslim world” and institute a new alphabet 
that would empower secular national identity.21       
A small number of scholars, however, have focused on the transnational influences 
that contributed to Latinization in Turkey. In expanding the study of the Kemalist Alphabet 
and Language revolutions to transnational perspectives, scholars have begun to ask new 
questions about the implications and impact of Turkey’s Latinization within a broader 
series of events occurring throughout Eurasia. Early examples of a transnational approach 
to Turkish language reform came from within the Turkish academic establishment itself. 
During the Symposium for the 50th Anniversary of the Alphabet Reform in 1978, convened 
by Prof. Dr. Afet İnan, scholars began to evaluate the transnational influence of the 1928 
Alphabet Reform.  
İnan was a prominent figure within Kemalist academic circles. The adopted 
daughter of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, she earned her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University 
of Geneva and played an influential role in the Turkish Historical Association (Türk Tarih 
 
20 Yılmaz, “Critical Examination of the Alphabet and Language Reforms in the Early Years of the Turkish 
Republic,” 66.  
21 Yılmaz, ibid.  
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Kurumu), established by her adopted father in 1932. By hosting the 1978 symposium, 
İnan’s moved to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of her adopted father’s alphabet 
reform. In her opening remarks, İnan stated that her objective was twofold. First, she 
sponsored research to evaluate “the results of the adoption and implementation of the New 
[Latin] Alphabet in the Republican era.”22 These studies examined the various Turkic 
writing systems by arguing that they sat on a historical continuum. The adoption of Roman 
letters under Mustafa Kemal in 1928, according to this scale, amounted to writing 
revolution that researchers viewed as the final stage in the historical progression of Turkish 
writing.  
Secondly, İnan called for comparative research that would highlight the influence 
of Kemalist Latinization on the other Turkic countries. Rather than inaugurating a full 
transnational approach to the study of Turkish Latinization, İnan’s objectives were limited 
to “providing information on the echoes of [Turkey’s] revolution in outside countries.”23 
These parameters, however, forged new comparative studies and evaluations of Kemalist 
and Soviet Latinization from scholars such as İlber Ortaylı and Bilal N. Şimşir.24  
Ortaylı’s speech at the symposium provides an early comparative of the Kemalist 
and Soviet Latinization movements. Delivering his talk thirty years after the reversal of 
Soviet Latinization and imposition of Cyrillic, Ortaylı stated at the Symposium “the Latin 
letters were accepted before Turkey in the regions of Soviet Azerbaijan and Karachay. It 
 
22 Afet İnan, “Açış Söylevi,” in Harf Devrimi’nin 50. Yılı Sempozyumu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1981), pp. 1-2, “…Türklerin kullandıkları yazı ve şekilleri ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devrinde Yeni 
Harflerin kabulü, uygulanmasının neticeleri üzerinde durulacaktır.”  
23 İnan, pp. 1-2. “Aynı zamanda dış ülkelerdeki bu devrimin yankısı ve durumu üzerinde de bilgi 
verilecektir.”  
24 Dr. İlber Ortaylı, “Türk Harf Devrimi’nin Dış Ülkelerdeki Etkileri Üzerine,” and Bilal N. Şimşir, “Türk 
Harf Devrimi’nin Türkiye Dışında Yayılması: Bulgaristan Türkleri Örneği,” in Harf Devrimi’nin 50. Yılı 
Sempozyumu (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981), pp. 103-109, 187-207.  
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is necessary to handle the question of how this event influenced Turkey’s own Latin 
alphabet reform.”25 For Ortaylı, “the [Soviet] reforms did not inspire the adoption of Latin 
letters in Turkey. The opposite in fact. Because the Alphabet reform in Turkey was realized 
in a fundamental and modest way, [the Kemalist reforms] were influential in several 
regions of the Soviet Union.”26 To backup this claim, Ortaylı states that it was the “failed 
experiment” of Latinization in Soviet Azerbaijan from 1922-23 that drove the war hero, 
Kazim Karabekir, who presided over the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress, to reject 
Latinization at this very venue. Karabekir stated that switching the Perso-Arabic script for 
Latin letter would mean “to fall to the awful state that the Azeris find themselves in.”27  
Ortaylı argued that, although the Soviet Union mandated Latinization two years 
before the Turkish Republic, the Bolsheviks’ work was marred by inefficiency and 
ultimately the decision to replace the Latin alphabets with Cyrillic ones in 1939-40.28 
Writing from the sole independent Turkic state at the time, Ortaylı concluded that Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, had to draw upon his own “courage,” 
not any external example from communist Russia, to successfully Latinize the Turkish 
alphabet. As such, Ortaylı questions the long-term of international impact of the Soviet 
efforts and the transnational dimension of Turkic Latinization.  
 
25 Ortaylı, 104. “Bilindiği gibi Sovyet-Azerbaycan ve Karaçay-Balkar bögesinde Latin harfleri Türkiye’den 
daha önce kabul edilmiştir. Bu olayın Türkiye’deki Latin harfleri devrimini ne yönde etkilediği sorununu 
ele almak gerekiyor.”  
26 Ortaylı, 104. “Kanımca bu değişiklik Türkiye’deki Latin harfleri devrimi için cesaret verici bir örnek 
değildi. Hatta tersine Türkiye’deki harf devrimi köklü ve tutarlı bir biçimde gerçekleştirildiği içindir ki, 
Sovyetler’in bazı bölgelerinde etkili olmuştur.”  
27 Ortaylı, 105. “Latin harflerinin kabulü halinde Azeri’lerin içinde bulunduğu kötü duruma 
düşüleceğini…”  
28 Ortaylı, 105.  
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Another key participant at Afet İnan’s 1978 Symposium, Bilal N. Şimşir, also 
aimed to examine “the spread of the Turkish [Latin] letters outside of Turkey.”29 His study 
centered on the “Alphabet Struggle” (Alfabe kavgası) among the Bulgarian Turkish 
community, which divided the community into conservatives (organized under the Chief 
Mufti of Sofia), and modernizers associated with the Turkish Teachers Union.30 Aligning 
themselves with the Turkish Teachers Union, the Kemalists inside Turkey promoted 
Latinization among the 700,000-member Turkish in Bulgaria.31 In this effort, the Turkish 
Republic played an irredentist and polemical role in the spread of Latinization among the 
Bulgarian Turks. With the victory of Latinization in Bulgaria, the Kemalists established 
themselves as the new, important force for Turkic Latinization.  
Şimşir expanded his transnational perspective in his monograph Türk Yazı Devrimi 
(The Turkish Writing Revolution), where he argues that Kemalist Latinization was part of 
a broader “Turkish Writing Revolution” that swept Turkic communities in the Balkans, 
Anatolia, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia. Locating Latinization’s origins in the Tanzimat 
Period (1839-1876), Şimşir sought to illustrate the broader interconnectivity of the 
movement across imperial and state boundaries. Here, he does not merely focus on politics 
or state building, but argues that Latinization came with the gradual expansion European 
economic, technological, and scientific structures in the Ottoman and Russian states.32 One 
example of this gradual expansion is through the telegraph. Using the expansion of 
telegraph lines throughout the Ottoman Empire in the 19th-century, Şimşir demonstrates 
 
29 Şimşir, Harf Devrimi’nin 50. Yılı Sempozyumu, 193. “Burada, Türk Harf Devrimi’nin Türkiye dışında 
yayılışına bir örnek olarak…”  
30 Şimşir, Harf Devrimi’nin 50. Yılı Sempozyumu, 188.  
31 Şimşir, Harf Devrimi’nin 50. Yılı Sempozyumu, 188.   
32 Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008).  
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that the adoption of the Latin scrip in Turkey was an evolutionary process that responded 
to new technological and material conditions. As such, Latinization in Turkey, Şimşir 
argues, falls within in a broader geopolitical, economic, and historical context that includes 
a network of debates and movements emerging across Ottoman-Russian borders.  
In addition to the telegraph, Şimşir also includes instances where non-Turkic 
Muslim groups pushed for Latinization for their respective communities before the Turks. 
Here, he cites the example of the Albanians in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Operating on nationalist doctrines, Albanian intellectuals began to advocate for 
Latinization of the Albanian language.33 In order to build Albanian national consciousness, 
these intellectuals argued that Latinization could serve as a neutral alphabet that would 
unite both Muslims and Christians. Just as the Arabic alphabet represented Islam so too did 
the Greek script signify Christianity. By that token, Albanian intellectuals rejected either 
as the language’s official alphabet. 34  
Şimşir’s states that, by 1869, the Albanian nationalist movement petitioned the 
Ottoman state to accept Latinization for all Albanian-speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire, 
intensifying their subsequent efforts to Latinize with the creation of both the Albanian 
Scientific Society and the Society for the Unity of the Albanian Language. The process of 
Latinization for the Albanians would prove controversial among the conservative Islamist 
groups within the empire. Thus, in 1908, the Albanian nationalists convened the Manastir 
Congress to officially endorse Latinization. It was only in 1911, just two years before 
 
33 Şimşir, 38-43.  
34 Şimşir, 39.  
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receiving independence from the Ottomans, that Latin alphabet was recognized by the 
Young Turk government for the Albanian nationalists.35   
 Highlighting both the telegraph and Albanian examples, Şimşir explains that the 
Latin script was well-known among the Turks in the Ottoman Empire before its adoption 
in 1928. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on knowing French for the Ottoman 
bureaucracy ensured that new generations of government officials could read and write in 
the Latin alphabet. In fact, as Şimşir demonstrates, the earliest renderings of Ottoman into 
the Latin language used French orthography. This shows that, unlike what is understood in 
both popular and academic circles, the Latin alphabet was not a completely “foreign” one 
by the 1920s. The Albanians represented one Muslim nationality that had successfully 
adopted Latinization before World War One, although not without controversy and 
contestation. The Latinization debate, therefore, was not a foreign one to Turks living in 
either the Ottoman or Russian empires.    
In the Interwar period, Şimşir argues that Baku and Ankara emerged as the major 
centers of Latinization. The earliest was Baku, the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan and host 
city to the Baku Turkological Conference in 1926. Şimşir states that “From the standpoint 
of the alphabet, Azerbaijan’s place is important. Azerbaijan, situated as a bridge between 
the North Caucasus, Central Asia, and Anatolia, …played a pioneering [öncü] role in the 
general history of the Turkish writing revolution.”36 Thus, while rife with standardization 
and implementation issues, Şimşir contradicts Ortayli by claiming that Soviet Latinization, 
 
35 Şimşir, 42-43.  
36 Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi, 362. “Bunun ötesinde Azerbaycan, genel Türk yazı devrimi tarihinde de öncü 
rolü oynamış ve bütün Türk dünyasını doğrudan etkilemiştir.”  
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especially the example from Azerbaijan, had “fundamental importance on the path towards 
accepting the Latin alphabet for the Turkish language.”37  
Subsequent scholarly studies of the Baku Conference have largely focused on the 
single contributions that individual participants offered to the debates over alphabet reform. 
These scholars have provided the groundwork that has evaluated the careers and 
perspectives of prominent intellectuals and academics, such as Theodor Menzel (the 
prominent German-born Turkologist who headed the Department of Eastern Studies at the 
University of Kiev and founded the influential historical periodical Islam)38, Halid S. 
Hocayev (lecturer in Arabic, Persian, and Azeri at the Institute of Higher Education and 
Azerbaijan State University)39, and Ahmet Bayturnsinoğlu (the Kazakh nationalist and 
educational reformer) to name a few.40 Furthermore, scholars have analyzed how pre-Baku 
Muslim reform movements in the Russian Empire, especially the usul-i jedid (or new 
method), helped define the parameters of linguistic, cultural, ethnographic, and educational 
reform in Turkic-speaking. These antecedents, scholars such as Mustafa Öner argue, 
played a defining role not only in defining the parameters of language reform at Baku, but 
 
37 Şimşir, 98. “Türk dili için Latin alfabesinin alınması yolunda asıl önem taşıyan akım, kuzey 
Azerbaycan’da başlamıştır.” 
38 Samir Kazımoğlu, “Alman Türkologları ve Birinci Bakû Türkoloji Kongresi (Prof. Dr. Georg Jakob, 
Prof. Dr. Theodor Menzel, Prof. Dr. Paul Wittek),” in 1926 Bakû Türkoloji Kongresinin 70. Yıl Dönümü 
Toplantısı (29-30 Kasım 1996) (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 1-5; Ömer Faruk Demirel, “I. 
Türkoloji Kongresi ve Theodor Menzel,” 1926 Bakû Türkoloji Kongresinin 70. Yıl Dönümü Toplantısı (29-
30 Kasım 1996) (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 27-58.   
39 Mustafa Toker, “Türkistan’ın Latin Alfabesine Geçemesinde Büyük Rol Oynayan Halid Seid Hocayev 
ve Yeni Elifba Yollarında Eski Hatıra ve Duygularım Adlı Eseri,” in 1926 Bakû Türkoloji Kongresinin 70. 
Yıl Dönümü Toplantısı (29-30 Kasım 1996) (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 81.   
40 Ferhat Tamir, “Ahmet Baytursınoğlu ve 1926 Baku Türkoloji Kongresi,” in 1926 Bakû Türkoloji 
Kongresinin 70. Yıl Dönümü Toplantısı (29-30 Kasım 1996) (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), 
pp. 115-119.  
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also birthed alternative and often confrontational views to Latinization on issues of Turkic 
language reform, orthography, and mass literacy.41  
In his study of the Baku Congress, Mustafa Oral brings in a transnational view by 
arguing that the Baku Conference was “incredibly important from the standpoint of both 
the development of the knowledge/science of Turkism and in the state of affairs of relations 
between Turkey and Russia.”42 Here, Oral emphasizes both the academic contributions the 
Baku Conference made to the development of Turkic identity as well as its place in 
bringing the two revolutionary regimes closer together culturally. Oral continues, “As is 
known, Turkish-Russian relations gained a new momentum after the Bolshevik Revolution 
and especially after the appearance of the Kemalist movement. Thus, at first view, the Baku 
Turkological Congress seemed like a step on the path towards cultural and intellectual 
collaboration in addition to political solidarity between the two countries.” 43  Oral, 
therefore, captures a moment of possibility felt by the attendees of the conference that, if 
the various linguistic issues facing the Turkic language were resolved within an 
international forum, the Turkic world would move towards closer cooperation and 
solidarity on various political and cultural issues. Latinization of the Turkic languages, 
therefore, was viewed by many participants as a fundamental step towards the linguistic 
cohesion and cultural renewal of the Turkic populations both inside the Soviet Union and 
 
41 Mustafa Öner, “I. Bakû Türkoloji Kongresinde İdil-Ural Türkleri,” in 1926 Bakû Türkoloji Kongresinin 
70. Yıl Dönümü Toplantısı (29-30 Kasım 1996) (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1999), pp. 13-25.   
42 Mustafa Oral, "Türkoloji Tarihinde 1926 Bakû Türkiyat Kongresi,” in Türk Dünyası Dil ve Edebiyat 
Dergisi Issue 17 (2004), pp. 107-129, p. 112. “Bu kongre, gerek Türklük biliminin gelişimi gerekse Türkiye-
Rusya ilişkilerinin gidişatı açısından oldukça önemlidir.”  
43 Oral, 112. “Bilindiği üzere Türk-Rus ilişkileri, Bolşevik Devrimi’nden, özellikle Kemalist hareketin 
ortaya çıkışından sonra yeni bir ivme kazanmıştı.”  
 
19 
in neighboring Kemalist Turkey. It is this momentary sense of possibility that Oral evokes 
that greatly informs my study of transnational Turkic Latinization.    
Equally important is the work of Kamil Nerimanoğlu, who published both 
Azerbaijani and Turkish-language editions of the Baku Conference proceedings with 
commentaries.44 Unlike Oral, Nerimanoğlu viewed the Baku Conference not as a brief 
moment of solidarity between Turkey and the Soviet Union, but as a “tragic historical and 
human drama” of Shakespearean porportions that ended with the executions of many 
participants during the Stalinist Purges (1936-1938).45 Within this drama, Nerimanoğlu 
stresses the political factors leading up the congress. The most important was that the 
Turkic groups, if counted collectively, made up the second largest group within the Soviet 
Union.46  
Furthermore, they bordered the Republic of Turkey, where the Kemalist leadership 
also sought to repress these same movements. For the Soviets and Kemalists, any Pan-
Turkist or Pan-Islamic irredentism was an affront to their own modernization projects that 
constructed separate territorial republics with distinct national identities. Thus, Latinizers, 
such as Azerbaijan’s Ağamalıoğlu, had to carefully navigate a solution that would 
universally endorse the New Turkish Alphabet and dissuade fears from both Soviet and 
Kemalist circles that this new script could embolden Pan-Turkic or Pan-Islamic 
associations.    
 
44 Kamil Vəli Nərimanoğlu & Əliheydər Ağakişiyev, 1926-cı İl Bakı Türkoloji Qurultayı (Stenoqram 
materialları, bilblioqrafiya və foto-sənədlər) (Bakı: Çinar Çap, 2006); Prof. Dr. Kamil Veli Nerimanoğlu & 
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Öner, 1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı (Tutanaklar) 26 Şubat – 6 Mart 1926 (Ankara: 
Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008). Both are translations of the original Russian transcripts.    
45 Kamil Vəli Nərimanoğlu, Ə. Ağakişiyəv, & S. Abdullayeva, “Latin Əsaslı Yeni Türk Əlifbası və I. Bakı 
Türkoloji Qurultayı Biblioqrafiyası” (Baku: 2006), 3-4. “Hüznlü tarix, insanlıq dramıdır.” 
46 Nərimanoğlu, Ağakişiyəv, & Abdullayeva, ibid.  
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By focusing on transnational intellectual and ideological networks, I will 
demonstrate that the Soviet and Kemalist language reforms of the 1920s inherited a broader 
set of political and ideological discourses, nurtured by the rise of nationalist movements in 
the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia, as well as in Russian-controlled Transcaucasia. By 
situating the Soviet and Kemalist reforms within these developments, I intend not to carry 
out a comparative study of Kemalist and Soviet language planning so much as illustrate 
that the common approaches to language reform stemmed from discussion, debates, and 
eventual implementation of nationalist language policies in the decades leading up to 
World War One. I envision the Soviet and Kemalist cases to be another set of examples 
that serve as a sequel of sorts to the Albanian experience. I will situate the Kemalist and 
Soviet language reforms within the broader historical context of nationalism and its 
influence over language policy.  
 
1b. Dissertation Outline 
My dissertation will chart the transnational discourses over language reform and 
national identity that were developed by and circulated among Turkish, Azeri, Tatar, Uzbek, 
and Kazakh reformist and intellectual circles. In particular, I will trace the development of 
these discourses as they pertained to Latinization. By reconstructing transnational reformist 
conversations and debates over Latinization, this study will contribute to our understanding 
of how the Latin alphabet became the preferred vehicle of modernization for both the 
Soviet and Kemalist reformers of the 1920s and 1930s. I argue that the ascendency of 
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Latinization owed much to a specific set of factors that emerged from early periods in the 
Russian and Ottoman empires.  
Chapter Two argues that these reformist discourses were built on the foundation of 
European Turkology (often rendered Turcology). Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, 
European Turkology grew out of Orientalist sciences and pursued a methodology that 
combined ethnographic, linguistic, and historical research on the Turkic peoples. Many 
Turkologists to reconstruct the “lost” history of the Turanic peoples, from whom they 
traced the origins of the Turkic tribes. This chapter will specifically focus on the 
Turkologists of the mid-to-late nineteenth century, who focused on locating and 
deciphering pre-modern Turkic inscriptions in Inner Asia. Undertaking several expeditions 
to the Orhon Valley in present-day Mongolia, scholars such as Vasili Radlov and Vilhelm 
Thomsen first copied, transcribed, and deciphered the first inscriptions of Old Turkic. Their 
academic findings, the chapter demonstrates, launched key debates over the Turkic 
languages and their status as a distinct language family. Absorbing and then deploying the 
linguistic and historical findings of the European Turkologists, Azeri, Tatar, and Ottoman 
reformers and intellectuals sought to awaken Turkish national consciousness in the pre-
WWI era in order to modernize their societies and instill a sense of pride in being Turkish.  
Chapter Three examines the emergence of the Turcophone press as the powerful 
mouthpiece for the dissemination of reformist ideas across Ottoman-Russian borders. 
Established in the nineteenth century, the Turcophone press in both Transcaucasia and the 
Ottoman Empire remained in private ownership for most of the pre-WWI period. As such, 
it was largely a mouthpiece for the bourgeois members of Turkic society, who were 
comprised of government, military, religious, and educational officials alongside a small 
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intelligentsia. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Turcophone press 
was divided on the question of language reform. The major of voices contributing to the 
debates advocated for the reformist position (ıslahatçı). This entailed preserving the 
existing Perso-Arabic script by reforming its vowel harmony system. The reformists 
argued against abolishing the script outright. Even as the 1905-11 revolutionary wave 
swept the Russian, Persian, and Ottoman empires, debates over language reform largely 
steered cleared of  Latinization. Instead, the press championed the existing script as central 
to the Turks’ religious, cultural, and literary heritage.  
Chapter Four focuses on the 1926 Baku Turkological Conference to illustrate the 
momentum towards Turkic Latinization in the 1920s Soviet Union and its eventual victory. 
With the collapse of the Tsarist order in the February and October 1917 revolutions, 
Russian Transcaucasia entered into a brief period of independent statehood before their 
incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1920. Focusing on Azerbaijan, I examine how 
independence from Russia triggered a new phase of political nationalism in which the 
Latinization movement steadily grew. During the early Soviet period of Azerbaijan’s 
history (1920-1939), this momentum was taken up by Azeri Bolsheviks to make their 
Soviet republic the first to adopt the Latin script. The 1926 Baku conference signaled a 
period where language reformers of all stripes convened to debate the Latinized New 
Turkish Alphabet. The victory of the Latinizers at this conference meant that Latinization 
would be official for all Soviet Turkic languages.     
 Chapter Five focuses on the Islahatçılar, or “reformists,” who opposed the New 
Turkish Alphabet before and after the Baku Conference. This group, continuing the 
discourses of their pre-WWI reformist forerunners, argued that the Perso-Arabic alphabet 
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was an important expression of unique Turkic culture and identity. As such, they 
vehemently opposed abolishing the script in favor of a “foreign” Romanized system and, 
instead, proposed merely reforming the existing alphabet. Itself a transnational group, the 
“reformist” ranks were formed with scholars from Russian Transcaucasia, Tatarstan, and 
Central Asia, as well as the Ottoman Empire and its Turkish successor state. Inclusion of 
their voices remind us that Turkic Latinization was far from a fait accompli even as late as 
the Baku Conference. Instead, the ıslahatçılar provided an alternative to Latinization that 
would uphold the Turks’ unique identity and promote mass literacy.   
Chapter Six will examine the 1928 Alphabet Revolution in Kemalist Turkey and 
the state’s role in shaping modern Turkish identity. Like their Soviet counterparts, the 
Kemalist revolutionaries in Turkey embarked upon creating a new ideological and 
modernizing state out of the dead Ottoman Empire. The Kemalists, however, envisioned 
Latinization and language reform as serving similar functions for social reform as their 
Soviet counterparts. Instead of promoting a global Marxist revolution, the Kemalists 
sought to construct a territorial, national, and secular nation-state for the Turks of Anatolia. 
This chapter will examine how the Kemalists coopted reformers and intellectuals to 
advocate for and implement the New Turkish Alphabet in the republic. In adopting this 
new script, the Kemalists sought to dismantle Ottoman-Islamic identity entirely and forge 
a new Turkish citizen under their republican ideology.   
 Though the Bolsheviks and Kemalists ultimately differed ideologically, they 
nevertheless cooperated on many fronts, especially economic planning in the 1930s.47 In 
 
47 Osman Okyar. "The Concept of Étatism." The Economic Journal 75, no. 297 (1965): 98-111. 
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the same vein, both Soviet and Kemalist language reformers drew from each other as they 
began to enact the policies of Latinization and purification within their respective domains. 
To illustrate this, I will examine several ‘language congresses’ (dil kurultayları), beginning 
with the seminal Baku Turkological Conference of 1926, in which participants from across 
the Soviet Turkic world convene to debate and ultimately implement Latinization within 
the Soviet Union. As they debated the issue of reform at home, the Kemalists followed the 
Soviet language reforms with great interest, even sending Alibey Huseynzade and Fuat 
Köprülü as delegates to the 1926 Baku conference. The Kemalist interest in the Soviet 
reforms stemmed from several factors, including linguistic commonalities between Turkish 
and other Turkic languages that facilitated the continuation of the international Turkic 
reformist network both the Soviet and Turkish states inherited.48    
 In conclusion, my dissertation argues that the Soviet and Kemalist language 
reforms came about because of new knowledge, methods, and political conditions. I do not, 
however, argue that Latinization was an inevitable outcome of Turkic language reform. 
Turkology and the Turcophone press alone were not enough to ensure that Latinization 
would take root in either state. They did, however, contribute greatly to the conversation 
on reform once state actors began to push for Latinization as the only way forward on the 
path towards modernization. Realizing these reforms required the right political conditions, 
which came with the establishment of new ideological states in Russia and Turkey. These 
 
48 For trans-border perspectives of Turkic intellectual activity and politics, see Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism: 
From Irredentism to Cooperation (Indiana University Press, 1995); Leila Karahan, “Atatürk Dönemi Dil 
Kurultaylarında Türk Dünyası,” in Türk Dili S. 574 (Oct., 1999), pp. 845-853; A. Holly Shissler, Between 
Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); James H. Meyer, Turks 
Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856-1924 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014); Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the 
Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
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states and their actors, although coming to power through a highly contingent set of events 
(the 1917 Revolution and Russian Civil War as well as the Turkish War of Independence 
and the abolition of the Ottoman dynasty), seized upon the momentum towards language 
reform by instituting the most radically modernizing efforts: Latinization and purification. 
     
1c. Sources 
In researching the issue of language reform in both Soviet Azerbaijan and the 
Turkish Republic, I have relied on a number of Turkish, Azerbaijani, and French-language 
sources from the various periods central to my reconstruction of this story. I have grouped 
these sources according to their use in my dissertation. Chapter Two employs original 
editions of the Journal Asiatique. The official publication of France’s Societe Asiatique 
(founded in 1822), the Journal Asiatique is important to the narrative of Turkology because 
it featured important articles written by Vasili Radlov. Radlov was the premier 19th-century 
Turkologist whose works on Altai Turkic language and literature helped naturalize the 
notion that a “pure” proto-Turkic language existed and, if reconstructed, could unlock the 
history and identity of the modern-day Turkic peoples. As the Societe Asiatique’s 
membership included not just Turkologists from Western Europe, but also a few members 
of the growing Ottoman patriotic movement such as İbrahim Şinasi, I conclude that it was 
an instrumental part of how Turkology was absorbed by Turkic-speaking Muslim 
intellectuals in the Russian and Ottoman empires.   
To chart how Turkic intellectuals and reformers began to absorb the writings of 
European Turkologists and tailor them for nationalist purposes, I rely on newspaper and 
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journal articles produced by these debating communities. The issue is that these 
intellectuals were prolific in their writings as the post-1905 (for Russia) and 1908 (for the 
Ottomans) era was once that saw limited easing of censorship in the press and the 
proliferation of nationalist, reformists, Islamists, and modernist newspapers. I have limited 
my research of these sources to articles dealing directly with questions of how language 
informed expressions of national identity, both culturally and politically. I have collected 
these sources from various previously-published anthologies. For the debates over 
language and identity on the Azerbaijani side, I have found the Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyası (Anthology of Azerbaijan’s Publications), published in Baku in 2007, to be a 
vital source for intellectual debates over language and identity.  
 In fact, one of the most important discoveries I have made as I collected my sources 
was the exent to which Baku bookshops that sell old Soviet editions of reformist literature. 
Therefore, like Azərbaycan Publisistikası Antologiyası, a lot of my sources from the 
reformers in question are in either Cyrillic or newly-Latinized Azerbaijani. For example, 
one edition of Alibey Huseynzade’s periodical Fuyuzat I obtained was published in Baku 
in 1994 and still remains in the Cyrillic alphabet. Another edition I have of Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu’s Üç Mədəniyyət (Three Civilizations), which I will use to help explore Kemalist 
notions of civilization and culture in Chapter 4, was printed in Baku in 2007 but includes 
an Azerbaijani language that is repleate with Turkish words. Rather than using these 
editions merely because they are unique items, I will actively show that, in Baku today, 
these debates are being reread, rehashed, and retailored to accommodate Azerbaijan’s post-
Soviet future. This process began in the late 1980s, during Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost, 
when Soviet Azerbaijan began reprinting long-forgotten works from Turkic intellectuals 
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and nationalists in order to reacquaint the Azerbaijani public with the important voiced 
who shaped Azerbaijani identity.    
 For the chapters that focus on the Language Revolution in Kemalist Turkey, I 
would group my sources into two categories. The first set of sources, mostly used in 
Chapter Five, come from newspapers and publications from the era of the Alphabet Reform, 
beginning in late 1928 and continuing into 1929 and 1930. Housed in Beyazit Devlet 
Kütüphanesi near Istanbul University, these newspapers, contemporary to the Alphabet 
Revolution, provide crucial insight into how the Kemalist state sought to spread the New 
Turkish Alphabet after 1928 by mobilizing different segments of Turkish society in the 
cause of the new script. I draw from nationally-circulated newspapers based in large cities, 
such as Hakimiyet-i Milliye and Cumhuriyet, but also include more regional papers, such 
as Yeni Adana, in my analysis in order to get a fuller picture of how the language revolution 
was disseminated in more village and rural areas outside Istanbul and Ankara.  
 The second set of sources I used to analyze the Language Revolution in Turkey 
comes from the premier state institution devoted coordinating and overseeing the 
revolution on the ground. Increasingly, that task fell to the Turkish Language Commission 
(Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti, established in 1932 but subsequently renamed Türk Dil Kurumu 
in 1936, as the Arabic and Persian loanwords ‘tetkik’ and ‘cemiyet’ were removed and 
replaced with the Turkic word kurum). In particular, I have found the TDK’s publications 
Anadilden Derlemeler (Compilations from the Mother Tongue, 1932), Osmanlıcadan 
Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları Tarama Dergisi (Publication of Term Equivalents from Ottoman 
to Turkish, 1934), and Türk Dili (Turkish Language, 1932) to be valuable primary sources. 
Each demonstrates the process by which the language reformers, staffed in the TDK, first 
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mobilized a large cross-section of Turkish society (including government officials, 
teachers, lawyers, doctors, and other professional groups) to first collect “pure Turkish” 
words from their immediate locales and then send these words back to Ankara to be 
processed. Ultimately, the goal was to purge the language of Arabic and Persian loanwords 
and, in their place, promote the use of words the reformers believe more accurately 
reflected the Turkish character of their national language. In studying this process of 
language purification, I have found that Turkology, as well as other language reform 
movements in other contexts, continued to play an important role in forming the basis and 
justification for the Turkey’s own attempt at language reform.  
 In addition to newspapers and publications from the TDK, I have also employed 
the transcripts of the important conferences that first debated matters of language and its 
role in forging new identities and then passed resolutions to advance the cause of language 
reform. The previous published and translated transcripts of the 1926 Baku Turkological 
Conference were particularly helpful in gaining insight into the debates centered on the 
issue of Latinization  in the Soviet Union. In particular, I have used both an Azerbaijani 
and Turkish-language editions of the Baku Turkological Conference as the original 
transcripts are largely in Russian. 
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2. Turkology and the Development of “Turkic” Identity 
 
2a. Introduction 
Chapter Two will chart the influence of European Turkology on the debates over 
Turkic language reform. As Turkology gained influence in European, Russian, and 
Ottoman academic and intellectual circles, its practitioners undertook scientific, 
anthropological, and linguistic research to reconstruct the nationalist and historical origins 
of the Turks. Their contributions provided the modern foundations for Turkic identity 
constitution that centered on discourses of nation, race, and civilization. As Turkological 
discourses over Turkic language and identity began to circulate in Ottoman and Russian 
Turkic intellectual and reformist circles, the debates began to insist upon a unique sense of 
identity that reaffirmed the Turks’ centrality in the development of global language, history, 
and civilization.   
 Turkology is as an academic discipline that emerged in Europe during the mid-
nineteenth century. Broadly speaking, Turkology formed a specific branch of Oriental 
Studies that researched the historical origins of the Turkic peoples in Western and Central 
Asia. This field first gained traction among European (British, French, German, Russian, 
and Danish) and, later, Ottoman scholars whose concern was to transliterate and decipher 
ancient texts and inscriptions written in the earliest variant of the Turkic language.49 By 
the early 20th century, Turkological research had become specialized as Turkologists 
 
49 Many of the Ottoman scholars engaged in Turkological research on language and debates on Turkic 
identity would provide many of the tools upon which the Dil Devrimi in the 1930s was enacted. For an 
informative study of how the linguistic endeavors of this cadre of Ottoman scholars, such as Şemseddin 
Sâmi’s 1899 Kâmûs-ı Türkî [the Turkish Lexicon], endured even after the Language Revolution of the 
1930s, see: Ali Özgün Öztürk, “Dil Devrimi Sonrası Türkiye Türkçesine Giren Türkçe Kelimelerin Söz 
Varlığına Etkileri” (PhD diss., Gazi University, 2008). For a recent edition of Kâmûs-ı Türkî see Şemseddin 
Sâmi, Kâmûs-ı Türkî (İstanbul, Çağrı Yay., 1996).   
 
30 
undertook academic expeditions into Inner Asia to study the dialects and folklore of the 
indigenous Turkic groups, as well as locate and decipher ancient Runic inscriptions in the 
earliest form of Turkic. These explorers—such as Vasili Radlov and Vilhelm Thomsen—
gained near-heroic stature in the eyes of many Turkic reformist and nationalists. Heroic 
not only because they had uncovered the earliest forms of the Turkic language from 
inscriptions, but also for their extensive field research spent collecting poems and folklore 
from contemporary Turkic peoples in Siberia and Central Asia.  
By the early 20th century, Turkology had come into its own as an academic 
discipline, with Turkological departments emerging in Kazan and Budapest universities 
and in learned societies, such as the Asiatic Society of Paris (Société asiatique). Within the 
lifetimes of Radlov and Thomsen, Turkology had successfully emerged as a respected 
discipline across Europe, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. As Turkologists preoccupied 
themselves with the earliest traces of Turkic identity, the bulk of their research depended 
on mastery of the various Turkic languages and dialects. Knowledge of these languages, 
especially in their oldest forms, would allow them to collect a wide range of oral and 
written texts from the Turkic-speaking world, with a focus on literary and historical sources. 
Turkologists believed that these texts would reveal the authentic identity of the Turkic 
peoples. Using language as their point of departure, Turkologists sought to group speakers 
of Turkic into standardized language families.  
This approach is best seen in how Turkologists, such as Radlov and Thomsen, used 
the emerging field of linguistics to decipher the Orhon inscriptions located in present-day 
Mongolia. These inscriptions, the Turkologists estimated, preserved the primordial form 
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of the Turkic language from which all others had descended.50 The emphasis Radlov and 
Thomsen placed on the earliest written form of Turkic spurred conversations among 
Ottoman and Russian intellectuals about the link between this early idiom and Turkic 
national identity. Turkology’s emphasis on the primordial, and the disciplinary methods it 
employed to uncover the earliest known variant of Turkic, proved to be its most enduring 
legacy for the post-WWI language reformers.  
 
2b. History of Old Turkic  
 The complete origins of the Old Turkic language remain obscure, but linguists and 
historians have located its geography to the Tengri Mountains (Tian Shan 天山) located on 
today’s Chinese-Kyrgyz-Kazakh border. Old Turkic is sometimes referred to as “Orhonic 
Turkic” after the eponymous valley in outer Mongolia that houses the first inscriptions in 
the language. The prominent Turkologists Vasili Radlov and A. von Gabain called the 
language “Alttürkisch” (Old Turkish) whereas others, such as W. Bang, called it “Gök-
Turkish” after the Gökturks. 51  Linguists and Turkologists have debated the proper 
classification of Old Turkic. The majority accept that it belongs to the Altaic family, but a 
vocal minority of scholars posit that it is more likely an isolate whose connections to the 
Mongolian and Manchu languages were constructed through trade, intermarriage, and 
migration. Regardless, Old Turkic is the proto-Turkic language from which modern Azeri, 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tatar, Turkish, Turkmen, Uighur, Uzbek, and Yakut stemmed.  
 
50 For an account of how nineteenth century scholars began to classify languages into Indo-European and 
other language families, see J.P. Mallory & D.Q. Adams, “Discovery” in The Oxford Linguistic 
Introduction to Proto-Indo-European and the Proto-Indo-European World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), pp. 1-12.  
51 A. von Gabain, Alttürkische Grammatik mit Bibliographie, Lesestüken und Wörterverzeichnis, auch 
Neutürkisch (Otto Harrassowitz Wiesbaden, 1974).  
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 The earliest written accounts of the Turkic confederations and states come from 
Chinese sources from the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), which referred to the Turks as 
Xiongnu (匈奴).52 This name is related to the English term Hun and denoted the nomadic 
confederations that ruled the Central Asian steppe from the third century BCE to the first 
century CE. From the sixth to eighth centuries CE, the First (552-630) and Second (682-
742) Turkic empires governed the Mongolian plateau independent of China, then under 
Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE). Tang historians and diplomats called this region Tou-kioue 
(突厥 ). 53  The Turks themselves referred to their independent states as khaganates, 
denoting the rule of the emperor-figure of khan.  
 The first inscriptions of Old Turkic appeared in the Orhon Valley in Outer 
Mongolia with the rise of the Second Turkic empire (682-742). The Kül Tigin, Bilgä Kagan, 
Tonyukuk, Išbara Tarkan, and Külli Čor inscriptions are bilingual in Old Turkic and 
Chinese and focus on military victories, heroes, and edicts from the khan to his subjects.54 
The First Turkic empire (552-630 CE) witnessed a series of succession disputes, as 
aristocratic families vied for the title of khan. Around the beginning of the seventh century 
CE, the Turkic confederation had split into western and eastern Turks as well as into the 
First Uighur Empire (750-840 CE). This left the Turkic tribes exposed to the Tang dynasty, 
which conquered inner Mongolia in 630 CE. The Tang left the khan in place and granted 
Tou-kioue autonomy, but it remained a vassal state until 682 CE.  
 The Second or Eastern Turkic empire bequeathed the first written texts in Old 
Turkic. Tekin states that the Old Turkic alphabet was a mixture of Aramaic, Iranian, and 
 
52 Von Gabain, 2.  
53 Vilhelm Thomsen, Inscriptions de l’Orkhon Déchiffrées (Helsingfors, Imprimerie de la Société de 
Littérature Finnoise, 1896), 57.  
54 Talat Tekin, A Grammar of Orhon Turkic (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1968), pp. 9-10.  
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invented letters for Turkic vowels.55 He classifies the old alphabet as “a mixture of syllabic 
and alphabetic writing systems.”56 Turkologists and historians have guessed at the origins 
and impetus for the Old Turkic writing system. Some have proposed that the Old Turkic 
alphabet is a product of the Turks’ vassalage under the Tang whose written documents and 
monuments the Turks supposedly sought to emulate. Others have stated that the script is 
older than the period of Tang vassalage.  
 According to Vilhelm Thomsen, who first deciphered the Orhon inscriptions, the 
Old Turkic letters were documented as follows.  
 
(Figure 1. Thomsen’s Old Turkic Alphabet Chart)57 
 
55 Tekin, 27.  
56 Tekin, 30.  
57 Thomsen, 9.  
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These letters, which Thomsen transcribed from the Orhon inscriptions, are a combination 
of vowels, consonants, and syllables. Deciphering this alphabet, which Thomsen 
completed with the help of the accompanying Chinese on the monuments, allowed 
Turkologists to examine the vocabulary and grammar of Old Turkic. Examining these 
inscriptions led these scholars to conclude that the continuities between Old Turkic and 
the contemporary Turkic languages were strong. For example, I have copied some of 
Thomsen’s analysis of the alphabet in the figure below.  
 
(Figure 2. Thomsen’s Orhon Turkic Grammar)58 
Thomsen’s 
Examples 
English Translation Turkic Equivalent Grammatical 
Features 
tuta “holding” tutan  tut- “to hold”  
taγda “on the mountain” dağda (Turkish) 
Tog’da (Uzbek)  
taγ: tog’/dağ 
-da: in/on  
täñridä “in the sky” gökte (Turkish)  täñri: tanrı (Turkish) 
-dä: in/on 
qaγanqa “to the khan”  Han (Turkish)  -qa: Turkic dative  
jirkä “to the country” Yerde (Turkish) jir: yer (Turkish) 
-kä: Turkic dative  
any “him/her/it”  Onu (Turkish) -y: -u (Turkish 
accusative) 
 
58 Thomsen, 10.  
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añar “to him/her/it” Ona (Turkish) -a: -a (Turkish 
dative) 
anda “on him/her/it” Onda -da: -da (Turkish 
locative) 
ol “region” İl (Turkish)  
maña/mañä “to me” Bana (Turkish) 
Mənə (Azeri) 
Note that Turkish 
often swaps the –m 
for a –b.  
mān “I” Ben (Turkish) 
Mən (Azeri)  
 
(Table 1. Turkic Language Comparison with Orhon) 
As evidenced by Thomsen’s examples and my chart, many grammatical and vocabulary 
features Old Turkic language are still prevalent in modern Turkic languages. The 
vocabulary for mountain, khan, country, region, and the pronouns are all direct from Old 
Turkic and are intelligible across the Turkic languages. In the same vein, Thomsen 
demonstrated that the grammatical features of Old Turkic, including the case system and 
vowel harmony, were also preserved in the modern Turkic languages. Thus, once the 
alphabet was deciphered, Turkologists and linguists were able to draw greater comparisons 
between the Turkic languages to better understand how these languages originated from 
the Mongolian plateau. Though much of the vocabulary and grammatical features survived 
into modern Turkic languages, Turkologists in the nineteenth century were puzzled over 
the non-Turkic elements that had entered these languages in the millennium and a half that 
preceded the First and Second Turkic empires and witnessed the influx of Arabic and 






2c. The Journal Asiatique 
 In the August 1822 issue of the Journal Asiatique, Jean Saint-Martin, member of 
the Société Asiatique which issued the publication, wrote a literary critique of M. Garcin 
de Tassy’s Exposition de la Foi musulmane.59 The Société Asiatique was founded in 1822 
as a scholarly community dedicated to research on Asia, the Levant, and the Maghreb. The 
Society’s early journals reveals that its initial focus was centered on Chinese and Arabic 
sources. The format of journal articles usually included the original text, followed by a 
translation into French, and then the translator’s analysis. The Society and its journal, 
therefore, stressed a certain rigor in language analysis that entailed both a close reading of 
the given text and sufficient knowledge of the language in question to produce a 
commentary on it.  
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Saint-Martin went to great lengths in his 
review to praise de Tassy for his preparedness “in the knowledge of the Turkish language 
through serious study of Arabic and Persian.”60 In fact, proper knowledge of Turkish (or 
what one would designate as Ottoman Turkish today) underscored Saint-Martin’s entire 
review. De Tassy stated that the Ottomans had achieved such political significance and yet 
were often ignored by Orientalists who chose to specialize in Arabic and Persian. Part of 
the reason for neglect, Saint-Martin points out, is that the Ottoman language had absorbed 
so many Arabic and Persian features that anyone seeking to master Ottoman had to 
acquaint themselves with these two other languages before. He writes on this issue that 
 
59 The review appears in J. Saint-Martin, Critique Littéraire, in Société asiatique (France). Journal 
asiatique : ou recueil de mémoires, d'extraits et de notices relatifs à l'histoire, à la philosophie, aux sciences, 
à la littérature et aux langues des peuples orientaux... / publié par la Société asiatique. 1822, 109 – 115. 
Source: gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France.   
60 Saint-Martin, 110.  
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…Probably the most powerful [reason that Ottoman is understudied] is the 
necessity that one has to know Arabic and Persian beforehand to understand 
Turkish authors. These writers, in fact, are in the habit of inserting in their 
works not only an endless stream of Arabic and Persian words, but also 
entire sentences in these two languages; the sort that, in order to translate 
them exactly, it is necessary to know these two languages sufficiently 
without which one is open to committing grave errors.61   
 
Saint-Martin’s observations forecast the future reformist and scholarly debates over 
authenticity in the Turkic languages, particularly concerning “inauthentic” foreign 
elements in these languages at the time the Turkologists began to study them.62  
 Saint-Martin’s review, however, did not mention the Perso-Arabic Ottoman 
alphabet as a hindrance or obstacle to studying of the language. Rather, Saint-Martin, in 
1822, writes that “an endless stream of Arabic and Persian words” was to blame for the 
difficultly of reading in Ottoman Turkish, not the fact that it is written in the Arabic script.63 
This distinction made between what De Tassy differentiated as “Turkic” from “Perso-
Arabic” grew more acute in the story of Turkic Latinization and informed the future 
discourses of the Soviet and Kemalist Latinizers. Principle among this inherited rhetoric 
was that the Turkish language constituted a unique idiom which, throughout Islamic history, 
had been diluted by the influx of Arabic and Persian loanwords. The flow of Arabic and 
Persian loanwords into the Turkic languages was viewed by Turkologists, most notably 
Vasili Radlov, as a contaminant that defiled the purity of the Turkic tongue.  
 
61 Saint-Martin, 110.  
62 The Earliest grammars of the Ottoman language predated the nineteenth century attempts at linguistic 
classification. For example, in Thomas Vaughan’s 1709 A Grammar of the Turkic Language, which 
predates the formation of Turkology, there is no mention of the Turks’ ethnic or linguistic identity. 
Vaughan does mention the Ottomans’ Muslim identity, but in reference to its supposed barbarity compared 
to Protestant Englishmen. While asserting a difference in civility between Englishmen and Turks, 
Vaughan’s Grammar does not necessarily assert racial or ethnic differences between the two.   
63 Saint-Martin, 110.  
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In fact, the influx of Arabic and Persian loanwords had opened the Turkic languages 
up to a broader Islamic world—complete with its religious, philosophical, literary, and 
artistic components and sensibilities—and provided the Turkic groups with an international 
Islamic vocabulary set against a solidly-preserved Turkic grammatical and syntactical 
structure. Furthermore, many of the foreign loanwords adopted into Turkic languages were 
adapted to the particular pronunciation and orthographic needs of the Turks. Therefore, the 
early Turkologists, while making substantial advancements in deciphering and translating 
the earliest Turkic inscriptions (an achievement which Kemalist language revolutionaries 
capitalized on decades later), failed to appreciate the nuances with which the Turks brought 
Arabic and Persian loanwords into their languages. Instead, the influential generation of 
Radlov and Thomsen gravitated towards nationalistic and civilizational perspectives of 
Turkic identity and language that stressed the Turks’ Central Asian roots as the foundation 
of their national identity and viewed their conversion to Islam as the point at which they 
were subsumed into the Arabo-Persian Islamic civilization.   
 A mere ten years after Saint-Martin’s review, Arthur Lumley Davids, also a 
member of the Société Asiatique, published his Grammar of the Turkish Language, which 
he dedicated to Sultan Mahmoud II sultan, stylized “His Sublime Highness Sultan 
Mahmoud Khan.”64 The impact of Davids’ Grammar on how European scholars wrote 
about Turkish and other Turkic languages was profound for several reasons. One reason, 
as Kushner explains, was that Davids’ Grammar was “the first systematic grammar of 
Turkish to be published.”65 Thus, Davids used the latest scientific and linguistic methods 
to make connections between Ottoman and other Turkic languages. In turn, his Grammar 
 
64 Arthur Lumley Davids, A Grammar of the Turkish Language (London: Parbury & Allen, 1832).  
65 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London & New York: Routledge, 1977).  
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placed these languages and their speakers within the same category: ‘Turkic.’ This 
classification, which explained how the various Turkic peoples were related, left an 
important mark on the development of Turkish conscious.  
Although he was “imbued with respect and admiration for the Turks’ role in 
civilization,”66 Davids differentiated the Ottoman Turks from European nations based on 
civilizational components, such as language, Islam, and the structure of Ottoman society. 
Ethnocentric notions of European civilization often pervaded the European Turkological 
approach to deciphering the Turkic languages and history. Nevertheless, European 
Turkologists sought to devise and apply the most accurate nomenclature for their field of 
investigation.    
 In this vein, Davids begins his Grammar with a discussion of the various 
misnomers the Turks have incurred in Europe. The term Tartar was the most glaring 
example of the failure of European scholars to accurately classify the Turks. Davids affirms 
that the Turks were quite distinct from the Tartar peoples by stating that “The term Tartar 
is…not only vague and indefinite, but also improper; and can only be compared to the 
equally undistinguishable name فرنك Frank, by which, as if actuated by a desire of 
retaliation, the Orientals designate the various nations of Europe.”67 This insistence on the 
difference between the Turks and Tatars would reappear in the writings of Turkic 
nationalists and reformers, such as Alibey Huseynzade. Through an intensive study of 
Turkic languages, Davids sought to establish that the Turks constituted a distinct ethno-
linguistic category, apart from other Asiatic nationalities such as Mongols and Tatars.  
 
66 Kushner, 9.  
67 Davids, i.  
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Davids asserted the uniqueness of the Turkic tribes and confederations in the period 
when the Russian state expanded into Transcaucasia and Central Asia and colonial 
administrators applied the term Tartar to the indigenous Muslim inhabitants they now 
governed. There were even “Russo-Tartar” schools set up by the Russian state as it sought 
to integrate an indigenous cadre of Turko-Tatar Muslims into its colonial administration. 
These schools emphasized Russian-language education and promised placement within the 
local administration. The first group of Muslim intellectuals in Russia, who began to 
disavow the term Tartar in the late nineteenth century, emerged from these schools and 
worked as interpreters or language officials for the empire.  
As for the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, Davids sets them up as Europe’s 
civilizational equal. He states that, while European civilization has surpassed the Osmanlis 
in scientific advancement, the Ottomans, in fact, “in the Belles Lettres…do not yield to us 
the palm of superiority.” 68  What we have, then, is a scholarly attempt to nuance the 
Ottoman Turks and their civilization, albeit putting both in constant competition with 
Europe. Davids’ introduction affords the Ottoman Turks a development that ran parallel to 
Europe’s: they began in obscurity and barbarism before gradually progressing into an 
advanced civilization. Ottoman Turkish literature, especially its poetry, was taken as 
evidence of the Turks’ evolution into a civilized people. In order to appreciate this literature, 
and hence this civilization, a systematic grammar needed to be prepared so that readers 
could discover the depths of the language.       
Through its insistence on researching the Turks through their languages, Davids’ 
Grammar set the stage for Turkology’s pursuit of older forms of Turkic and its variants. 
 
68 Davids, lxv.  
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All nations and peoples, it was believed, had specific origins in the past and emerged 
through several historical stages. The Turks were no exception and, in order to discover 
their exact origins, one had to trace their languages all the way back to its earliest forms. 
As the disciplines developed in the nineteenth century, Turkologists turned to pursuit of 
the earliest forms of Old Turkic using the latest scientific and disciplinary methods.  
The Turkologists set out, therefore, to conduct linguistic research among the 
various Turkic confederations and peoples living in Central Asia and the Steppes. The 
advent of Russian colonial ambitions in the region provided these scholars with 
unprecedented access to Turkic peoples and the inscriptions their supposed ancestors had 
left behind. For Turkologists, such as Radlov and Thomsen, the Turkic peoples of Central 
Asia harbored atavistic knowledge of Old Turkic language, folklore, and customs that 
could help them uncover the “lost” past.  
 The advancement Turkology as an academic discipline had an important impact on 
Turkish-speaking Muslim intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire and Russian Caucasus. 
These intellectuals drew upon Turkology to form a scientific and historical basis for 
cultural and national revival among the Turkic peoples. In an age of European imperial 
encroachment, Turkic-speaking intellectuals and reformers believed that unlocking the 
Turkic national spirit could forge cross-border ties between the Turkic peoples in the 
Ottoman and Russian empires. For Turkic Muslim intellectuals, therefore, Turkology came 
with a powerful set of “historical truths” that served as the foundation for the renewal they 
hoped for. In other words, intellectuals in the Ottoman and Russian empires sought to forge 
linguistic, cultural, and religious connections based on common a shared historical past the 
Turks worldwide supposedly held. These intellectuals, therefore, followed Turkology with 
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great interest, joined European Turkological societies, and soon made their own 
contributions to the field. By the end of the nineteenth century, they emerged as an integral 
part of the discipline.  
  
2d. Vasili Radlov 
The expansion of the Russian Empire into the North Caucasus and Central Asia 
also informed and aided the development of Turkology, which by the end of the nineteenth 
century had become a complex, polyphonic field of inquiry. As the Russian conquest of 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia was underway, Turkological societies began to spring up 
across Europe. By 1851, for example, the membership of the Société Asiatique boasted 
several important Turkologists including Ilya Nikolaevich Berezine and the Azerbaijani-
born Mirza Kasem-Beg, whose own Grammar of the Turkish-Tatar language (1839) drew 
upon contemporaneous Turkological linguistic and ethnographic methodologies as it 
deconstructed Turkic grammar. Both of these scholars came from the Russian Empire and 
were employed in its educational institutions. European Turkological Societies, such as the 
Société Asiatique, also connected Russian Turkologists with Ottoman intellectuals.  For 
example, Ibrahim Şinasi, a giant of the Ottoman literary establishment, and Kemal Ahmet 
Efendi, the architect of the Ottoman public education system, 69 were also recorded as 
official members of the Société Asiatique in 1851.70 As language was a central subject of 
inquiry, Turkologists, Ottoman, and Transcaucasian intellectuals alike threw themselves 
 
69 Selçuk Akşin Somel, The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 41. 
70 Société Asiatique, “Liste des Membres Souscripteurs,” in Journal asiatique : ou recueil de mémoires, 
d'extraits et de notices relatifs à l'histoire, à la philosophie, aux sciences, à la littérature et aux langues des 
peuples orientaux, 1851.  
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head long into linguistic studies in search of rational and scientific answers to these 
questions.  
 When it came to research on the Turkic languages in the Russian Empire, the 
German-born Russian Turkologist, Wilhelm Radloff (hitherto referred to by his Russified 
name Vasili Radlov) towered above the rest in how prolific his research had become. A 
member of the Société Asiatique, and a contemporary of Kasem-Beg, Şinasi, and Kemal 
Ahmet Efendi, Radlov would ultimately achieve prominence through the publication of his 
multivolume dictionary of Turkic languages, as well as his phonological study Phonetik 
der Nördlichen Türksprachen (Phonetics of the Northern Turkish Languages), published 
in 1882.71 Radlov’s dictionary, entitled Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte, 
was a compilation of Turkic words with their German and Russian equivalents. In the 1960 
edition of Radlov’s dictionary, the reason why Radlov chose Russian Central Asia was that 
“the Altai Turks, who were not Muslim and thus spared before the Arab-Persian 
overgrowth, had the purest Turkish, and from there one should start the exploration of 
Turkish languages.”72  
Thus, Radlov’s study of Altai Turkic came from the fact that it had been untouched 
by the influx of Arabic and Persian words that came with the Islamization of the Turkic 
tribes. This signaled for Radlov and other Turkologists that Altai Turkic came closest to 
the Old Turkic language as it had been spared Islamization.  Altai Turkic, Radlov believed, 
had largely been preserved. In privileging Central Asia, Radlov broke with Davids and 
other scholars by avoiding travel to the Ottoman Empire and, instead, focusing his 
Turkological inquiries on the Turks of the Central Asian steppe. Radlov’s emphasis on the 
 
71 Dr. W. Radloff, Phonetik der Nördlichen Türksprachen (Leipzig: T.O. Weigel’s Verlag, 1882).  
72 Wilhelm Radloff, Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1960), 1.  
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earliest forms of Turkic languages in Central Asia would revolutionize Turkology by 
centering non-Ottoman Turkic languages within Turkological research.  Simply put, 
Radlov did not view Ottoman Turkish as a “pure” form of Turkic. Instead, Radlov pursued 
Central Asian Turkic languages that exhibited less Arabic or Persian influence. Radlov 
held that Ottoman, though at its heart a Turkic language, no longer reflected the essential 
characteristics of Turkic peoples or their ethos. In other words, Radlov believed that “The 
Ottoman [language] always remained alien…as the spoiled "Efendi jargon" in this (old!) 
language.”73 Radlov looked upon the Ottoman language with “regret…[at] the surpassing 
of Turkish "purity" of the Altai-Turkish” and, as such, “led to Radloff in the pursuit of the 
phonetics of ancient [Turkic] monuments to [avoid Ottoman’s] totally devious 
constructions.”74  Thus Vasili Radlov came to the conclusion that Ottoman Turks had 
deviated too far from their Turkic roots.  
Radlov is also most famous for his publication of the ancient Orhon Turkic 
inscriptions in Mongolia, an endeavor that was a major stepping-stone for deciphering them 
later.75 Praised by Ottoman and Transcaucasian intellectuals and nationalists throughout 
his life, Radlov’s memory would ultimately be expunged during the Stalinist era of the 
Soviet Union for the crime of “Pan-Turkism,” something the Soviet state believed would 
undermine its territorial integrity. Before he had reached prominence, and later infamy, 
however, Radlov built his reputation by traveling throughout Central Asia and publishing 
acute and detailed studies of various Turkic peoples and languages he encountered there. 
His travels coincided with the Russian conquest and colonization of the Central Asia 
 
73 Radloff, 1.  
74 Ibid.  
75 The inscriptions were first deciphered by Danish Turkologist Vilhelm Thomsen.   
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steppes, which no doubt provided Radlov with access to these often remote places as well 
as influenced how he wrote about the peoples he encountered.  
Radlov published one of his articles in the Journal Asiatique entitled “Observations 
on the Kirghiz.”76 The article shows the complex relation Radlov had to the Turks he was 
studying. On the one hand, the article reaffirms the imperial mission of the Russia state 
vis-à-vis the people of Central Asia. This, no doubt, hampers the supposed objectivity 
Radlov believed his analysis carried. For example, Radlov ends his study by discussing the 
economic relations between the Kirghiz and their neighbors in Bukhara and Kokand (both 
in present-day Uzbekistan), which, owing to their constant nomadic status, was a vital link 
in procuring goods such as silks, cottons, and other fineries. The nomadic lifestyle of the 
Kirghiz and their dependency on urban centers may very well have been the case, however, 
this led Radlov to conclude his entire study with the following observation: “We see, by 
this quick glimpse, that [the Kirghiz] are today at a degree of culture that, perhaps, is much 
lower to those that could be found a thousand years ago; what we can only attribute to 
nomadic life, that keeps a people in a mindless state, without allowing them any 
progress.”77 Thus we see that, for as nuanced as Radlov’s study was, it still subscribed to 
European notions of civilization on whose spectrum the “nomadic” Kirghiz Turks are 
“found” lesser than Europeans in terms of historical, literary, and cultural development.  
Despite his ethnocentric conclusion, many of Radlov’s observations actually sought 
to challenge preconceived notions of the Steppe peoples, particularly the erroneous labels 
that tended to group all of the complex confederations together. He therefore deployed 
 
76 M. Radloff, “Observations sur les Kirghiz,” in Journal asiatique : ou recueil de mémoires, d'extraits et de 
notices relatifs à l'histoire, à la philosophie, aux sciences, à la littérature et aux langues des peuples 
orientaux... / publié par la Société asiatique. October 1863, pp. 309 – 328.  
77 Radlov, 328.  
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these same notions of civilization to examining the erroneous labels given to the Kirghiz, 
including Kazakh by the Russian Cossacks, Bourout by the Chinese, and Kara Kirghiz by 
past European explorers. All of these names, argued Radlov, were baseless and completely 
unknown to the Kirghiz themselves.78  
Instead of relying on what he believed to be misnomers, Radlov decided to conduct 
an etymological inquiry of these names and, as a result, settled on Kirghiz after recording 
the origin story of the confederation. This foundation myth of the confederation held that 
all had descended from forty maidens (kirk kiz in Turkic) and thus, everyone was bound to 
that origin as Kirghiz. What we see at work here, then, is Radlov’s use of oral testimonies 
and foundation myths, which he acquired through knowledge of the local languages, to 
classify this particular confederation. Furthermore, Radlov describes the confederation’s 
folklore, customs, living arrangements, and nomadism as important components that make 
up a Kirghiz individual.  
Nevertheless, Radlov does not view the Kirghiz as completely static or pristine in 
their makeup. He recognizes that, throughout the history of the confederation, there was 
much interaction, intermarriage, and assimilation of customs, culture, and lifestyle, though 
not always voluntary or peaceful, with surrounding confederations and states. In fact, 
Radlov documents that, despite a long history of interaction with various other peoples, the 
Kirghiz “are not the original peoples of this area [and that] all the other Muslim peoples 
distrust them and do not want to have relations with them: neither the Kazakhs, nor the 
Sarts of Kokand, nor the Tatars of Kachgar (Uighurs, Khou-za in Chinese) look upon them 
as brothers.”79  
 
78 Radlov, 310.  
79 Radlov, 315.  
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As for the Turkic components of the Kirghiz, Radlov comes down firmly on the 
side that, although they have a unique origin story and customs, their language can only be 
classified as Turkic. Trying to skirt the question of the confederation’s racial origins, 
Radlov writes that “As for the origin of the Kirghiz, I will not dare to affirm anything. 
[Some scholars] classify them among the five tribes of the Germanic peoples; other writers, 
quite the opposite, believe they are of Finnish origin, and finally, still others [believe they] 
are of the Turkic race.”80 However, as much as he leaves the racial classification of the 
Kirghiz to the reader, Radlov does confirm that “the language the Kirghiz speak now is a 
purely Turkic dialect that even provides such a large resemblance with the dialect spoken 
in the Altay [Mountains].”81   
Radlov’s discussion of the language classification of Kirghiz shows that, already 
by the mid-nineteenth century, ideas about a single Turkic people were already taking form. 
These ideas would go off into several important directions: one camp would hold that the 
Turkic peoples were a unique group and the other would put forth the idea that the Turkic 
peoples were subsumed, along with Finns, Hungarians, Koreans, and Mongolians, into a 
larger classification of peoples called the Turanic peoples. At the center of these ideas was 
the question of language itself and, thus, Turkologists and others would focus their studies 
on the grammar, syntax, vocabulary, and orthography of various Turkish ‘dialects’ in order 
to piece the origins of the Turks together. 
Beyond his article for Société Asiatique, Radlov conducted many more inquiries on 
the Turkic languages. One of the cornerstones of Radlov’s career, and of the field of 
Turkology more generally, was his multivolume Proben der Volkslitteratur der Türkischen 
 
80 Radlov, 317.  
81 Radlov, 318.  
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Stämme Süd-Sibiriens (South Siberian Oral Literature) published in 1866. For this work, 
Radlov collected poems, proverbs, stories and folklore from among the different Turkic 
peoples he lived and worked, including the Altai peoples believed to be the original Turkic 
peoples. Each volume of this massive work was dedicated to a different Turkic language, 
including Altai, Tuvin, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Crimean Tatar.82  
In the first volume of his Proben, Radlov collected and published proverbs, epics, 
and stories from the Altai peoples. Collecting and synthesizing these different folkloric 
works meant that they had to be transcribed in a way that could be accessible to someone 
from outside of these societies. In other words, Radlov needed to devise a system of 
transcription from to set down what was an oral tradition into written form. He devised, 
therefore, a 40-letter alphabet for Altai and Tuvin, the languages he worked with for his 
first volume. Radlov’s alphabet was based on Cyrillic, but included extra characters and 
vowel markers to correspond with all the possible sounds of both languages.83   
Works like the Proben helped Turkologists see the links between these languages 
better.  Furthermore, these poems and stories also shed light on the very foundation of the 
Turkic peoples. Soon, Turkologists and Turkic intellectuals in the Ottoman and Russian 
empires were supplied with ample evidence of the ancient traditions and history of the 
Turks. By making the comparison between these works of literature, as well as the 
similarities between the languages, both the Turkologists and Turkic intellectuals could 
 
82 V.V. Radloff, South Siberian Oral Literature: Turkic Texts Volume 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1967), x – xi.  
83 The vowels of Radlov’s devised alphabet were A, Ä, E, O, Ö, Y, Ÿ, I, ы, and ẙ. The ä corresponded to a 
flat e (ə sound in Azerbaijani); the Ÿ to a mid-range between ü and i; the ы to the Turkish ı; and ẙ to the ü 
in both German and Turkish. For the more particular letters he devised, Radlov referred to the Ottoman 
language. For example, Radlov’s letter for the Ñ, which he transcribed as an h with a diacritic mark on the 
lower right, was referred to as the Ottoman نك. What is immediately apparent when reading Radlov’s 
Proben is how familiar many of the words are to speakers of other Turkic language. This is even the case 
for Turkish or Azerbaijani, which are the most removed from Altai.  
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begin to chart when a pristine, original Turkic language, Altai in this case, emerged. With 
Altai under their belt, both groups set out to dig deeper into ancient forms of Turkic to 
uncover more history and knowledge about the past. 
 
2e. Léon Cahun  
Along with Radlov, there were other late-nineteenth century Turkologists who 
made their own investigations into the linguistic and historical beginnings of the Turks. 
One important work was Léon Cahun’s Introduction à l’histoire de l’asie (1896).84 Cahun 
begins his history, which spans from the origins of the Turks and Mongols until 1405, with 
several observations. First, he states that the Turks and the Mongols are “intermediaries 
between the Persian and Chinese civilizations.”85 Cahun’s conception of the intermediary 
stemmed from period of the First and Second Turkic empires. However, he recognized that, 
in his own time, the Turks and the Mongols have subdued both Iran and China. Cahun 
states that the Turks and Mongols “first seized in these two neighboring societies the 
Persian and Chinese languages, the ideas and the knowledge they found at their disposal” 
and then incorporated these features into their government structures. 86  Persian and 
Chinese, rather than Turkic languages, became the languages of the court and of learning 
in the new Turco-Mongol states. What ensued, therefore, was a complex exchange of 
culture in which the Turco-Mongols were at once the dispensers and receivers. In other 
words, though they controlled the states and day-to-day politics of the regions they 
 
84 Nationalists, such as Ziya Gökalp, Necib Asım, and Yusuf Akçura, credit Cahun’s book as one that had a 
large impact on Turkology and Turkish national consciousness in the late nineteenth century. Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk even possessed a heavily annotated copy of the book, which he had read in his youth, and 
was also greatly influenced by Cahun’s conclusions. 
85 Léon Cahun, Introduction à l’histoire de l’asie: Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405 (Paris: Libraires 
de la Société des Gens de lettres, 1896), vii.  
86 Cahun, viii.  
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conquered, these dynasties were ultimately conquered by the culture they had subjugated, 
as they had to assimilate it into their own regimes.  
Cahun does not mean to say the Turks or the Mongols are somehow deficient in 
their “failure” to fully develop their own civilization. Rather, he was making a point about 
the continued separateness of the Turks and Mongols from all of those around them. They 
were still, in Cahun’s estimation, pure, pristine peoples who harkened back to the 
characteristics of their ancestors. Though he believed the Turks had not reached the cultural 
heights of the Chinese and Persians, Cahun does list the virtues of the Turks: “they embody 
the military spirit; their virtues are those of true men of war, courage, obedience, 
uprightness, common sense; they have been just rulers, firm administrators. Far from 
distrusting art and science, they have honored intellectual endeavors; they have tried to 
incorporate them and make them natural [to their own rule].”87   
On the question of language, Cahun categorizes the Turkic tongues within the 
family of “Eastern European and Continental Asia” that includes Finnish, Hungarian, 
Mongolian, and Manchu. 88  Cahun further divides these languages into subgroups, 
including Finno-Hungarian, Mongol, Manchu, and Turkic. What unified these language 
groups, despite not having a known common ancestor, were certain grammatical features 
they all shared.89 For one, these languages shared agglutinative features in which they 
“…possess a particular faculty that is for nuancing action, expressing all modes of action 
in a single verb while introducing particles between its monosyllabic radical and its 
agglutinative suffix.”90  
 
87 Cahun, ix.  
88 Cahun, 33.  
89 Cahun, 33.  
90 Cahun, 34.  
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Secondly, these languages exhibited vowel harmony, at least in the spoken variant. 
Cahun states that “a word such as bit-mak would be barbaric to a Turk; Bit-mek [rather] is 
necessary. The Turk changes the name Mohammed to Mahamat or Mehemed [based on the 
principle of vowel harmony].”91 In explaining the distinctive features of these languages, 
what many would call the Altaic languages, Cahun drew upon the work of past linguists. 
Like Radlov, Cahun believed that these languages, especially the Turkic languages, 
maintained their purity in the face of contact with Persian, Chinese, and Arabic. Though 
the Turks had been absorbed into the World of Islam, which Cahun writes at length on, and 
into Persian and Chinese civilization, they managed to emerge from the process still unique 
and with all of their original heroic, linguistic, and historical distinctions.  
It is easy to see, therefore, why a work such as Cahun’s would have such broad 
appeal among the Ottoman and Transcaucasian intellectuals. For one, his work reinforced 
a growing orthodoxy that the Turks constituted their own ancient nation. It was precisely 
the way in which Cahun tapped into the desire to explore the ancient origins of the nation 
that made his work so important for Soviet and Kemalist reformers in the future. Cahun, 
though stressing that the Turks never quite established a full civilization, nevertheless 
emphasized their heroic qualities and their openness towards cultural innovation. For many 
nationalists, to whose societies the very doctrine of nationalism seemed an innovation, 





91 Cahun, 34.  
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2f. The Orhon Inscriptions and the Ancient Turkic “Nation”  
During an expedition funded by the Russian Geographical Society, Nikolai 
Yadrinstev, a prominent Turkologist of the late nineteenth century, led a team of specialists 
through the Orhon Valley in Mongolia. During this expedition, Yadrinstev’s team came 
across the famous Orhon Inscriptions (Orhon Yazıtları), which was comprised of dual Old 
Turkic-Chinese engravings on stone columns. Two years later, in 1891, the Russian 
Academy of Sciences sent a second expedition to the Orhon Valley, this time accompanied 
by Radlov. More Old Turkic inscriptions were discovered there and Radlov was tasked 
with publishing an accurate transcription of the Old Turkic and translation of the 
inscriptions themselves. It was Vilhelm Thomsen, the Danish Turkologist, who ultimately 
deciphered the Orhon Inscriptions and cracked the Old Turkic alphabet. Thomsen 
published these findings in French in 1899.92  
Thomsen’s decipherment and analysis of the Orhon Valley Inscriptions was a major 
advancement in Turkology. His influence was such that future Turkologists and Turkic 
intellectuals alike viewed these Orhon Inscriptions as an essential hallmark of their 
historical and national identity. From his initial publication of the Inscriptions’ 
decipherment, there was considerable debate among Turkologists as to the finer points of 
the translation Thomsen put forward. His 1916 Studies, published by the Finno-Hungarian 
Society, would give Thomsen the opportunity to clarify his work and answer some of his 
critics. For example, in the first section of his Studies entitled  ) >, un1q, on1q, Thomsen 
posits that the Orhan Inscriptions speak of the ancient ‘Ten Tribes’ of the Turks. These ten 
 
92 The Finno-Hungarian Society in Helsinki published a second edition of his work in 1916. This edition, 
which I use in this section, is entitled Studies Concerning the Interpretation of the Turkic Inscriptions of 




tribes were designated by the name on oq, meaning ‘ten arrows,’ a reference to how they 
were divided.93  
The leader of each tribe, Thomsen hypothesized, was gifted an arrow to show his 
tribe’s eternal connection to the greater the Turkic nation. Thomsen pushed forward his 
observation in contrast to Radlov’s that held on oq actually meant ‘ten tribes,’ rather than 
‘ten arrows.’ Citing Thomsen’s failure to provide an accurate translation, Radlov explained 
that the significance of ‘ten arrows’ lie in the fact that the Turkic tribes were separate 
entities from the onset. As such, they were not primordially united into a single Turkic 
nation. Radlov translated the Old Turkic word 1q as uq, meaning tribe, rather than ok 
meaning arrow.94 Thomsen, however, was concerned that the radical (1 )’s sound had not 
yet been sufficiently documented and that it designated a vowel between an o and u. For 
Thomsen, understanding the exact vowels was crucial in understanding the underlying 
message of the Inscriptions themselves.    
These debates over the origins of the Turks were followed by Ottoman and Russian 
Turko-Tatar intellectuals and reformers who coopted them to argue for more nationalistic 
understandings of the Turkic past. The origin story of the Turks as a single nation that had 
subsequently divided was more credible, in Thomsen’s view, if they had done so 
voluntarily, each taking an arrow to symbolize their eternal attachment to each other. Ten 
tribes, on the other hand, was too ambiguous: the question that remained with this 
hypothesis was one between ten distinct tribes from the beginning or a division of a single 
tribe into ten.  
 
93 Both the word for ten ‘on’ and arrow ‘oq’ survive in modern Turkish (ok) and Azerbaijani (ox). 
94 Vilhelm Thomsen, Etudes Concernant L’Interprétation des Inscriptions Turques de la Mongolie et de la 
Sibérie (Helsinki: Société Finno-Ougrienne, 1916), 6.  
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In addition to the ‘ten arrows’ that designated the division of the Turkic peoples 
into ten tribes, Thomsen wrote about the mythical land of Tou-kiue whose ruler was 
identified as “the ancestor of the Eastern Turkish chieftains.”95 It was in this land that the 
first Turkic Empire, made up of both a state of Eastern Turks and one of Western Turks, 
first came to prominence. This empire was fractured, according to Thomsen’s translation 
of the Orhon Inscriptions, when the Western Turks sought complete independence from 
their “Eastern brethren.”96 Nevertheless, research on the mythic land of Tou-kiue, the ten 
tribes of the Turkic nation, and the early history of the Turkic empire imbued Turkic 
intellectuals and nationalists with a primordial identity that was used to generate cultural 
and linguistic renewal.  
As nationalist movements began to take root among Turkic reformers and 
intellectuals, the question of linguistic heritage moved into the foreground of debates and 
programs to modernize society. Turkic-speaking reformers read and coopted Turkological 
scholarship and methods of inquiry to legitimize their own linguistic and political goals. 
Though its origins lay in Europe, the discipline of Turkology proved instrumental in 
establishing Turkic ethno-linguistic identities. The central credo of the Turkologists was 
that the Turks belonged to a unique and primordial nation. This nation, while part of the 
greater Islamic community, was nevertheless distinct and its recovery levied introspection 
that would sideline non-Turkic Muslims. Turkic reformers in both the Ottoman and 
Russian empires, therefore, centered language as an essential component of their effort to 
disseminate this new national ethos as well as modernize society in its pursuit.    
 
 
95 Thomsen, 18.  
96 Thomsen, 18.  
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2g. Conclusion: Turkology and Language Reform  
 This chapter outlined the major contributions to Turkology as well as how this 
European discipline provided “scientific” foundations for Turkic nationalisms in both the 
Russian and Ottoman empires. Turkology’s insistence on language as an essential marker 
of difference influenced the drive to Latinize and purify the Turkic languages in the 1920s 
and 1930s in both the Turkish Republic and Soviet Union. Here, there was a direct link 
between the academic output of scholars, such as Radlov and Thomsen, and the subsequent 
movement among language reformers in the post-WWI period to enact Latinization and 
purification.  
Their task, however, was to build a new national language for the Turkish nation. 
This language, they believed, should be as Turkified as possible, hence as many Arabic 
and Persian terms should be expunged from the official lexicon as possible. 1934, the year 
the Turkish Language Association published its periodical, was the height of the 
purification movement in Turkey. Thus, Radlov’s dictionary, far from acquiring dust on a 
library shelf, became an important resource for the purification movement of the 1930s in 
Turkey.  
For example, in the mid-1930s, the Turkish Language Association published its 
Collection Periodical of Terms from Ottoman to Turkish (Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz 
Karşılıkları Tarama Dergisi), shortened to Tarama Dergisi. This publication, the product 
of the Central Committee Organization of the Turkish Language Association, sought to 
draw upon not only the contemporary Turkish dialects spoken across Anatolia, but also to 
utilize past scholarship on the Turkic languages in the construction of a new national 
Turkish idiom. The introduction of the Tarama Dergisi states that the TDK “considered on 
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the one hand a comparison of the Turkish language with the oldest Turkic dialects and with 
other language families and, on the other hand, creating an essential Turkish vocabulary 
with a lexicon of dialects and historical and comparative grammar with today’s Turkish.”97 
The association’s use of Turkological works to access the earliest forms of Turkic 
served a couple of important objectives. First, as the periodical states, the Language 
Revolution enacted by the association was for the purpose of “collecting and producing the 
treasures of the Turkish language found in old books and in the people’s language.”98 Thus, 
the TLA enacted the Language Revolution based on both academic works of Turkology 
and on the collection of contemporary words spoken in different parts of the country. In 
both cases, both combing over Turkological works and collecting vocabulary from all 
corners of the new Turkish nation-state, the TLA privileged words of verified Turkic origin 
over those who entered the language as foreign loanwords. Both elements, the scholarly 
and the nationalist mobilization efforts, comprised the Kemalists’ plan to “purify” the 
Turkish language.              
 Radlov’s work was essential to their endeavors at language purification because it 
housed a vocabulary from the eastern Turkic languages that was largely “preserved” from 
the onslaught of Arabic and Persian words that came with Islamization.99 In fact, in a 
section outlining the various written sources that the association drew from in their lexical 
compilation, the TLA states that “The four volume Lexicon of the Turkic Dialects, written 
 
97 Türk Dil Kurumu (T.D.T.C.), Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları Tarama Dergisi (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1934), 5.  
98 Ibid.  
99 By Islamization, I mean the process, lasting over several centuries, in which the Turkic tribes began to 
convert to Islam. The conversion of various Turkic tribes happened for a number of reasons, including 
economic and military advantages and also the power of the Sufi movement that proselytized in Central 
Asia. As the Turkic tribes converted to Islam, their language was infused with a new string of loanwords 
from Arabic and Persian. Many Turko-Muslim states, such as the Seljuk Turks, adopted Persian as the 
language of their courts and of literature, whereas Arabic became the official language of religious matters.  
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by Radlov, is one of the most valuable works [upon which they drew], perhaps the most 
important.” 100  The association presents Radlov’s qualifications as an academic in 
Turkology, listing the Russian institutions that he taught and researched in. From there, the 
periodical presents an extensive bibliography of Radlov’s scholarly contributions to 
Turkology as well as a short description of why the particular work was consulted in the 
effort to collect authentic Turkic words. 
Kemalist and Soviet reformers on the whole considered Turkology a scientific (ilmi 
in Turkish or elmi in Azerbaijani) and therefore sound basis upon which to construct their 
historical, linguistic, and cultural identity.  The rise of the two revolutionary states in Russia 
and Turkey demonstrated that Turkology could be recycled to legitimize new nationalist 
or socialist objectives, especially as they pertained to language reform. As they absorbed 
the latest Turkological discoveries and general scholarship, both Kemalist and Soviet 
language reformers expanded upon and reworked it to imbue their own reformist goals 
with academic and scientific legitimacy. 
Turkology, however, fell out of favor in the Soviet Union towards the beginning of 
World War Two. As such, much of the Turkological scholarship was censored by the 
Soviet authorities and many proponents of Turkology were imprisoned or executed as 
“pan-Turkist” fifth columns against the state. The once-celebrated Radlov and Thomsen 
soon fell out of favor and were largely forgotten. In the Turkish Republic, Turkology was 
also not always viewed with benevolence by the Kemalists, who increasingly sought to 
sever Anatolian Turks’ historical and linguistic ties with their Turkic brethren in Central 
Asia. Downplaying the linguistic and cultural connections with Turkic peoples outside the 
 
100 Türk Dil Kurumu (T.D.T.C.), Osmanlıcadan Türkçeye Söz Karşılıkları Tarama Dergisi (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1934), 43.  
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boundaries of the Turkish Republic was paramount in promoting a unique sense of 
Anatolian Turkish identity and language that had only tangential connections. More than a 
mere wing of European Orientalism, Turkology’s connection to Turkish nationalism, even 
in the mind of Soviet and Kemalist authorities, was firmly established in the Interwar Era.  
 Analyzing Bilâl Şimşir’s work, for example, demonstrates the influence of 
Turkological scholarship. In his 2008 edition of The Turkish Writing Revolution, Şimşir 
relies heavily on Turkological scholarship to present this history of the Turkic language 
and its alphabets. He begins his history of the Turkic alphabet citing the scholarship of both 
Thomsen and Radlov: “Köktürk inscriptions, since the 18th century, caught the attention of 
scientists [bilim adamları], however, for a long time they remained unreadable. Finally, the 
Danish scientist Vilhelm Thomsen, in 1893, deciphered the Köktürk inscriptions and was 
successful in reading the Orhon inscriptions.”101 Here, Şimşir uses the terms “bilim adamı” 
and “bilgin,” both of which mean scientist or scholar, to characterize Thomsen. Turkology 
remains, even in the 21st century, to be viewed as bilim, science or knowledge, for certain 
historians of Turkey.  
Following the previous generation of Turkologists, Soviet and Kemalist reformers 
too viewed this rediscovered primordial Turkic language as embodying the unique national 
characteristics and identity of Turks across Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Both 
the early Turkologists and post-WWI Soviet and Kemalist language reformers believed 
primordial Turkic was subsequently altered from its essential state by non-Turkic foreign 
cultures (the Chinese, Persians, Arabs, and Russians for example). The focus on primordial 
Turkic and its subsequent “degeneration” at the hands of foreigners raised questions among 
 
101 Şimşir, 1.  
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the language reformers as to whether the Turkic variants in use at the time still reflected 
the unique national characteristics of Turks themselves.  
The shift towards incorporating Turkology into the various intellectual and 
reformist programs in the Soviet and Kemalist experiences entailed the internalization of 
the ideas of positivism, scientism, and nationalism.102 By incorporating positivism, science, 
and nationalism into their various political programs, Turkic intellectuals and reformers 
from the Ottoman, Russian, and even Persian empires sought answer questions about the 
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3. Language Reform and Nationalism in the Pre-WWI Turcophone Press 
 
3a. Introduction  
 This chapter begins with a letter from Namık Kemal to his associate Menemenli 
Rifat Bey, dated August 3rd, 1878. A prominent figure within the Young Ottoman patriotic 
movement, Kemal had become an intellectual and political figure who disseminated his 
ideas through the new literary establishment and print culture taking root during the 
Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876).103 In his letter, Kemal shares his views on the issue of 
reforming or Latinizing the Ottoman language, noting that “this issue of change (tebdil) or 
reform (islah-ı hat) has become one of public discussion even since [he] entered the world 
of publishing.”104 First, Kemal systematically compares the current Ottoman alphabet with 
the Latin script to determine which letters and sounds would be preserved or lost in his 
hypothetical switch to the Latin script. In one section, he writes  
 Latin letters have a C, an S, a K, and a G. As for our language, even 
though there are kafs (ك) that are read as yâ (ی), nun (ن), or se (ث)، there is 
still need for the kef (ڭ) for Teŋrı (تنکری), değildim (دكلدم), kâtip (كاتب) along 
with a kaf (ق) and a sin (س). With what letter would the ghayn (غ  ( be 
expressed? If H is used to substitute for any one of these letters, he (ه), hâ 
    how will the remaining two be written?105 ,(خ) or hı ,(ح)
 
Taking aim at Europe and the Tazimat reformers keen to blindly graft its culture and 
government institutions onto Ottoman society, Kemal continues:  
In nations that use the Latin script, a man is not able to read everything he 
sees within 15 or 20 days; [Europeans’] spelling problems are much greater 
than ours which shows the need for years of effort just to be able to write. 
In French spelling, there are many who hesitate to write a word with the C 
 
103 Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish 
Political Ideas (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000); Erik Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History 
(London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005); Carter Vaugh Finley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).  
104 Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, Namık Kemal’in Hususi Mektupları II: İstanbul ve Midilli Mektupları 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1969), 190.  
105 Tansel, 190-191.  
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or the S; even the famous [Adolphe] Thiers said ‘we [French] are both the 
slaves to the typesetter and dictionaries.106   
 
Namik Kemal’s letter illustrates the general climate of debate over the Ottoman 
language and its alphabet in the nineteenth century. As is evidenced from his letter, issues 
of alphabetic and language reform became pressing, as Ottoman society underwent the 
sweeping reforms of the Tanzimat era. These reforms were aimed primarily at establishing 
a shared patriotic identity for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of their religious confession. 
Under this new political ideology, called Ottomanism, the Tanzimat reformers attempted 
to “base the [Ottoman] state on a new kind of identity, rather than the traditional Islamic 
one, and so foster loyalty among all ethnic and religious groups living within the 
boundaries of the Empire.”107  
In instituting these reforms, Sultan Abdülmecit I (1839-1861), grand vizier Mehmet 
Reşit Paşa (who held top diplomatic and governmental posts from 1834 to 1858), and the 
bureaucracy at large implemented European-style reforms to bring “everyone living in 
Ottoman territory under a single national designation [Ottoman] and [aimed at] recognizing 
equal rights and responsibilities without harming the empire’s Islamic traditions.”108 In 
achieving this, the Tazimat reformers aimed to prevent the spread of ethnic separatist 
movements that were often used as proxies for the expansion of European imperial interests. 
The main current of thought flowing through the Tanzimat period was “Ottomanism,” 
namely “Ottoman patriotism [an] affirmation of the equality of all Ottoman subjects before 
the law regardless of religion.”109  
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107 David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (Londong: Frank Cass, 1977), 7; Masami 
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 Though couched as the only way to preserve the Ottoman system, these Tanzimat 
reforms undermined the old paradigm and set the empire on a new course towards 
Balkanization and nationalism. Devised and implemented by European-educated officials 
called “French-knowers” (Frankofonlar), the Tanzimat reforms overturned the traditional 
institutions—the Janissaries, the timar/iltizam taxation systems, and the local power of the 
ayans—in favor of state centralization in the hands of the modern imperial bureaucracy 
and of Europeanizing the Ottoman military, government ministries, and education 
system.110 Enacted by state elites, the Tanzimat reforms sparked major controversies and 
debates within Ottoman intellectual circles. These debates were central to the rise in 
popularity of the Young Ottoman clique headed by Namik Kemal.  
Kemal critiqued the Tanzimat reforms for discarding Ottoman-Islamic traditions, 
customs, ideals, and institutions to remake the empire in the mold of modern Europe. 
Furthermore, Kemal also “argued that most of the reforms implemented by the Ottoman 
state for the sake of seeming civilized through superficial Westernization at the expense of 
real “civilization,” which had to include democracy, participation, a parliament, and 
political freedom.”111 Advocating for the expansion of liberal freedoms to protect traditions 
from state centralization, Namik Kemal and his fellow Young Ottomans contributed to 
debates over Ottoman language reform. This debate on language was connected to larger 
conversations over the interplay between modernist reform, Ottoman-Islamic tradition, and 
identity. The various contributors, editorialists, academics, and intellectuals debated the 
 
110 William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East 5th edition (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2013), 76; Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History 3rd edition (London and New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2009), 44.  
111 Cemil Aydın, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Asian Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 36. 
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appropriate degree of Europeanization in Ottoman society, especially pertaining to 
borrowing French loanwords in the language. The Young Ottomans, therefore, weighed in 
on debates over language reform debates as part of their overall political landscape that 
included constitutionalism, citizenship, and equality of all Ottoman citizens under the law.  
Kemal’s letter, therefore, illustrates the general climate of debate and reform in the 
nineteenth-century Ottoman context. Conscious that the expansion of European empires 
necessitated reform and modernization, Namık Kemal nevertheless strove to preserve 
Ottoman traditions and symbols, including the alphabet, amidst the political and social 
transition the empire was undergoing through reform. In the case of the Ottoman alphabet, 
Kemal argues that “adopting the Latin letters into our language for reform is much like 
supposing that wearing French clothes is reason for property reform,” and, therefore, 
amounted to a superficial change of script that would create as many orthographic issues 
as the current script.112  
In a subsequent letter to Menemenli Rifat Bey, Namik Kemal again addressed the 
issue of adopting “French letters” (Firenk harfleri). Though the Tanzimat reformers and 
other Latinizers believed that adopting the script would bring benefits to the Ottoman 
language in terms of publishing and literacy, Namik Kemal challenge this assertion. Not 
only would the adoption of Latin letters pose difficulties and be inconvenient for the 
Muslim community, whose literary traditions were tied to the wider Islamic milieu, but 
Kemal also argues that the non-Muslim Greeks and Armenians would also be opposed to 
substituting their own alphabets with Latin letters: “even the Greeks and Armenians would 
not accept reading and writing with French letters as both of their alphabets are one 
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thousand times superior to the Latin letters.”113 Thus, Namik Kemal advocated for using 
previously-existing traditions and symbols in the modernization of the empire.     
Focusing on Namik Kemal’s wider intellectual and reformist networks, this chapter 
will focus on how debates over language and national identity developed in the nineteenth 
and twentieth-century “trans-imperial Turcophone press.”114 This period, spanning from 
the 1860s through 1914, laid the intellectual and nationalist groundwork for the future 
Soviet and Kemalist language reforms. In the decades before World War One, a small but 
forceful cadre of Turkic-speaking Muslim reformers and intellectuals in the Ottoman and 
Russian empires began to forge intellectual and political networks within “a trans-imperial 
Turcophone public space.”115 Using print media as their primary instrument, the reformers 
and intellectuals, who built this “trans-imperial” network, used it to launch vigorous 
debates over the political, religious, and economic transformation of their societies.116 
In these efforts, contributors to this newly-emerging public space of debate and 
communication “imagine[d] new kinds of ties among themselves, new collective affinities, 
and new modes of action” as they sought to push for a more encompassing Turkish 
consciousness and the modernization and strengthening of their local societies against 
European encroachment.117 The shared themes of societal transformation, mass literacy, 
and national identity in the trans-imperial Turcophone press centered heavily on issues of 
language and, increasingly, on the debate the need to reform the Perso-Arabic alphabet 
 
113 Tansel, 236.  
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 By the early 20th-century, editorials and news articles, which called either for .(الفبا)
reforming or abandoning the existing alphabet, appeared more frequently. This was a 
general trend in both the Ottoman and Russian Turcophone press and, as stated above, this 
period also saw an expansion of the public arena to include voices on both sides of the 
imperial divide.  
Taking up language and identity as its central themes, this chapter examines how 
Turco-Muslim reformers across imperial boundaries viewed language reform as a 
prerequisite to broader social transformation, mass literacy, and national identity formation. 
Language reform, therefore, was placed at the heart of a new desire for modernization and 
societal transformation among the Turco-Muslim reformers in the Russian and Ottoman 
empires. Far from being a passive agent in this process, the pre-WWI Turcophone press 
contributed to a new birth of print media in which the power and construction of language 
served as an important tool for reformers to disseminate their ideas on modernization and 
language reform to a more international reading public.  
Though not an exhaustive or comparative history of the rise of the Turcophone 
press, this chapter will nevertheless expand upon some common themes that were routinely 
discussed by the reformers on the topic of language. Among these were the promotion of 
specific forms of Turkic (either colloquial dialects or a common Turkic language), the 
social response to language reform from broader society, and the intersection between 
Islam, which represented continuity and order, and modernization, which was a process 
busy upending traditional patterns of Muslim life. Language, like Islam, was at the heart 
of these debates. The subsequent Soviet and Kemalist language planners inherited these 
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issues as they set about transforming their local Turkic languages through Latinized 
alphabets.  
 
3b. Note on Terminology  
To understand the shifting notions of nationalism and its relationship to language, 
it is pertinent to understand some of the common terminology used to articulate the nation. 
Firstly, the question for Turco-Muslim reformers was how to translate the concepts of 
national from their Western Europe, mostly French, context. In other words, how would 
conceptions such as la nation, la patrie, or le peuple translate to a Turco-Muslim in the 
Ottoman or Russian empire. Turkic reformers adopted specific terms to translate nationalist 
and revolutionary concepts from France to their own constituencies. All ultimately derived 
from Arabic, these terms nevertheless became common in both Persian and Turkic 
languages.  
Term Root Meaning in Turkic 




Tayfa  طوائف( طائفة )ج 





Azeri: tribe, race, kinship  
Turkish: troop, party, band   
Kavim  )قوم )ج اقوام 
(Arabic and Persian: people, 
nation, tribe) 
A people, nation  
(Table 2. Comparison of National Terminology) 
What is common about these terms is that they originally denoted ethnic or 
sectarian divisions. What is also interesting about the incorporation of “tayfa” is that its 
origins as a military term meaning troop or band translates effectively in the nationalist 
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period. A “tayfa,” or “troop,” would build solidarity as a common people working to defend 
and develop their nation. These terms were constantly used in relation to the terms “lisan” 
or “dil,” both meaning ‘language.’ In writings across the Russian and Ottoman Turkic 
intelligentsia, the Turkic language was as often and tightly bound to Turkic identity and 
Islam. Even then, sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia Turks were often resolved in 
the effort to forge larger ties based on largely-intelligible Turkic languages. Language, 
therefore, cut deeper for the Turkic nationalists than religion as the foundation of the Turkic 
nation, but also as a facet of identity that they could transform through modernization. 
Often, these measures were proposed in the name of the “millet,” “tayfa,” or “kavim.” In 
the Ottoman context, “kavim” was used by the Turkish Association (Türk Derneği) to 
denote the Turkic tribes living both within the empire and across the border in Russia.118 
  
3c. Early Debates over Language Reform  
 As Turkology was developing in Europe, the question of language and identity took 
a prominent place within Ottoman intellectual and reformist circles. In a speech delivered 
to the Ottoman Scientific Society (Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye) in May 1862, the Minister 
of Education, Antepli Münif Efendi, stated that “Reading and writing Turkish with Arabic 
letters is difficult. Because there are no vowels to be found in that alphabet, a Turkish word 
can be read in several ways. It comes to where the same word can be read five or six 
different ways. Common words can nevertheless be read correctly. But, for a word whose 
definition is not known, it is not probable that it will be read correctly.”119 Münif Efendi 
 
118 Arai, 7.  
119 Quoted in Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 20. “Arap 
harfleriyle Türkçe okuyup yazmak zordur. Bu alfabede ünlüler bulunmadığından Türkçe bir sözcük çeşitli 
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was a career statesman in the Ottoman Empire: he had served as a diplomat in both 
Germany and Iran, as well as the Minister of Education and of Commerce.120 As he spoke 
to the audience, Münif Efendi highlighted the major controversies surrounding the issue of 
language and identity in the Ottoman Empire. First, Münif Efendi signaled that future 
language reformers would distinguish between what was “Turkish” and what was “Arabic 
and Persian.” Based on the Arabic alphabet, the Turkish script did not, in Münif Efendi’s 
estimation, reflect the actual pronunciation of words. As such, Münif Efendi believed that, 
in its current form, the Arabic alphabet was “not sufficient for book, journal, and newspaper 
publishing.”121 
It is doubtful that the entire audience listening Münif Efendi’s speech would have 
agreed on the “inadequacy” of the current Perso-Arabic script. Münif Efendi himself, 
according to Bilal Şimşir, favored reforming, rather than replacing, the existing script. His 
principle aim, as the minister of education, was to improve literacy rates within a 
modernized education system. He advocated for breaking up the cursive Arabic script into 
individualized, block letters, as well as adding diacritical marks to mark the range of 
Turkish vowels. Munif Efendi’s reformist suggestions would be the forerunner of the 
“reformist” (ıslahatçı) position within the debates over language reform.   
Münif Efendi’s contemporary was Mirza Fethali Axundov, an Azeri social 
reformer living in Russian Transcaucasia but who traveled to and made extensive 
connections in the Ottoman Empire. Like Münif Efendi, Axundov also wrote about the 
 
biçimlerde okunabilmektedir. Aynı sözcüğün beş-altı değişik biçimde okunabildiği olur. Ama anlamları pek 
bilinmeyen sözcüklerin doğru okunabilmesi hemen hemen olanaksızdır.” 
120 Hikmet Yıldırım Celkan, “I. Meşrutiyet Döneminde Modern Bir Eğitimci: Münif Paşa,” in Gaziantep 
Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 7(2), 2008, pp. 399-404.  
121 Şimşir, 20. “Arap harfleri, kitap, dergi, gazete basımında da hiç elverişli değildir.”  
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orthographic problems with the Arabic script. Unlike his reformist counterpart in the 
Ottoman Empire, Axundov advocated for total Latinization of his local Transcaucasian 
Turkic language.122 This language, called “Azeri” or “Azerbaijani” today, descended from 
the same Oghuz Turkic language family as did the “Turkish” spoken in Ottoman Anatolia 
and Istanbul. As such, both “Azeri” and “Ottoman Turkish” were both referred to as 
“Turkish” (Türk dili). Initially writing in Persian (the written and academic language of 
educated Muslims in Russian Transcaucasia), Axundov argued in his tracts that the Latin 
alphabet was necessary for the “Turkish” (ترکی) “in order for the pronunciation to 
[conform] to how the words actually are sounded.”123 Axundov took his argument that the 
Latin alphabet was best suited for Turkish to various government officials in both the 
Russian and Ottoman empires, including giving a presentation at the Ottoman Scientific 
Society in 1863.124  
For both Münif Efendi and Axundov, the more formidable obstacle to either 
reforming or Latinizing the alphabet was its deep association with Islam. As such, any 
movement towards reforming or Latinizing the script remained greatly limited in the mid-
nineteenth century. Both the Ottoman and Azeri Turkish alphabets (الفبا) were officially 
written with a modified version of the Perso-Arabic script. Though no formal 
standardization was enacted, both scripts often borrowed the Persian letters  ،گ، هچ، پ  and 
also followed Persian’s example in consolidating several letters: ذ، ز، ض، ظ to a Z sound.   
 
122 Şimşir, 21-22.  
123 Quoted in Şimşir, 21. “Huruf-i kadimenin noktaları ilga olunup (kaldırılıp) yerlerine diğer bir alâmeti 
muttasıla vazından (konulmasından) ve kelimelerin gereği gibi telaffuz olunması içün bazı harekât-ı cedide 
ihtıra’ı (bulumu) ile bunların mileli ecnebiye (yabancı uluslar) hututu (yazıları) misillû (gibi) huruf 
sırasında (Latin alfabesi biçiminde) tahririnden (yazılışından) ibaret bulunmaktadır.” 
124 Şimşir, 21.  
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However, though the Persian letters provided Turkic languages with a more 
accurate range of consonants, they did not accurately reflect the range of vowels that 
existed: a, e, i, ı, o, ö, u, ü (in addition to ə for Azeri). A fundamental aspect of all Turkic 
grammars is vowel harmony, which sets the rules for connect morphemes to root words, a 
process called agglutination. These agglutinative structures are used in all aspects of the 
language and employ a range of vowels as their connectors. Because agglutination is 
fundamental to Turkic languages, both Münif Efendi and Axundov sought to reform the 
script Turkic languages were written in order to more accurately reflect the range of vowels 
that form the backbone of this grammatical system. Though they approached the question 
of reform differently, both Münif Efendi and Axundov argued that such changes to the 
language would increase literacy (kiraat or okuma-yazma) more rapidly.   
As Bilal Şimşir notes, however, in expanding technologies, especially the telegraph, 
the Latin alphabet was used in place of the Perso-Arabic script.125 The Ottoman Empire in 
the nineteenth century was not the world power of previous centuries and, thus, was subject 
to the expansion of European economic interests. The telegraph, imported from Europe, 
signaled a major shift towards the Latinization of Turkish as the messages received were 
transcribed in the Latin alphabet. Owning to the dominance of French as the language of 
the empire’s new political elites, Ottoman Turkish was transcribed using French 
pronunciation. For example, an 1875 telegraph from the Ottoman embassy in London to 
the Palace Chamberlain (başmabeynci) in Istanbul shows that French pronunciation formed 
the basis for how the Ottomans conceived of their language with Latin letters. Compared 
 
125 Şimşir, 30-38.  
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with the New Turkish Alphabet that would be implemented by the Republic 53 years later, 
the differences are striking. 126      
 1875 Telegraph: 
Messoudiyé Firgatini humayounoun herchéissi yolounda oloub, 
Suvarissi yola tchikmak itchoun, éyam havaya mountazidir… 
 
Modern Turkish Transcription:  
 
Mesudiye Firgatini hümayunun herşeysi yolunda olup, süvarisi yola 
çıkmak için eyamı havaya muntazırdır… 
 
By analyzing Ottoman-era telegraph cables in the nineteenth century, Şimşir argues that 
the Latin alphabet gradually expanded across the globe to become to universal alphabet 
(Latin Harflerinin Evrenselliği). This “extraordinary expansion” (bu olağanüstü yayılma) 
happened for a number of reasons: European colonialism, international commerce, 
missionary activity, and scientific discoveries.127 The Ottoman Empire became one site for 
the expansion of the Latin alphabet, although in limited areas such the telegraph.  
 
3d. Ismail Gaspriski and the Usul-i Jedid (New Method) 
 One of the prominent themes in the language debates was the need for societal 
transformation. As stated before, the Turcophone press in both the Ottoman and Russian 
empires launched debates on the scope and direction of social change. However, owing to 
the tide of revolution sweeping the two states in the late 1910s, most intellectuals gradually 
advocated for some version of transformation that would modernize Muslim society and 
 
126 This telegraph, dated November 16, 1875, is cited in Şimşir, 35. Sent from the Ottoman embassy in 
London to the palace chamberlain, the telegraph affirmed the naval ship, Mesudiye, ordered by the palace. 
The telegraph concludes with affirming Sultan Abdülaziz’s enthusiasm for expanding the empire’s naval 
superiority.  
127 Şimşir, 30.  
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equip it with the scientific and technological concepts it needed to withstand the European 
powers and renew society from within. When he visited Cairo in 1907, Ismail Gasprinski 
gave an inaugural speech calling for “reform and the awakening of the Muslim world, 
blaming Muslims themselves for their crisis of military weakness, colonial despair, and 
economic backwardness.”128 This speech exemplified the attitude and assumptions taken 
by the reformers discussed in this section. The feeling that united the voices included in 
this study was that the Muslim world was under grave threat from the European colonial 
empires. These empires had surpassed the Muslim world militarily and technologically. 
The push for an internal reform of Muslim societies from Gasprinski and others, 
spearheaded in both the Ottoman and Caucasian Turcophone press, particularly how 
language reform was to spearhead this change.  
The 1905 Russian Revolution energized the liberal and intellectual Muslim upper-
class to the Ittifaq al-Muslimin (the Muslim Union). This union was meant to represent the 
voices of Russia’s Muslims, especially the Tatars of Crimea who headed the Union. It 
would also hold sway over Muslim deputies in the newly-established Duma. Among the 
members of the Muslim Union were prominent intellectuals and journalists such as Ismail 
Gasprinski and Yusuf Akçura, a Tatar intellectual who would contribute greatly to the 
Language Reforms in Kemalist Turkey two decades later, as well as Əlimərdan 
Topçubaşov, an Azeri intellectual and politician who would serve as the future Foreign 
Minister and Speaker of the Parliament during the years of the Azerbaijani Democratic 
Republic (1918-1920).129  
 
128 Aydın, 85.  
129 The ADR was formed as an Azeri Muslim republic that declared its independence from Russia in 1918. 
Remembered in Azerbaijan as the first incarnation of Azerbaijani statehood, the ADR was nevertheless 
powerless without reliance on British backing based on its interest in Caucasian oil. To say that the ADR 
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Since the vast majority of Muslims in Russia were Turkic-speaking, the Muslim 
Union and its members took on a particularly Turkic flavor as they advocated for the 
expansion of political rights for their communities. Ismail Gasprinski’s leadership of the 
union was particularly symbolic as his Pan-Turkic newspaper The Interpreter (Tercüman), 
strove for a common Turkic language and the dissemination of that common language 
through the press in order to linguistically unite all the Turkic Muslims of Russia. 
Gasprinski’s motto, quoted endlessly by future Turkic-language reformers in both the 
Soviet and Kemalist cases, was “Unity in Language, Thought, and Action” (Dilde, fikirde, 
işte birlik).130  
Using his paper as his outlet, Gasprinski’s immediate audience were the Muslims 
of Russia, particularly the Turkic-speaking Crimean Tatars. Gasprinski’s objective in 
printing this paper was not nationalist, but modernist and reformist. In other words, 
Gaspinski did not seek for the Tatars, or other Muslims of Russia, to gain independence 
but to gain cultural autonomy under which they could modernize. The objective of this 
autonomous modernization was so that Muslims could better serve the Tsar and the Russian 
state as equals rather than remain a subject and colonized group.   
It was with an eye towards autonomy, modernization, and increased presence in 
Russia that Gasprinki advocated for the implementation of the “usul-i jedid,” or “new 
pedagogical methods,” in the Muslim schools (madrasa) throughout the Crimea. This new 
method entailed restructuring the curriculum and educational system to include Ottoman, 
 
was a mere “puppet state” of the British, however, would be to underestimate the power that Azerbaijani 
nationalism held for the Azeri Muslim intellectual and upper classes who dominated the parliament and 
political establishment. The president of the ADR, Memmed Emin Resulzade, is still regarded as a national 
hero in Azerbaijan as well as a Pan-Turkic symbol in publications in both Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
130 Eruğrul Yaman, Gaspıralı İsmail ve Türkçede Birlik (Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 2015). 
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Tatar, and Russian-language instruction, Arabic and Quranic courses, Western sciences. 
This usul-i jedid, Gasprinski and his followers hoped, would foster a Muslim identity 
rooted firmly in modernity, science, cosmopolitanism, and rationalism.  
In calling for reforms to Muslim educational systems, Gasprinki coined the famous 
dictum “United in Language, Thought, and Action,” which became a rallying cry for 
Muslim and Turkic intellectuals both in Russia and in the Ottoman Empire. Using this 
dictum, intellectuals, reformers, and nationalists sought to make greater connections 
between themselves based on common Turkic characteristics like language. As such, 
though the paper was based in Crimea, Gasprinski’s Tercüman/Perevodchik became 
influential across the Turkic-speaking regions of the Russian Empire and even had a 
following in the Ottoman Empire.   
As such, the Turcophone press turned to debates over language itself. In particular, 
the issue of whether or not to transmit these ideas through a supranational Turkic language 
(usually Ottoman or Crimean Tatar) was central. One group advocated the creation of a 
supranational Turkic language that could be understood by Turkic peoples from Bulgaria 
to Western China. Championed by the adherents to Ismail Gaspıralı’s dictum Unity in 
Language, Thought, and Work, this group of reformers included prominent voices such as 
Yusuf Akçura and Alibey Hüseynzade, both born in imperial Russia. In creating a 
commonly-intelligible Turkic idiom, these reformers elevated Ottoman Turkish by arguing 
that it was the most prestigious Turkic dialect and the language of the last independent 
Muslim empire. There were also calls for Crimean Tatar, the language of Gasprinski’s new 
madrasa system, to become the new Turkic standard.   
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Another group, however, focused their efforts more locally. Instead of emphasizing 
a supranational Pan-Turkic language, these reformers sought to elevate their own local 
Turkic language or dialect (lehçe) to the level of a modern, literary language. Though aware 
and empathetic to the plight of Turkic Muslims across both empires, these locally-minded 
reformers nevertheless argued that societal transformation needed to benefit, above all else, 
their immediate societies first. While not denying that the Turkic peoples descended from 
common origins, these locally-minded reformers played up the divergence of the Turks 
into various confederations, states, and empires. Emphasizing the local led these reformers 
to privilege their homegrown Turkic languages, particularly Azeri and Crimean Tatar, over 
a single supranational Turkic tongue.  
Though these movements emphasized different aspects of religious, ethnic, and 
linguistic identity, all were unified in two fundamental ways. First, supranational and 
locally-minded reformers both held that fostering modern forms of national identity 
necessitated reform and renewal of the Turkic languages and cultures. In many cases, 
reformers and intellectuals often addressed the issue of religious and linguistic reform in 
the same breath, seeing the two as inherently linked.131 Renewal of language was a central 
program of each movement and, thus, literary figures such as novelists, poets, playwrights, 
and journalists took the leading role in the renewal of language. Second, these movements 
sought to employ modern sciences and newly emerging academic disciplines to provide a 
firm for this nascent national identity. Among these were the newly-emerging academic 
 
131 One primary source of my research is a published anthology of the leading Azeri intellectuals of this 
period, Cəlal Bəydili Məmmədov, Azerbaycan Publisistikası Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007). This 
volume features a number of articles in which both linguistic and religious identity are spoken about as well 
as includes authors who, while not writing about the two in the same article, nevertheless take up the issue 
of both in separate writings.   
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disciplines and methodologies of History, Sociology, Archeology, Anthropology and 
Linguistics.  
Latinizers, reformists, supranationalists, and localists alike built upon the 
foundations laid by nineteenth-century European Turkologists as they articulated modern 
concepts of ethno-linguistic nationalism and identity. “Rediscovering” Turkic identity, 
these reformers generally argued, would lead to a cultural and national “revival.” This 
transformation, they argued, were prefaced on elevating the Turkic languages to the level 
of modern, literary idioms. As such, all camps of reformers believed in the centrality of 
language to others aspects of society that they sought to change, including education and 
printing. They often prescribed the same remedy, societal modernization, for a host of 
issues, including European colonialism, internal political paralysis, and Muslim-Turkic 
cultural and literary “renewal.” In all these areas, the reformers emphasized that the engine 
driving change should be the rediscovery and exaltation of authentic forms of national 
identity for Turkic Muslims.  
There were many reformers, however, who rejected Turkicness as their primary 
marker of identification. Merely speaking Turkish as their primary language did not 
necessarily mean to them that they had to recognize solely Turkic bonds. In fact, these 
reformers often held that Turkic identity was less compelling and unifying than Islam or 
even Ottoman, Persian, Islamic, and Russian identities. By the beginning of WWI, the dust 
over these debates had not settled and it was not entirely certain that Turkism alone would 
win the day. The chapter will map out the various reformers calling for on language reform 




3e. Calls for Social Transformation in the Russian Caucasus  
 This section will examine the prominent currents of Turkic reformism and 
nationalism in Russian Transcaucasia. Home to the Azeri Turks, Transcaucasia became a 
crucial site for the establishment and dissemination of the Turcophone press and the 
reformist ideals that it bore. As these currents were developing, however, the terminology 
too was shifting from an emphasis on Turks as members of the greater Islamic community 
to Turks as a distinct national entity. Within these debates, the terms “Muslim,” “Turk,” 
“Tatar,” and “Turanic” were often used interchangeably to designate the Turco-Muslim 
communities under Russian imperial dominance. As the reform movement spread, 
however, its terminology became more precise and centered almost exclusively on Turk 
and Turanic identity.   
One prominent voice of the Turcophone press in the Russian Caucasus was 
Məhəmmədağa Şahtaxtlı (1846-1931). Born in the Transcaucaisan city of Yerevan (capital 
of present-day Armenia), Şahtaxtlı’s biography was typical of the reformist circles both in 
Russian Transcausaia and the Ottoman Empire. He received primary education in local 
schools before graduating to the Tiflis Gymnasium. Şahtaxtlı went on to study in the 
Collège de France and the École pratique des hautes études (1873-1875). Often, reformers 
such as Şahtaxtlı widely traveled outside of Transcaucasia to obtain education and gain 
exposure to political climate of the era in Russia, Europe, and the Ottoman Empire. While 
studying in France, Şahtaxtlı became a member of the Société Asiatique. Upon returning 
to Transcaucasia from France, Şahtaxtlı became a committed advocate for the European 
modernization in Turco-Muslim society.  
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 In his 1903 article “Our Ailment and Remedy” (Dərdimiz və Dərmanımız), 
Məhəmmədağa Şahtaxtlı wrote that the largest problem facing the future generations of 
Azeri Turkic in Transcaucasia was the current lack education in modern sciences and 
unawareness of its technology. This was a sentiment echoed across reformist networks and, 
in Transcaucasia, was aimed primarily at the “obstinate” Islamic madrasa system which 
kept the population ignorant of the latest development of science taking place in Europe. 
In Şahtaxtlı’s judgement, this ignorance threatened to keep the Azeri Turks perpetually 
subservient to the colonial powers and unable to assert themselves as a distinct people. 
Blaming the Islamic establishment, Şahtaxtlı writes “We have quite a few mollas and 
literate men. Older Islamic civilization remains only a name. [However], given our current 
conditions, they think it is sufficient to reach only this level, this perfection. And, alas, 
today they want to advance, to progress with their shortsighted ideas.”132 Along with the 
mollas, whom he criticized as having a myopic insistence on preserving Islamic knowledge, 
Şahtaxtlı also castigates the blind imitators of European culture, those whom he labels 
debutants or coquettes (nazəninlər). 
 Şahtaxtlı’s critiques of the Transcaucasian Muslim establishment reflected a greater 
concern within reformist circles in the Turkic world: namely, that the advent of European 
scientific and imperial dominance had exposed the weaknesses of Islamic civilization. Here, 
we witness the foundations of another assertion, the weakness of Islamic civilization, that 
Kemalist and Soviet reformers drew from in the 1920s. The religious establishment, in 
Şahtaxtlı’s estimation, were guilty of obstinacy and obscurantism and were plunging the 
 
132 Şahtaxtlı, 25. “Bir çox mollalarımız, oxumuşlarımız var. Qədim İslam mədəniyyətinin yalnız adı qalmış. 
İndiki zahiri şəraitimizlə o mərtəbəyə, o kamala yetmiş-çatmış zənn edirlər və bu gün də o fəsad, kar-
görməz fikirlə guya tərəqqi etmək, qabağa getmək istəyirlər. Heyhat!”  
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Muslim world into weakness and ignorance of the tools (science and technology) needed 
to maintain independence and sovereignty.    
Şahtaxtlı stated categorically that Muslims, especially his own community in 
Russian Transcaucasia, first had to admit to themselves that European civilization had 
eclipsed the historic achievements of Islamic civilization (İslam mədəniyyəti). So much so 
that, by the early 20th century, Islamic civilization “remained in name only.”133 Şahtaxtlı 
continued in his article: “We [Muslims] read the works created in the time of older, natural 
and devout Islamic intellectuals from books translated by the Europeans. We see what 
those who have civilization now are doing. We remain surprised and bewildered opening 
our mouths a yard-wide. Is this enough? No, let us learn from the things we observe.”134 In 
order to appreciate Şahtaxtlı’s insistence on copying European progress, one must 
understand how he—as well as his contemporaries—viewed human history and 
development. In Şahtaxtlı’s article, the terms mərtəbə (مرتبة in Arabic; stages), and 
mədəniyyət (مدنیت in Persian; civilization) constantly appear, signaling that he believed 
civilization was a continuum marked by various stages. Whereas Islamic civilization was 
once the most advanced and the top tier of literary culture, by Şahtaxtlı’s own lifetime, 
European civilization was believed to have “surpassed” Islam in political, scientific, and 
technological terms.  
European civilization, in Şahtaxtlı’s estimation, had adopted and capitalized on 
much of the knowledge generated by Islamic civilization. Europe, therefore, had expanded 
upon this knowledge and, with it, surpassed Islam as the top civilizational tier. Though 
 
133 Şahtaxtlı, 25. “Qədim İslam mədəniyyətinin yalnız adı qalmış.” 
134 Şahtaxtlı, 25. “Qədim, xalis, mütədəyyin elmi-islamların vaxtı ilə vücuda gətirdikləri əsərləri 
avropalılardan tərcümə edilən kitablarda oxuyuruzş Tövbə! İndiki mədənilərin yapdıqlarını görürüz. 
Ağzımızı bir qarış aşıb sərsəm, mədhuş qalırız. Bu qədərmi? Xeyr, gördüklərimizdən ibrət alayız.”  
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Şahtaxtlı argued the roots of European modernity were found in Islam, the Europeans 
nevertheless succeeded in making indigenizing this gift of Islam and exporting their variant 
to the rest of the world through imperialism. In addition, Şahtaxtlı cites Japan and China 
as non-European civilizations that were successfully integrating European modernity in 
their own cultural contexts.135 The world was changing through European modernization 
and Muslim societies could do nothing to prevent this change. On the contrary, Şahtaxtlı 
argued that Muslims should not resist but fully embrace all aspects of European modernity.  
“We are proud of old Arab civilization,” Şahtaxtlı wrote, “and we are surprised, 
saying that Europeans borrowed civilization from Muslims. But, to start with, let’s consider 
how shameful this [thought] is for us. Even if Christian Europe had accepted old Islamic 
civilization, let us show the same persistance in learning and using our own possession.”136 
Here, Şahtaxtlı identifies civilization as a Muslim possession [mal, مال], something that 
Muslims throughout history had developed and contributed to. The problem, therefore, was 
that contemporary Muslim society stood complacent in the face of their own civilizational 
foundations being used against them by Europe. Since they believed that European 
civilization was based on Islam already, Şahtaxtlı and other reformers reasoned that 
adopting modernization from Europe would be natural and speedy. They were steadfast in 
the belief that, although Europe had the mantle of civilization and modernity for the 
moment, Islam remained the etermal essence of science and Enlightenment.  
 
135 Şahtaxtlı, 28-29.  
136 Şahtaxtlı, 29. “Yeri gələndə qədim ərəb mədəniyyəti ilə fəxr ediriz. Avropalılar mədəniyyəti islamlardan 
aldılar, deyə şişiriz. Amma bir kərə fikir edəlim ki, bu bizim üçün nə qədər ayıbdır. Avropa xaçpərəst ola-




Şahtaxtlı was not the only figure writing in the Turcophone press to call for the 
adoption of European modernity within Azeri Muslim society. Həsən Bəy Zərdabi, the 
founder of Transcaucasia’s first Turkic-language newspaper The Ploughman (Əkinçi) also 
advocated for the adoption of European forms of modernization. Zərdabi approached the 
issue from the revolutionary populist perspective he had picked up while a student of 
mathematics and chemistry at Moscow University. 137  This movement, called 
narodnichestvo (народничество) in Russian, sought to enact a populist revolution against 
the Tsarist regime using the peasants and their village societies as a model for societal 
reform. Zərdabi became famous for his 1875-1877 newspaper Əkinçi (the Ploughman). 
The first Turkic-language newspaper published in the Caucasus, The Ploughman 
advocated for the enlightenment and education of the Turkic Muslim population under 
Russian domination.138  
Enlightenment would come, Zərdabi argued, with the implementation of Ismail 
Gasprinski’s usul-i jedid. This model, the reformers believe, would not only strengthen 
Turkic Muslim identity within the Russian Empire, but also provide the scientific and 
 
137 Turan Həsənzadə, “Birinci Azərbaycan Qəzeti,” in ЧəсəнБəj Зəрдаби, Əкинчи (Бакы: Азəрбаичан 
Дøвлəт Нəшриjаты, 1979), 5.  
138 Soviet historiography, for example, presented the newspaper as an essential step in the development of 
the culture of the Azerbaijani proletariat. For example, in a 1979 reprinting of the newspaper by the 
Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, Zərdabi was cast as a tireless reformer 
opposing the ills of Azerbaijani society, including “societal repression,” “medieval backwardness,” and 
“religious fanaticism and superstition.”  What The Ploughman offered, according to the Soviet 
historiography, was “the development of realist literature” in Azerbaijan. Realism, the ability to show life 
and society not as idyllic or stylized but as as they really unfolded and developed, was seen as a major 
contributor to the enlightenment of the proletariat. Realism, it was believed, taught the workers and 
peasants the true nature of their exploitation and misery. 
Equally eager to co-opt the Turkic press into its own paradigm, the post-Soviet nationalist 
historiography emphasized The Ploughman as the Azerbaijani nation’s first newspaper and, rather than 
proletarian consciousness, cast it as an essential step in the dissemination of Azerbaijani nationalism. The 
Ploughman, in Mehdi’s view, was both born from these overarching changes in the structure of Caucasian 
Muslim society and shaped how such changes were articulated and disseminated. Mehdi casts Zərdabi and 
his newspaper as instrumental in “exposing the necessity of secular education” among other attributes 
traditionally perscribed for the development of nations.       
 
82 
technological tools this society needed to modernize. Far from erasing Turkic Muslim 
identity in Russia, Zərdabi saw Gasprinskip’s usul-i jedid, especially its emphasis on 
teaching modern science, as the basis upon which Muslims in Russia would build renewed, 
modernized identities. 
In a January 1906 article for the newspaper Həyat (Life), Zərdabi wrote an article 
entitled İttihadi-Lisan, or Linguistic Unity. One of the crucial words he repeates throughout 
this article is the word tayfa. However, Zərdabi invests the word with a new meaning: he 
writes about tayfa not so much as a tribe but as a modern people with a national identity: 
“we the Turkic nations in Russia.”139 When Zərdabi speaks of his own tayfa, he speaks 
with a certain historical memory: Turkic Muslims who had been incorporated into the 
Russian state after the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828. This treaty, signed with the Persian 
Qajar dynasty, recognized Russian dominance over the Northern Caucasus and the 
inhabitants therein. A little less than a century later, Russian influence was felt in all sectors 
of Muslim life, including Russian schools and the growing prominence of Russian as the 
official language of communication and interaction with the imperial administration.   
With these stakes in mind, Zərdabi explains in his 1906 article that every nation 
(tayfa) possesses a soul made up of two equal halves: its religion (mezheb) and its language 
(lisan or dil).140 Zərdabi affirms that “all Muslims subject the Russian state are Turks,” and 
therefore united by both religious and national kinship. He, therefore, directed his article 
towards a local audience of Caucasian Muslims who were under the dominance of the 
Russian Empire. For Zərdabi, the strain of Russian colonialism on Turkic Muslim societies 
 
139 Həsən Bəy Zərdabi, “İttihadi-Lisan,” in Cəlal Bəydili Məmmədov, Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), 14. “…biz Rusiyada olan türk tayfaları…” 
140 Həsən Bəy Zərdabi, “İttihadi-Lisan” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), pp. 13-15.  
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created the conditions by which different “currents” (şəfəqi) of the Turkic language 
emerged that threatened to divide the previously unified Muslim community.141 To renew 
their place in the world, Zərdabi argues that Turkic Muslims in Russia should unlock the 
true essence of their linguistic and religious identity by supporting it with “science 
education” (elm təhsil). For reformers like Zərdabi, modern sciences would both provide 
the tools for Turkic Muslim society to recover its authentic religious, linguistic, and 
national of identity and show the way towards reaching a shared civilization with Europe 
based on Enlightenment and rationality.142   
Science education would also perform a more fundamental function for reformers 
of Zərdabi’s bent, it would also develop the Turkic languages and push them towards 
greater linguistic unity. Zərdabi wrote in favor of complete linguistic unity among the 
Turkic peoples of Russia: “How unfortunate it is that we Turks have departed from each 
other in language and religion and are the reason for our own fall from strength. Therefore, 
it is now crucial for us to get behind linguistic unity...build a common language [ümumi 
dil] and read and write in this common language. Let it be the language that everyone reads 
and writes in.”143 Zərdabi continues to advocate for Ismail Gasprinski’s Crimean Tatar to 
form the basis for this common Turkic language that would unify the Turks of Russia.144  
Here, Zərdabi uses the term “bəradərimiz” (from Persian برادر meaning brother) to refer to 
 
141 Zərdabi, 13-15.  
142 Zərdabi, 13-15.  
143 Zərdabi, 14. “Heç insafdırmı ki, biz türklər bir dildə, bir dində ola-ola bir-birimizdən aralanıb artıq 
gücdən düşməyimizə səbəb olaq. Ona görə bizlərə vacibdir ki, indi vaxt keçməmişdən ittihadi-lisan 
dalıncan olub bir ümumi dil bina edib, bu ümumi dildə yazıb-oxuyaq ki, vaxtilə o dil hamının yazıb-oxumaq 
dili olsun.”  
144 Zərdabi, 14.  
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Ismail Gasprinski, indicating that he had made not only linguistic links to Gasprinski, but 
national links based on Turkic identity.  
Zərdabi explicitly speaks in nationalist terms when he argues that language and 
religion were both necessary components for the existence of a “tayfa” and, more 
importantly, its perpetuation. Furthermore, he also argues that both of these components 
should be taught to the new generations through a modern education system. Zərdabi writes, 
“We Muslims subjects of Russia...do not have our own national libraries and, upon the 
advice of missionaries and Russian priests in state schools, it is illegal to study our language 
and our literary-legal works.”145 This lack of education among Muslim children of their 
linguistic and cultural heritage was, for Zərdabi and other reformers, the most formidable 
obstacle towards forming a national community.  
Throughout his article, Zərdabi echoed Şahtaxtlı’s sentiment that Muslim society 
in Transcaucasia needed transformation. He concurred that the instrument of this 
transformation should be European modernity—with specific attention towards learning 
and incorporating European sciences and technologies into Muslim life. Zərdabi, therefore, 
called upon Muslims in Transcaucasia to adopt science as the basis for societal order: 
“Truly, a nation [tayfa] that begins to teach science [elm, علم] is like he who opens the door 
of a dark room and goes outside so that the light of day, besides illuminating his eyes, will 
enlighten things already inside the dark room.”146  
 
145 Zərdabi, “Dil və Din,” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası Antologiyası (Baku: 
Şərq-Qərb, 2007), pp. 21-23. “Çünki bizim öz milləti məktəbxanalarımız yox idi ki, orada öz dilimizdə, öz 
məzhəbimizidə elm təhsil etmək olaydı və dövlət tərəfindən açılan məktəblərdə rus keşişlərindən 
misyonerlik edənlərin məsləhəti ilə bizim dilimizi və adabi-şəriəti oxutmağı qadağan etmişdilər.”  
146 Həsən Bəy Zərdabi, “İttihadi-Lisan” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyasl (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), 13-15. “Hər tayfa elm təhsil edən vaxtda lazımdır ki, öz dilini və 
dinini bərk saxlasın. Həqiqət, elm təhsil etməyi başlayan tayfa qaranlıq otağın qapısını açıb çölə çıxan 
kimidir ki, bu zaman günün işığı onun gözlərini nurlandırmaqdan başqa, otağın da içinə daxil olub orada 
olan şeyləri artıq işıqlandırıb bir qeyri-surətə salır.” 
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Zərdabi likened Muslim society to a dark room, obscured by its own superstition 
and fanaticism and unable to accommodate the reality of modernization. Like Şahtaxtlı, 
Zərdabi did not attribute this superstition to Islam’s true or essential character, but as a 
result of “hillbilly mollas” (avam mollalar) who hindered Muslim advancement by 
insisting on preserving unscientific and non-rational traditions alive.147 He wrote that “In 
this way, people's views will evolve and, even if religion is as our reactionary clerics say, 
the traditions we have adopted from all sides have mixed with religion. In this encounter, 
religion is destroyed if it does not conform to rationality.”148 “True religion” (əsil din), 
Zərdabi held, had nothing to fear in adopting European modernization. 149 On the contrary, 
“true religion” required that Muslim societies catch up to Europe by adopting its science 
and rationality. 
On the subject of the Turkic language, Zərdabi argued that “all Muslims subject to 
the Russian state” were Turks and, thus, should strive to construct a common Turkic idiom 
that would be understood by Turks in the Crimea, Volga region, Central Asia, and 
Transcaucasia.150 Like Islamic identity, Zərdabi argued that the Turkic languages should 
be reformed to fit into the modern age. He wrote that “Language is such that it is not 
possible to preserve it in its original state. The door to the dark room has been opened and 
things have happened that have changed our customs. The number of new words [coming 
into our language] will grow day by day and there is not harm to our language with the 
growth of the new words, it is beneficial. For, these words are the reason for our 
 
147 Zərdabi, 13-15.  
148 Zərdabi, 13-15. “Belədə insanın rəyi də təğyir tapa bilir və əgər din bizim avam mollalar deyən kimi 
olsa ki, hər bir tərəfdən götürdüyümüz adətləri də dinə qarışdırıblar, o vaxtda belə din ağıl ilə düz 
gəlmədiynə bərbad olur.”  
149 Zərdabi, 13-15.  
150 Zərdabi, 13. “Biz Rusiya dövlətinə tabe olan müsəlmanların hamısı türkdürlər.”  
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advancement.”151 Thus, he advocated for the adoption of new European words into Turkic 
languages that carried the concepts of modern science and technology. These words bore 
the mark of European civilization that Zərdabi and other reformers believed the Muslim 
Turks could benefit from and use to strengthen their own societies.   
“Our [Azeri] Turkic language,” Zərdabi continued on the subject of language and 
reform, “has fallen into different types of dialects (şivə) in every area that it is spoken and 
has departed from different dialects. Certainly, these Turkic nations (bu türk tayfalar) have 
begun scientific education and they have left the dark room for the outside; and yet, they 
have become even more distant from one another throughout this process.” 152  Thus, 
Zərdabi calls for the Russian Turkic peoples to unite linguistically to overcome the 
“disintegration” of the language into unintelligible dialects and to forge a common Turkic 
idiom that all could understand and use for communication. This newly-constructed Turkic 
idiom, for reformers in Russian Transcaucasia, should harbor the modern scientific and 
technological vocabulary from Europe and should be deployed within a modern 
educational system.    
  Another important Azeri Turkic reformer and major contributor to the 
Transcaucasian and Ottoman Turcophone press was Ahmet Ağaoğlu. 153  Born into a 
wealthy Shiite family in Transcaucasia, Ağaoğlu received his education in both Moscow 
 
151 Zərdabi, 13. “Dil bir şeydir ki, onu öz halında saxlamaq mümkün deyil. Elə ki qaranlıq otağın qapısı 
açıldı, qeyri tayfalar ilə gediş-gəliş artdı, artıq şeylər ələ gəldi və adətlər dəyişildi, təzə sözlərin qədəri 
günü-gündən artacaqdır, belə sözlərin artmağının dilə zərəri yoxdur, xeyri var.” 
152  Zərdabi, 13-14. “Amma bu dil ayrı-ayrı yerlərdə carı olduğuna hər tərəfdə bir qeyri cür şivəyə düşüb, 
qeyrilərdən aralanıb, əlbəttə, zikr olan qayda ilə bu türk tayfaları elm təhsil etməyə başlayıb, yəni qaranlıq 
otaqdan çölə çıxıb tərəqqi yoluna düşəndə bir-birindən dəxi artıq uzaqlaşacaqdırlar.”  




and Paris and became familiar with the works of European Orientalists and Turkologists. 
In addition, Ağaoğlu followed the latest political currents sweeping both the Russian and 
Ottoman empires, including the politicization of Turco-Muslims in both empires at the time 
of the 1905 and 1908 revolutions. Around the time of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, 
Ağaoğlu moved to Istanbul where he continued his political and journalistic endeavors. 
This was not uncommon for Turco-Muslim intellectuals in Russia to do: other prominent 
figures, such as Yusuf Akçura and Alibey Hüseynzade, also came to the Ottoman Empire 
as emigres and would, along with Ağaoğlu, contribute greatly to the intellectual and 
theoretical ideology of the young Turkish Republic in the post-war period.      
 In a 1905 article in Kaspi, entitled “Words, Words” (Sözlər, Sözlər), Ağaoğlu 
argues that attachments to an ideal Islamic past does nothing to address the problems that 
his contemporary generation of Turko-Tatar Muslims faced with European imperial 
encroachment and their annexation of Muslim territory. Ağaoğlu passionately argued that 
the major reason for Muslim global decline was the static social and cultural conditions in 
which they resided. Like his contemporary reformers, Ağaoğlu did not believe that Muslim 
societies were intrinsically unable to meet the conditions of the modernizing world. Islamic 
history had, on the contrary, proved time and again that Muslims could accommodate and 
even indigenize change coming from outside. Ağaoğlu therefore argued that Muslims 
needed to institute a transformation of their societies from within using European science 
and technology.     
Though Ağaoğlu held solidarity among Muslims in high esteem, he nevertheless 
called out what he saw as empty or vapid appeals to “Muslim Friendship” (Müsəlmanların 
dostu).  Evoked to promote pan-Islamist aspirations, Ağaoğlu believed that shallow appeals 
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to Muslim friendship ignored the dire conditions that Muslims found themselves in at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Ağaoğlu warned his readers of the danger of retreating into 
nostalgia for the Islamic past: “Ah, this past! What does it want from us anyway? Is it not 
enough that [this past] destroyed us in every way—materially, intellectually, spiritually as 
well as destroyed our language, our religion, our nation, and national character?”154 If 
Muslims in Transcaucasia were to rescue themselves from their cultural and societal 
decline, as reformers like Ağaoğlu saw it, they had to discard the traditions of their past 
and forge a new society in which Islam would flourish amidst modernization and social 
transformation.   
In short, Ağaoğlu summed up not only his view of Muslim society in Transcaucasia, 
but across the Turkic-speaking world: “in no place, in none of us exists the slightest 
initiative, in no place, in none of us exists any original idea…[or] fearless thoughts, no 
elevated feelings appear.” 155  The time was ripe, he thus argued, to enact a social 
transformation of Muslim society that would reorient it towards the sciences and 
technologies of Europe as well as adopt various European educational methods to buttress 
this process. Just as Zərdabi had argued, Ağaoğlu believed that Islam not only could 
accommodate European modernization, but through Islam’s insistence on rationality (‘aql), 
Muslims should embrace rationality on principle not matter its source. Simply put, he 
believed that pan-Islamism and talk of “Muslim friendship” was empty as long as Muslim 
societies remained behind Europe. Believing that Muslims across the world could 
 
154 Əhməd Bəy Ağaoğlu, “Sözlər, Sözlər” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyasl (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), pp. 303. “Ah, bu keçmiş! Axı o bizdən nə istəyir? Onun bizi hər 
məada-həm maddi, həm zehni, həm mənəvi baxımdan məhv etməsi, dilimizi, dinimizi, xalqımızı xəlqiliyimizi 
məhv etməsi yetməzmi!  
155 Ağaoğlu, 302. “Heç yerdə, heç birimizdə zərrəcə təşəbbuskarlıq yox, heç yerdə, heç birimizdə heç 
orijinal ideya yox, heç yerdə heç birimizdə heç cəsarətli fikir yoxdur, heç bir ülvi duyğu təzahür etmir.”    
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overcome their current status vis-à-vis Europe, Ağaoğlu nevertheless decided to 




3f. Turkology and the Development of Turkishness  
The increasing emphasis on Turkic identity first developed in Turco-Muslim 
centers throughout the Russian Empire: Bahçesaray in the Crimea, the Jadids in Central 
Asia, and the reformers in Transcaucasia. Eventually, the awakening of Turkic identity 
reached into the territory of Russia’s Ottoman rivals to establish trans-imperial links 
between Ottoman and Russian Turks. Each region produced a generation of reformers who 
sought to introduce modernizing changes in the educational, economic, and cultural life of 
their Muslim compatriots. This mid-to-late nineteenth-century generation of reformers, 
however, were divided over whether the reforms should produce a Europeanized society, 
ostensibly because they were mimicking Europe, or if they were to temper the totalizing 
scope of Europeanization by preserving various aspects of Turkic linguistic, religious, and 
cultural identity.  
 The initial awakening of Turkishness was not necessarily a nationalist awakening 
in the sense of demanding an independent Turkish nation-state. Rather, the nurturing of 
Turkic identity mostly came from within literary, newspaper, and intellectual societies and 
associations operating throughout the Ottoman and Russian empires in the late 19th-century. 
Thus, the study of Turkishness’ transformation into the politically-minded Turkism 
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(Türkçülük) follows the conversations on issues, such as language reform, between various 
reformist publications and intellectuals in the Turcophone world. 
 An exemplary figure in the development of Turkic identity was the Azerbaijani 
intellectual and reformer, Alibey Hüseynzade (1864-1940). Born into an ulema family in 
Azerbaijan, Hüseynzade studied in the Physics and Mathematics Department of the 
University of St. Petersburg before relocating to Istanbul in 1889 to study at the Medical 
Faculty of Istanbul University. It was in the Ottoman Empire that Hüseynzade became 
politicized and both became an active member of the Committee of Union and Progress 
and one of the leading figures for the Turkist movement emerging in the Ottoman Empire. 
His 1905 article, entitled “Who Are the Turks and From Whom Do They Originate” and 
published in the journal Həyat (Life), became one of the foundational works of Turkism, 
along with Yusuf Akçura’s Three Political Styles (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset).   
In this article, Hüseynzade clearly draws from Turkological scholarship to forge a 
definition of the Turkish nation (qövm). This nation, for Hüseynzade, is distinct from the 
greater Islamic community and, hence, a Turk is someone with a distinct Turkish identity 
and language, not merely a member of the global Islamic ummah. 156  Incorporating 
Turkological research into his manifesto, Hüseynzade argued that, to attain an accurate 
understanding of Turkic identity, history, and nationhood, the Turks must begin to consider 
themselves a distinct national entity entirely separate from other Asiatic nationalities, such 
as their fellow Tatar, Mongolian, Persian, and Arab coreligionists. After berating past 
European—as well as Arab and Persian—historiography for falsely labeling the Turks as 
Mongols or Tatars, Hüseynzade calls upon Turco-Muslim society to educate itself in 
 
156 Hüseynzade, 127.  
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European sciences in order to find the accurate classification for the Turks. Playing out 
across Hüseynzade’s article was the tension between his critiques of the falsities of 
European historians regarding the origins of the Turkic nation and his recognition that 
concurrent European advancements in linguistics, history, anthropology, and Turkology 
have nevertheless provided the Turco-Muslims with new avenues to discover and assert 
their identity.  
The application of nineteenth-century European academic disciplines, in particular, 
Turkology, was fundamental to how reformers and intellectuals within these communities 
began to promote modern Turkic identities. According to his reading of the latest scientific, 
linguistic, historical, and archeological studies on the subject, Hüseynzade found it proper 
to divide the Turks into three categories: Siberian or Golden Horde, Russian-European, 
and Transcaucasian.157  In dividing the Turks along geographical lines, Hüseynzade made 
use of the contemporary scientific and linguistic research that placed the idiom of the Turks 
with Finnish, Hungarian, Mongolian, Manchurian, and Japanese into the “Altay-Uralic” or 
“Turanic” language family based on “commonalities that exists between them.”158 These 
common features were often juxtaposed with Arab and Persian culture, language, and 
civilization to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Turkish nation and its contributions to 
modern civilization.  
For example, in one section of his article, Hüseynzade examines the morphology 
of Turkic languages and argues that, because changes in Turkish words did not signal a 
shift in the definition of a word, they were linguistically distinct and separate from Arabic 
 
157 Hüseynzade, 134-135.  
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whose morphology did, in fact, change the inherent meaning of words.159 In other words, 
he is representative of reformers and intellectuals of the era who picked up on the academic 
currents from Europe and used this new knowledge to forge new understandings of the 
Turks as a “distinct” nation within Asia. Hüseynzade also critiqued prominent Ottoman 
Turkologists and linguists, such as Şamseddin Sami, for also “falsifying” the true origins 
of the Turkic nation. In further issues of his article, Hüseynzade wrote that “Sami Bey 
supposed that the Tatars were a small tribe (or nation) that were the first Turkic tribe and 
“tatar” was used for general Mongolia and for the names of all inhabitants there.”160    
In his exploration of Turkic identity and the need for reforms, Alibey Huseynzade 
concurred with Zərdabi that Russian Turco-Muslims should employ a common Turkic 
language. The Turkic language, for Huseynzade, had undergone drastic change since 
European global expansion. Not only were there now numerous Arabic and Persian words 
owing to Islamic influence, but Huseynzade also stressed that Turkic languages had also 
absorbed the Greek, Latin, French, and English terminology that accompanied European 
science. Thus, Huseynzade viewed the language he spoke in terms of “New Turkish” 
(türkiyi-cədid). This New Turkish was to be promoted through the expansion of education 
in order to give the nation its modern component. This language, for Huseynzade, should 
be Ottoman Turkish (Osmanlı lisanı): “In this manner, the Ottoman language, one of the 
Turkic dialects, has expanded and evolved to such a degree that the best, deepest thoughts 
and the most polite and delicate emotions is as smart as Arabic and Persian and rival any 
 
159 Hüseynzade, 137.  
160 Hüseynzade, 133. “Samibəy öylə zənn etmişdir ki, tatar ən əsil türk əqvamından kiçik bir qövm olub, 
bunların namına nisbətən ümum moğollara ‘tatar’ deyilmişdir.”  
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language in Europe.”161 Thus, Huseynzade envisioned a common Turkic language that 
would be able to express the complexities of European scientific discoveries along with the 
subtleties of daily human life. Ottoman Turkish, in his estimation, was the most literary 
and elite form of Turkic and, as such, merited the status of being the common prototype of 
Turkic speakers across the globe.  
Not all reformers, however, agreed with making the Ottoman language the Turks’ 
international standard. In fact, there was a group of reformers who actively resisted the 
imposition of Ottoman Turkish upon their communities. Instead of Ottoman, these 
reformers argued that local Turkic dialects, such as Azeri, should be promoted as they 
constituted the actual languages spoken by the Turkic populations. In a 1914 article, 
entitled The Language Issue (Dil Məsələsi), Yusuf Vəzir Çəmənzəminli argued against the 
expansion of Ottoman at the expense of Azeri Turkish. Calling the pan-Turkist linguists 
“bombastic” (qəliz), Çəmənzəminli stressed that, when they spoke of “linguist unity,” 
language reformers “consider[ed] the Ottoman language and give Azerbaijani Turkish over 
to writing books, newspapers, and journals in this language.”162  
For Çəmənzəminli, the language that should be promoted was the language spoken 
by the common folk of the Turkic nation. He writes that “Our essential language is spoken 
in the bazaars, in places where common people congregate, in the hands of the cattle 
breeders. Our writers, rather than showing the way towards having the people speak with 
 
161 Alibey Huseynzade, “Qəzətəmizin Dili Haqqında Bir Neçə Söz” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), 
Azərbaycan Publisistikası Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), 155-158. “Bu surətlədir ki, türk 
şivələrindən biri olan osmanlı lisanı o dərəcə tövsi və təkamül etdi ki, ən ali, ən dərin fikirləri, ən nazik, ən 
rəqiq hissləri ifadəyə bugünkü ərəbi və farsi dillərindən belə müsteid və müqtədir olub bilapərva hər hansı 
Avropa dili ilə rəqabət edə bilir.”  
162 Vəzir Çəmənzəminli, “Dil Məsələsi” in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), 643. “Buna görə də osmanlı dilini ümumi bir dil sayırlar və bu dildə 
de kitablar, qəzetlər və jurnallar yazıb Azərbaycan türklərinə verirlər.”  
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their own language, instead want to take themselves from their correct path and throttle 
society.”163  Here, Çəmənzəminli launches a critique on the leaders of the Pan-Turkic 
movement who sidelined all Turkic languages and dialects in favor of the Ottoman idiom. 
With this article, he pointed out that most people throughout the Turkic-speaking world do 
not speak Ottoman Turkish.  
Therefore, Çəmənzəminli called upon reformers not to impose Ottoman on their 
local socieities and certainly not on his native Azerbaijan. Instead he wrote, “Let it not be 
forgotten that in Azerbaijan there are several million people and the majority of them are 
quite backwards. For this reason, they remain slaves day-in and day-in, they have fallen 
under the foot of foreigners. Their lands, their ploughable fields come from their hands, 
commerce goes, they have not news of art, they don’t know what the nation and progress 
even are.”164 Çəmənzəminli advocated that the principles of nationalism (milliyyət) and 
progress (tərəqqi) be brought to the common populace through their own language, Azeri 
Turkish. “In which language,” Çəmənzəminli writes, “are you going to speak to others 
saying “Oh brother, send your children to school, don’t sell your fields, open your eyes?” 
Certainly with society’s own language, in Azeri Turkish. These people don’t know the 
Ottoman language.”165  
While Huseynzade, Çəmənzəminli, and Zərdabi focused on the issue of which 
dialect would unite the Turkic-speaking world, other reformers turned to the question of 
 
163 Çəmənzəminli, 643. “Əsil dilimiz bazarlarda, xalqın toplandığı yerlərdə, tərəkəmə elinin içində 
danışılmaqdadır. Qələm sahiblərimiz buralara yönelib bunları öz dilleri ilə danışdırıb yol göstərməkdənsə, 
özləri düz yoldan çıxıb, camaatı da avara qoymaq istəyirlər.”  
164 Çəmənzəminli, 643. “Gərək yaddan çıxmasın ki, Azərbaycanda neçə milyon adam var və onların çoxu 
geridə qalıblar. Bu səbəbdən də gün-gündən əsir olub, əcnəbilərin ayağının altına düşürlər. Torpaqları, 
əkin yerləri əllərindən çıxır, ticarət gedir, sənətdən xəbərləri yox, milliyyət və tərəqqi nə olduğunu 
bilmirlər.”  
165 Çəmənzəminli, 644. “Bunları hansı dillə danışdırmalı ki, başa düşsün? Əlbəttə camaatın öz dili ilə, 
Azərbaycan türkcəsində. Osmanlı dilini bunlar bilməzlər.”  
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orthography and which alphabet best represented the true potential of the Turkic languages. 
Speaking of the millet, Ömər Faiq Nemanzadə’s 1904 article “Our Language and our 
Orthography” (Dilimiz və İmlamız) tackles the issue of Turkish orthography as reflected in 
the Perso-Arabic script. Like the previous reformers discussed, Nemanzadə was born into 
an upper-class Azeri family in the Caucasus. Having studied at the Fatih Madrasa in 
Istanbul, Nemanzadə nevertheless came to support secular education in the Caucasus. He 
worked as a journalist and newspaperman in Baku and Istanbul and was a close associate 
of Celil Məmmədquluzadə, the owner of Azerbaijan’s most successful satirical magazine 
Molla Nesreddin. In his article on orthography, Nemanzadə argues that a nation without a 
strong literary tradition resembles a person without language. 166  Nations that do not 
preserve their literary heritage, Nemanzadə argues, are destined to die out. Language issues, 
therefore, were of paramount importance.  
Like Huseynzade, Nemanzadə saw the newness of the Turkic language spoken in 
the Caucasus. He too pointed out the Arabic, Persian, Russian, and other linguistic 
influences on Azeri Turkish. However, Nemanzadə also argued that the orthography, or 
writing system, that the Turkic languages used needed to be reformed. In this his view 
reflected those of Münif Paşa in the Ottoman Empire. Both men sought to reform, rather 
than Latinize, the Turkic languages spoken by their societies. Nemanzadə wrote that “those 
who soil our language are the reason for its becoming unintelligible and for adopting 
thousands of Arabic and Persian rules which are not necessary for us [the Turks].”167 His 
recommendation was for the complete Turkification of all Arabic and Persian loanwords 
 
166 Ömər Faiq Nemanzadə, Dilimiz və İmlamız in Cəlal Bəydili (Məmmədov), Azərbaycan Publisistikası 
Antologiyası (Baku: Şərq-Qərb, 2007), 396-398.  
167 Nemanzadə, 398. “Böylə tək-tək sözlərin dərdinə yenə səbir etmək olar. Amma dilimizi bərbad edən, 
anlaşilmamağına səbəb olub bizə çox gərək olmayan (...) minlərcə ərəbcə, farsca qaydalar və ibarələrdir.” 
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as well as for reforms in how vowels are marked: “In short, I want to go through with 
writing [our words] in a more Turkified manner and to abandon many of the Arabic and 
Persian words and even rules that are not necessary.”168  
If Çəmənzəminli saw the Ottoman language as a threat to the continued 
development of local Azeri Turkish, then Nemanzadə saw the continued and uninterrupted 
primacy given to Arabic and Persian words and grammatical rules as an internal threat to 
the development of the language. He argued that reformers no longer had a need to guard 
the sacred Arabic and Persian forms and that adapting the language to the modern era meant 
bringing out its more Turkic characteristics. Nemanzadə was even an early advocate for 
language purification, or the removing of foreign (in this case Arabic and Persian) elements 
in a language and replacing them with those derived from the language itself. In particular, 
Nemanzadə called for the vowels to be marked more explicitly in Turkish print, arguing 
that it would increasing the speed of literacy and reading comprehension.  
 
3g. Yusuf Akçura and Ottoman Turkism  
The Young Turk movement had its origins as part of a larger secret organization, 
called ‘The Ottoman Union’ (İttihadı Osmani). The Ottoman Union was formed by 
members of the Ottoman military and medical academies who were all professionals and 
European-educated.169 By Erik Zürcher’s reckoning, the core membership was comprised 
of Muslim Albanians, Kurds, Circassians, and Turkic émigrés from Russian Caucasia.170 
 
168 Nemanzadə, 398. “Sözümün qısası, türkcəmizin varlığını, yaşamağını hamımızın bilikli, hünerli 
olmamızı, avam üçün yazılan kitabların, qəzetlərin anlaşılmasını istəyirsək bacardığımız qədər ‘gərəksiz’ 
və ‘artıq’ olan ərəbəcə, farsca sözləri, hələ qaydaların çoxunu buraxıb…” 
169 İskit Yayınevi, Resimli-Haritalı Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi, 3401.  
170 Zürcher, 99.  
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Actual Turks from Anatolia, Zürcher found, were not represented at all among the 
leadership of the Ottoman Union. 171  Even after the 1908 Revolution, the core of the 
Ottoman Union comprised of Muslim men with a median age of twenty-nine whose 
families had already been employed in the civil service. Their geographical concentration 
was from the Balkans, Istanbul, and, in a few cases, from Bursa and Izmir.172  
What unified the Ottoman Union movement, and the subsequent Young Turk 
movement that grew out of it, was therefore not bonds of Turkish ethnicity, but common 
visions on how to preserve the empire as a whole. This vision included reinstating the 1876 
Constitution, ensuring equality and security for all subjects of the empire regardless of 
religious affiliation, and promoting a sense of responsibility on the part of the empire’s 
ruling class towards the governed. Eventually, the group changed its name to the 
Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), which reflected both their 
desire to preserve the empire and to push it on the road towards modernization with 
scientific and technological progress.  
 The perilous state the Ottoman Empire found itself in at the beginning of the 
twentieth century prompted a new generation of intellectuals, activists, journalists, and 
military and state officials to examine what could be done to end the turmoil. It was among 
this generation that the first stirrings of Turkish nationalism were born. For the 
development of Turkish nationalism, no other contributor is as important as Yusuf Akçura, 
a Volga Tatar émigré to the Ottoman Empire. Akçura’s presence in the Turkish nationalist 
movement came with the publishing of the 1904 pamphlet Three Styles of Politics (Üç 
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Tarz-ı Siyaset) in the Cairo-based newspaper Türk.173 In this pamphlet, Akçura argued that 
the future of the Ottoman state lay in complete Turkification and that other sources of 
identity (including identities based on Ottomanism and Islamism respectively) would 
ultimately lead to a failure to consolidate society and stand up to the encroaching European 
powers. What Akçura sought to create then was ethnic and linguistic homogeneity out of a 
heterogeneous empire.   
  Yusuf Akçura, as stated before, was born in Russia to a Volga Tatar family. He was 
thus not Ottoman by birth, which is important to consider given his anti-Ottomanist 
sentiments in the 1904 pamphlet. Born into a distinguished Tatar family in the Volga region, 
Akçura grew up around industrial and intellectual elites who were well versed in Turkic 
languages and literatures. In fact, Akçura was related to Ibrahim Akçura, a distinguished 
professor of Turkic languages and literature, and by marriage to none other than Ismail 
Gasprinski, the founder of the influential newspaper Tercüman/Perevodchik. 174  His 
upbringing, therefore, afforded Akçura every opportunity to engage with scholars and 
activists, who had an eye towards the cultural empowerment of the Turks of Russia. Upon 
receiving an advanced education in both Istanbul and Paris, Akçura returned to the Volga 
region to take part in its industrialization. After finding this unfulfilling, Akçura accepted 
a teaching position in the Mahmudiye Medresesi in Kazan, instructing courses in history 
and geography. It was with teaching that Akçura became politically active and began 
contributing articles in various journals and newspapers. At the same time, he established 
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connections with secret Turkic societies in the Ottoman Empire looking to overthrow the 
despotic Hamidian regime.175  
 Akçura’s 1904 pamphlet, therefore, came at a time when he was establishing 
himself on the political scene in the Turkist national movement. In 1904, however, this 
movement was largely cultural in nature and was taken up by literary circles and select 
government and military officials. Expounding the need for Turkification, Akçura was 
writing against the more dominant articulations of identity: Ottomanism and Islamism. 
Ottomanism or the Ottoman national ideal, Akçura held, was a product of the Tanzimat 
period of the mid-nineteenth century. This period witnessed the rapid modernization and 
westernization of the Ottoman military, state bureaucracy, and ordering of society. It also 
introduced the standardization of the Ottoman legal system, granted legal equality to all 
Ottoman citizens regardless of religious affiliation, limited industrialization, and the 
introduction of private land ownership. In short, the Tanzimat era was one of tremendous 
change that put the empire in line with the European states.  
 What Ottomanism, as an ideology, held was that common Ottoman identity and 
solidarity should prevail over religious, ethnic, and linguistic affiliations. Turks, Arabs, 
Greeks, Armenians, Slavs, Jews, and others were declared equal both legally and in 
property-rights within the Ottoman vatan, or fatherland. This ideology was espoused by 
the Young Ottoman movement, which produced numerous plays, poems, and treatises that 
called upon the Ottoman citizenry at large to defend the fatherland from outside powers. 
The apex of the Young Ottoman movement was the establishment of the 1876 Constitution 
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(the first put into practice in Ottoman Empire) that formally guaranteed equality to subjects 
of the sultan within a constitutional framework.  
Akçura defines Ottomanism in very specific terms: “[As] a fundamental goal, 
[Ottomansm seeks] to introduce the same political rights and impose the same obligations 
on the Muslim and non-Muslim people in the Ottoman lands; as such, to grant [all peoples] 
religious and intellectual freedom; to bring equality in particular to all.”176 In this, Akçura 
wrote that Ottomanism imagined the empire to be similar to the United States in that it was 
a polity made up of a patchwork of ethnic, religious, and national communities. The final 
observation Akçura made about Ottomanist politics was that it “was not preoccupied with 
the Turks and Muslims outside Ottoman borders.”177  
Furthermore, Ottomanism, though a lofty ideal, was fundamentally incapable of 
reconcile diverse elements of society. The concept of a multiethnic fatherland, for Akçura, 
was preposterous because it did nothing to create a strong, unifying factor.178 Instead, 
Ottomanism recognized the religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences in society and tried 
to unite them under the banner of equal rights and privileges. As such, the very differences 
that were tearing the Ottoman Empire apart were not address and these guarantees by the 
state for equality was merely a bandage for what was a gaping wound.      
 The next style of governance that Akçura turns to is Abdülhamit’s preferred 
method: Islamism. Akçura refers to this as “Islamic politics” (İslamiyet politikası), 
claiming that the term Pan-Islamism was a European misnomer. 179  The ideology of 
Islamism, according to Akçura, entailed rallying Muslims “to try and create a single 
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nation…[which] all Muslims should be convinced of based on ‘religion and nation being 
one’ which every Muslim memorizes from the youngest age.”180 Akçura saw that this 
Islamist ideology was born from the disillusionment on the part of Ottomanists who saw 
the failure of the Ottoman fatherland to emerge in society. These reformers rallied around 
Abdülhamit and the notion of Muslim solidarity as the way to strengthen the empire. They 
sought, therefore, to empower the core of the empire’s population of which Muslims 
constituted the majority.   
Though Pan-Islamism claimed to be, in part, a reaction to the displacement of 
Islamic tradition by the modernization period of the preceding century, it in fact drew on 
modern notions of patriotism and state power that were unprecedented in Ottoman history. 
Islamism, therefore, reconstituted and refocused the direction of patriotism towards Islam. 
This reorientation, Akçura remarked, had led to significant changes to the Ottoman state. 
He claimed that schools devoted more time to Islamic studies than in the past, that “hodjas, 
imams, sayyids, sheikhs, and sheriffs filled the imperial palace,” and that religious pilgrims 
had recently become important in the eyes of the state.181  This was the result of the sultan 
and his ministers using the post-Tanzimat modern state, with its robust bureaucratic, 
military, and educational apparatuses, to steer society towards Islamic solidarities.  
By Islam, the Hamidian state meant Sunni Islam tied directly to imperial religious 
hierarchies and institutions. Non-imperial understandings and practices of Islam were cast 
as heterodox and often suppressed, as was the case with the Alevis in southeastern Anatolia 
who were forced to attend special Sunni schools. The Sunnism of Abdülhamit’s Islamist 
program allowed him and his ministers to capitalize on the title of Caliph of Islam and the 
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sultan’s tenure as the Protector of Mecca and Medina. Using these titles, the Ottoman state 
was able to elicit political mobilization from Muslims.  
 Akçura’s criticism of Islamism was based on his conception of the nation. The 
nation, Akçura believed, could not be established on the basis of sectarian or religious 
affiliation. As nations were products of the modern age, modern criteria (ethnicity, 
language, and kinship) had to be applied in their formation. Islam, in Akçura’s conception, 
did not fit these criteria, as it did not speak directly to Turkism. Turkism would, in his view, 
be marginalized in a polity that was based primarily on Islamic identity. He gave proof of 
this claim by citing that the Hamidian regime had already moved to suppress nationalism 
of any kind, including Turkism. What the Ottoman state needed, Akçura argued, was to 
reconstitute itself on Turkism: Turkish would serve as the common language of the empire 
and thus everyone would assimilate into Turkism.  
 Akçura’s concept of Turkism, however, needs to be explored to understand what 
exactly he was advocating. We have already stated that Akçura believed Ottomanism and 
Pan-Islamism as ideologies had failed to impose a uniformity on what had developed into 
a chaotic society. Akçura’s main objective in advocating for Turkism, therefore, was to 
offer a convincing roadmap that would implement order in a society that was quickly 
disintegrating. When this chaos and disintegration are taken into account, one understands 
the need for ideological movements such as Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism. Both of these, 
in their own way, promised to restore stability by coopting certain segments of the 
population into notions of patriotism and devotion. They deviated from each other on the 
methods, but not the ultimate objective. And it is through this lens, meaning the failure of 
these ideologies to produce order and homogenization, that Akçura launches his critique 
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and calls for the fostering of ethnically Turkish solidarities. What each ideology lacked, 




As Turkic intellectuals and reformers pushed for modernization to transform their 
societies along European lines, they ran up against the pressing issue of language and its 
relation to national identity. This question became a major preoccupation for reformers and 
permeated both the regional and trans-imperial levels in both the Ottoman and Russian 
empires. In the Ottoman capital Istanbul, these local currents embraced aspects of Turkism, 
Ottomanism, or Islamism, but limited the scope to their local societal and political situation. 
Likewise, their counterparts in Russian-controlled Transcaucasia, a center of the 
Turcophone press as important as Istanbul, also debated the merits of Islamism, Turkism, 
but espoused more local identities that stemmed from Azerbaijan’s historical 
connectedness to Persia and to the Caucasus. This diverse array of ideologies is seemingly 
contradictory and complex. It can, however, be categorized into two major camps: those 
ideologies that sought to privilege supranational identity (such as in Pan-Islamism and Pan-
Turkism) and those that sought to champion more local expressions of identity (such as 
Ottomanism, Persianism, and Caucasianism).  
For many, the mere fact that they spoke a local variant of Turkic (Ottoman Turkish 
and Azerbaijani respectively) did not necessarily mean that intellectuals and reformers 
identified as Turks. In fact, promoting Turkic identity to the detriment of Ottoman, Persian, 
Islamic, and even Russian identity took a lot of convincing. Even by the beginning of WWI, 
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it was not entirely certain that Turkic identity alone had won the day. This chapter has, 
therefore, mapped the major figures within the Turcophone press and charted where their 
ideas and objectives concerning language reform overlapped and intersected. This chapter 
has attempted to demonstrate that, far from being the dominant ideology at the time, Turkic 
national consciousness had to contend with formidable alternatives that were just as 
powerful in capturing the imagination of intellectuals and reformers in the Turkic press. 
This chapter has illustrated how the Transimperial Turcophone press took up the 
issues of language reform and Turkic nationalism, merging them into a single debate over 
the future identity and modernization of the Turks. These debates occured in the midst of 
tremendous political and social change in both the Russian and Ottoman empires. The issue 
of Turkic national identity and language became politicized like never before, with 
nationalists and reformers arguing that language would contribute greatly to the 
modernization of society. The debates between intellectuals in the Caucasus, for example, 
show the association of language with national identity, both at the regional and trans-
imperial level. Many of the reformers themselves had traveled in between the Ottoman and 
Russian empires and even to Europe for various educational and political reasons. They 
were reacting to the shifts in Europe due to nationalism and the encroachment upon their 
own soverienty through these modernized European societies. 
 Like Turkology, the emergence of the Turcophone press and the debates over 
language had important reprucussions for the future language reforms in the Soviet Union 
and Turkish Republic. As the next two chapers will demonstrate, the early debates over 
language in the pre-WWI Turcophone press raised questions of orthography, language 
purity, and the place of Arabic and Persian words in Turkic. These questions remained 
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unresolved in this period, but would be taken up with vigor by the new revolutionary states 
that replaced the Russian and Ottoman empires. Like Turkology, the revolutionary states 
would capitalize on previous debates such as the ones discussed in this chapter. Here, they 
imagined themselves as the successors of these debates or as the logical outcome of 







































4. Soviet Azerbaijan and The Revolutionary Latin Script (1923-1930) 
 
 
(Figure 3. The Opening of the Baku Conference)  
4a. Introduction    
The photo above is taken from footage documenting the opening proceedings of 
the 1926 Baku Turkological Conference.182 Upon viewing this footage, totaling around 
eight minutes and thirty seconds, the viewer finds themselves within a conspicuously 
Soviet setting. In the foreground of the shot, “Turko-Tatar” workers and peasants have 
descended upon Baku, the capital city of Soviet Azerbaijan, to hear debates on the future 
of all Turkic languages spoken within the Soviet Union. Facing their proletarian 
constituents, a panel of Soviet experts (party leaders, Turkologists, linguists, historians, 
and ethnographers) have come to debate the repeal of the Perso-Arabic script and its 
 
182 “1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı Görüntüleri,” in Prof. Dr. Kâmil Veli Nerimanoğlu & Prof. Dr. 
Mustafa Öner, 1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı: Tutanaklar (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008).    
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replacement with the European Latin alphabet. Presiding over the entire session is the 
portrait of the late Vladimir Lenin, which serves as a constant reminder of the principles of 
the October Revolution and its efforts to establish a new socialist civilization in Eurasia.  
The organizers of the Baku Conference, especially its principle organizer Səməd 
ağa Ağamalıoğlu, believed that replacing the Perso-Arabic alphabet with a writing system 
based on Latin was a revolutionary act, which would help guide the Turko-Tatar proliteriat 
from an immobile Islamic past into a bright future of modern and socialist civilization. The 
Perso-Arabic alphabet symbolized the Islamic past, which had succumbed within the last 
century to European imperialism. The Latinizers at Baku argued that, if the Turko-Tatar 
peoples were to escape the devistating effects of Tsarist colonial exploitation, they had to 
undergo a rapid transformation that would abandon Islam as their primary source of 
identity and adopt secular nationalisms. This massive transformation was to take place 
within the framework of Soviet National Policy, itself an ideology and political program 
still in the process of formation at the time of the conference. The Latin script, therefore, 
symbolized these revolutionary aspirations.  
In addition to Latinization, the speakers at the Baku Conference debated other 
linguistic issues. Also on the agenda the purification of the Turkic languages, which 
entailed a comprehensive purge of Russian, Arabic, and Persian loanwords from Turkic 
lexicons and replacing these foreign loanwords with indigenous and authentic Turkic 
equivalents. The goal, as with Latinization, of purification was to assist in the creation of 
standardized Turkic languages that would disseminate new nationalistms to the local 
populations. The Baku Conference was convened, after all, during the Soviet state’s 
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massive endeavor to delineate territorial republics across the non-Russian regions of the 
Soviet Union using ethnographic, linguistic, and historical research. 
The construction of Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia was the 
product of a long series of debates within the Soviet Communist Party about chauvinist 
policies in the non-Russian regions. Tsarist colonialism, the group around Vladimir Lenin 
and Josef Stalin argued, had long denied the non-Russians of the empire a national identity. 
This was especially true of the empire’s largest minority group, the Turko-Tatars who 
comprised ten percent of the overall population. This demographic, dispersed throughout 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia, needed to adopt news forms of nationality within the 
newly-delineated Soviet republics. Within these polities, both local national identity and 
Soviet socialism would be promoted through local languages, as opposed to Russian. By 
constructing territorial republics, the Bolsheviks were working against Russian chauvinism, 
the belief that all nationalities should assimilate into Russian culture, that Lenin’s 
governing faction held would prevent the spread of socialism on the non-Russian periphery.   
The transcripts of the 1926 Baku Turkological Conference are therefore littered 
with terms such as “national,” “Turkic,” “revolution,” “civilization,” and “socialist,” all 
invoked with similar revolutionary vision by the conference speakers. The result was a 
period of innovation and experimentation for the Soviet Turkic republics concerning how 
to reconcile Soviet socialism with their local and international identities and connections. 
In this effort, the conference drew from many of the Turkological findings of the past, 
especially those of Vasili Radlov whose honor was shared by Ismail Gasprinski’s as the 
conference dedication. 183  Soviet leaders in the Turkic republics sought to use this 
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Turkology, particular its linguistic and historical findings, to mold their populations along 
national lines. The different fields of research made tremendous contributions to the state’s 
large-scale effort to create non-Russian national republics. This meant that “Turko-Tatar” 
proletariat was to be the main beneficiary of the resolutions regarding language, national 
culture and identity. They were to be brought into the Soviet system not as Russified 
subjects, but as unique nationalities fostered at the local level.   
 
4b. Korenizatsiia: Soviet Nationality Policy  
 This section will examine the nature of Soviet Nationality Policy from April 1923, 
when the Russian Communist Party adopted korenizatsiia as its official policy towards the 
non-Russian nationalities, until the late 1930s, when the Soviet Union imposed a new 
policy of Russification.184 As such, it will lay out what factors lead to the adoption of 
korenizatsiia, as well as what this new policy enabled on the Soviet periphery. Without 
korenizatsiia and the support of Moscow, the reform of the Turkic languages spoken on 
the peripheries of the Soviet Union would not have been possible. Soviet Nationality Policy, 
therefore, provided structural as well as ideological shifts in how the non-Russian 
nationalities were to conduct their lives and integrate into greater Soviet society.  
 Korenizatsiia is a word coined from Russian in the early Soviet era that means 
“nativization” or “indigenization.”185 It is a term that has largely become synonymous with 
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“Soviet Nationality Policy” in the historiography of the Soviet periphery in the 1920s and 
1930s. By enacting this policy, the Bolsheviks sought to coopt the power of the nationalist 
movements that had been unleashed in the wake of the Russian Civil War (1818-1922). 
After the Bolsheviks came to power in the October 1917 revolution, they not only fought 
a civil war with White Russian (anti-Bolshevik) forces, but also had to navigate the touchy 
subject of the empire’s ethnic minorities of the empire. Wanting to undo a century of Tsarist 
policies of Russification and forced assimilation, the Bolsheviks’ first policy was to 
proclaim the right of these “nationalities” to independence and self-determination.  
This declaration was met with a wave of secessionist movements in Transcaucasia, 
Central Asia, and other areas of the Russian periphery. In Transcaucasia itself, Georgian, 
Armenian, and Azerbaijani nationalists collaborated to form the breakaway Transcaucasia 
Democratic Federal Republic in 1918, only to abolish this polity two months later in favor 
of full independence and self-determination for the three nationalities. Expediency, 
however, would spell doom for these republics as the Bolsheviks came to the realization 
that they could not survive without the resources of Russia’s former colonies, especially 
the oil located in Baku. The Red Army decided, therefore, to invade Transcaucasia in April 
1920 and, with the help of local Bolshevik sympathizers, established a Soviet in Baku.  
 With Bolshevik victory over the Whites the Civil War, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) was declared in 1922. The world’s first communist state, the USSR 
began as a coalition of the Russian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Launched from a revolutionary insurgency against the Tsar to the 
founders of a new state, Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders in Moscow found 
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themselves in a difficult situation in regard to Soviet policy on nationality. The Bolsheviks 
believed that socialism would emancipate the non-Russian groups from Tsarist colonialism 
and yet, the non-Russian nationalities once again found themselves part of the Russian state, 
albeit one undergoing the process of Sovietization. The debates over the best policy for the 
non-Russian Soviet nationalities were furious debate within the Soviet Communist party. 
One faction argued that, under a socialist state, nationality was an irrelevant concept. 
Instead, this side argued, the Soviet Union should spend its political capital on exporting 
Russia’s proletarian revolution to the periphery. To do this, this group sought to impose 
the Russian language, which they stylized the “language of October,” upon the non-
Russian minorities.  
 Lenin and Stalin vehemently disagreed and argued that these “Russifiers” were in 
danger of replicating Tsarist colonial practices. At the party congress in 1923, Lenin 
proposed a program of “nationalization” whereby the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow 
would sponsor and subsidize local communist parties on the periphery that would operate 
within “indigenous” cultural and linguistic parameters. The denial of non-Russian 
nationalities, Lenin and Stalin argued, would put the entire Soviet system in danger and 
jeopardize the spread of socialism. Like the “Russifiers,” Lenin and Stalin also strived to 
create of a socialist state that would sponsor an internationalist socialist revolution. 
However, as this revolution had not materialized, Lenin’s Bolsheviks argued that non-
Russian societies should develop along the continuum that Russia had: into modern nations. 
Nationalism, in Lenin’s estimation, was a necessary and unavoidable step on the road 
towards international socialism. What his side called for, therefore, was a coherent policy 
 
112 
to deal with the nationality question. To this end, Lenin and his cadre devised and 
implemented “Soviet Nationality Policy.”   
Western academic research on Soviet Nationality Policy has its origins in the early 
Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from World War Two as 
the two global superpowers. Early articles, mostly published in the academic journal The 
Russian Review from 1945 until the mid-1960s, assessed the contemporaneous application 
of Soviet Nationality Policy and evaluated this application against Soviet rhetoric. These 
articles were also interested in this policy as a potential model for other multiethnic states 
that were emerging in the aftermath of World War Two and the wave of global 
decolonization that followed it. Often, early scholarship traced the origins of Soviet 
Nationality Policy to the early declarations of the Bolsheviks after the October 1917 
Revolution that brought them to power. In these early declarations, the Bolsheviks—Lenin 
and Stalin in particular—stressed the right of all non-Russian minority groups to “self-
determination, including the right of secession from Russia.”186  
Realizing that the right of secession would ultimately harm the Soviet project, 
cutting the Bolsheviks off from Baku oil or Central Asian cotton, early scholarship on 
korenizatsiia explains that Soviet leaders decided to morph their new socialist state into 
“federal state of many nationalities,”187 or even a “melting pot”188 in which non-Russian 
nationalities would enjoy a degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy and Russian culture 
and language would be curtailed in the Soviet periphery.  
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and, in particular, the subsequent 
independence of states in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) 
allowed scholars of Soviet Nationality Policy both unprecedented access to new archival 
sources and travel to these countries themselves. Furthermore, in addition to Russian, 
scholars have slowly begun to learn the titular languages of the Central Asian and 
Transcaucasian republics, especially Uzbek. As such, the field opened to new theoretical 
approaches, including those that examined the experience of non-Russian Soviet 
nationalities from new perspectives of gender, nationalism, Islam. 189  What these new 
perspectives have signaled is the ultimate shift in the historiography towards examining 
center-periphery relationships in which non-Russian Soviet society is brought into the 
center of the discussion. In particular, Adrienne Lynn Edgar’s Tribal Nation: The Making 
of Soviet Turkmenistan has broken new ground in the analysis of how local communist 
elites in Soviet Turkmenistan received and negotiated the terms of Soviet National Policy 
with Moscow.190 Edgar’s focus on center-periphery, in particular, has inspired my own 
approach to researching and writing on the Turkic language reforms in Soviet Azerbaijan.  
Following Edgar’s example, I will limit my current chapter to addressing two vital 
components of Soviet Nationality Policy. The first is “the promotion of national cultures 
and elites in [the] non-Russian [Soviet] republics.”191 The promotion of national cultures 
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meant that the Russian language and Russians themselves were to be marginalized in the 
non-Russian Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan. The marginalization of the once-
dominant Russian culture, largely imposed upon the periphery through colonialism, would, 
in the words of Edgar, “distance the Soviet government from tsarist colonialism and 
convince non-Russian nationalities that it [the Soviet government] supported their 
aspirations for self-determination and cultural autonomy.”192  
The Bolsheviks, therefore, imagined a federal Soviet Union made up of various 
territorial republics whose borders corresponded to a particular ethnic group. The Soviet 
Union, in this estimation, was to form individual republics for Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 
Tajiks, Turkmen, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians, Ukrainians, and so on. Within these 
republics, the message of socialism would be spread through local languages (as opposed 
to Russian) and local communist parties would be staffed with native elites (as opposed to 
Russians) who would be able to preserve the cultural and linguistic autonomy of their 
particular republic. This was a policy, according to Terry Martin, that rendered the Soviet 
Union “an affirmative action empire” in that it would take the unprecedented step of 
“promoting national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many 
of the characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state.”193   
 
4c. Formation of Soviet Azerbaijan (1917-1936) 
This section will focus on the emergence of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist 
Republic (hence Azerbaijani SSR or Soviet Azerbaijan) with special attention to the 
interplay between state building and language politics. Both Azeri nationalists and their 
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Bolshevik successors subscribed to a view of linguistic engineering guided by political 
ideology. Thus, language reform and Latinization were increasingly debated within the 
parameters and needs of the modern Azeri nation-state.  
In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, Russian-colonized 
Transcaucasia proclaimed independence and formed the Transcaucasian Democratic 
Federative Republic. This federal union, consisting of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, 
lasted only one month (from April to May 1918), after each succeeded in favor of 
establishing its own independent state. Thus, on May 28th, 1918, the Muslim members of 
the Transcaucasian Seim (parliament) declared an independent Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic (ADR). Internally, the new Azerbaijani state had a population of two million, 
with Transcaucasian Tatars and Turks classified as “Azerbaijani.”194    
It was in this brief era (1918-1920) that both the First Armenian Republic and 
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic formed. The Armenian Republic was locked in a war with 
the Turkish Nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal and Kazim Karabekir, over claims to 
eastern Anatolia in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). The Azerbaijani Republic, for its part, 
struggled to gain international recognition as well as mediate the interethnic tensions 
between Turkic and Armenian groups that often bled into pro and anti-Bolshevik partisan 
movements.   
The new Azerbaijani republic was beset with external and internal complications 
from its inception. Externally, the Azerbaijanis were caught up in larger regional 
developments in the wake of the Russian Civil War, rise of Iranian nationalism following 
the Persian Constitutional Revolution, and the Turkish War of Independence. Iran, for 
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example, refused to recognize the new Azerbaijani republic, insisting that the toponym 
“Azerbaijan” constituted a province within Persia that was stolen under Tsarist colonialism 
in the 1810s to 1820s.195  Additionally, under the direction of Nuri Pasha, the half-brother 
of the Young Turk leader Enver Pasha, the Ottomans formed the “Army of Islam,” from 
their own 5th Army, and, operating on the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic rhetoric, invaded 
Transcaucasia in August 1918. Lastly, the new Azerbaijani state grappled with the Russian 
Civil War that divided its political leadership into those who strongly favored national 
independence and Bolshevik partisans who favored merging with Soviet Russia.  
Internally, it was the Russian Civil War that preoccupied Azerbaijani politicians 
the most. From the onset of independence, Azerbaijan’s government was formed by 
Memmed Emin Resulzade of the Musavat (Equality) Party. Espousing Azerbaijani 
nationalism, independence, and a strong Turco-Muslim identity, Musavat struggled to keep 
Bolshevik, Ottoman, and Persian interference in the new republic at bay while the new 
nation secured diplomatic recognition from the Paris Peace Conference. Against the 
Musavat Party stood the Muslim Socialist Himmät (Workers) Party, made up of 
Mensheviks who favored Azerbaijan’s national independence but along socialist lines. The 
Himmät also rejected appeals to Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamism and downplayed 
Azerbaijan’s ties with the Ottoman Turks. By 1919, the Himmät party had undergone a 
crucial merger between its old guard, led by Ağamalıoğlu, and its “Tiflis center,” made up 
of younger radicals, such as Mirzə Davud Hüseynov, Mir Fattah Müsavi, and Ahsum 
Aliyev.196  This merger between the old guard and the young radicals of Himmät would 
prove fateful for the future Latinization drive in Soviet Azerbaijan. Ağamalıoğlu and 
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Hüseynov were both to give impassioned speeches at the 1926 Baku conference in favor 
of Latinization.   
Local Bolsheviks, desiring a full union with Soviet Russia, were the strong political 
force against both the Musavat and Himmät. As the Himmät’s membership grew in 1919, 
so too did the local All-Russian Community Party-Bolsheviks (ARCP-B), which pushed 
for full union with Soviet Russia. Represented by the Baku Committee, the ARCP-B was 
headed by an Armenian Bolshevik named Anastas Mikoyan and Nariman Narimanov. 
Mikoyan held the view that the Himmätists were, in fact, “right-wing socialists” who were 
secretly promoting “chauvinistic” nationalists like pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism under 
the guise of socialism. 197   From exile in Russia, the Azerbaijani Bolshevik Nariman 
Narimanov proclaimed “Let the Soviet power be brought to all states and nationalities 
professing Islam: in ten years, they will achieve what they were unable to accomplish in a 
century.”198 Thus, local Bolsheviks like Mikoyan and Narimanov worked to spread the 
revolution within the young Azerbaijani nation and argued that communism was the only 
path towards advancement for Azeri Muslims.   
 In the midst of revolutionary turmoil, early Azeri politicians debated the issue of 
Turkic language and identity. At the forefront of these debates were educators who, under 
the Director of Education H. Şahtahtlı, debated the issue of the Azeri alphabet, which they 
referred to as “Turkish.” These debates over the alphabet were held at the Congress of 
Inspectors of the Higher and General Education, Peoples Schools, and the Teachers 
Training Directorates in December of 1918.199  In the ADR, the major debate over language 
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reform dealt with the question of reforming or changing the script completely. Those who 
wanted reform (ıslahatçılar) argued that the Arabic script represented the Azerbaijani 
people’s historical and cultural links to the greater Muslim world and that, with slight 
reforms, the present script was best suited to serve the new Azerbaijani state and its national 
ideals. Historically connecting Azeri Turks to the greater Muslim world, the reformers 
believed that overturning the Arab alphabet meant severing the nation from its religious 
and cultural roots. The so-called “reformers” came largely from the Musavat Party rank 
and file and from the influence of the remaining Young Turks in Azerbaijan, who wished 
to maintain linguistic connections to Ottoman Anatolia.200 
Their opponents, the Latinizers, argued that the Arabic script stifled the Azeri 
language, as it was not equipped to represent the full range of vowels and consonants in 
the language. Wishing to cut Azerbaijan free from pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic associations, 
the Latinizers argued that the Arabic alphabet represented the Turks’ past Islamic identity 
that they believed was the source of their societies’ stagnation and obstinacy in the face of 
modernizing change. Doing away with the Arabic script, the Latinizers argued, would mark 
a fresh beginning for the Azeri nation to reconstruct a modern and unique Azeri that would 
allow the country to advance in the modern modern, Europeanized world. Hailing this new 
age, early Azeri Latinizers called their proposed script the New Alphabet (Yeni Elifba).201      
The Red Army invasion of Transcaucasia in 1920 spelled the end of Azerbaijan’s 
independence from Russia and its incorporation into the Soviet Union. When the 
Bolsheviks took control of Baku in early 1920, they had to strike a compromise with the 
Himmät, now organized under the name Azerbaijani Communist Party-Himmät, in contrast 
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to their own faction. According to Swietochowski, this compromise entailed that “There 
was to be one Communist organization for all nationalities inhabiting Azerbaijan, and all 
references to its Muslim or Turkic character were to be dropped, as was the name Himmät. 
The party would be called Azerbaijani, a term carrying both territorial and national 
connotations.” 202   With the forging of a single Azerbaijani Communist Party, former 
Himmätists, such as Ağamalıoğlu and Hüseynov, merged with Azeri Bolsheviks like 
Narimanov and formed the core of the Azeri Bolshevik faction that would push for and 
host the Baku Conference.      
The Bolshevik invasion of Transcaucasia in 1920 meant the abolition of the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani independent states and their absorption into the Soviet Union. 
Bolshevik control of Transcaucasia signaled important shifts in the political arrangement 
of the region. Firstly, Bolshevik leadership in Moscow sought to support the Turkish 
Nationalist movement against the division of Anatolia by the British, French, Italian, and 
Greek states. Their control of Transcaucasia facilitated the Treaty of Kars (1920-21) that 
ended the war between Turkish nationalists and the First Armenian Republic, ceded eastern 
Anatolian territory lost to the Turks since the 1876-77 Russo-Turkish War, and paved the 
wave for official recognition from the Bolsheviks of the Turkish Nationalists as the 
legitimate government of Turkey. The signatories of the Treaty of Kars were the Russian, 
Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian Soviet republics and the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, with Kazim Karabekir acting as its delegate.  
When it was brought into the Soviet Union in 1920, Soviet Azerbaijan was 
technically designed as a “sub-republic” of the greater Transcaucasia Federative Soviet 
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Socialist Republic (TFSSR, 1922-1936), which also included the Armenian and Georgian 
SSRs. The TFSSR was a federated Soviet republic in the North Caucasus and the successor 
state to the independent Caucasian republics that emerged with the Russian Civil War 
(1918-1923). In 1936, the Soviet Transcaucasian Federation was abolished and the three 
republics were granted “independence” from one another. Thus, the 1926 Baku 
Turkological Conference was held in the period when Azerbaijan strove to make 
differentiate itself by taking on Soviet Nationality Policy by hosting the conference and 
projecting Baku as the center of Soviet linguistic modernity in the new socialist order.  
The formation of national republics in the Soviet Union was seen by Lenin and his 
associates as “a natural and essential stage of historical development,” especially if non-
Russian groups were to progress towards socialism.203 Nationalism, for the Bolsheviks, 
was the spark for the modernization of European societies, as it led to the emergence of 
both capitalism and industrialization. The Bolsheviks, therefore, believed that the 
nationalist stage of human development was a regrettable, yet necessarily, one through 
which all nations had to pass on the road towards socialist internationalism. It was best 
practice, in their estimation, to promote national consciousness within Soviet territorial 
republics so that the non-Russian nationalities would develop, modernize, and industrialize 
under socialist conditions. Socialism was the Soviet’s ultimate objective; national 
consciousness and territorial republics were merely a means to that end.  
The second component this chapter will address is the actual implementation of this 
policy in the area of language reform in Soviet Azerbaijan. It was one thing to espouse the 
principles of indigenization, but quite another to enact these policies in real life. In the 
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1920s, this task seemed almost insurmountable in areas such as Central Asia where there 
were many ethnic groups that did not have a “necessary relationship to specific 
geographical locations.”204 Transcaucasia, I maintain, presented the Bolsheviks with less 
problems in that nation-states and national boundaries existed briefly before the 
establishment of the Soviet Union. Though the experience of nation-states in 
Transcaucasia’s was brief and highly contested, Bolshevik leaders were able to draw upon 
this past experience in the formation of territorial republics during the 1920s and 1930s. In 
Soviet Turkestan (Central Asia today), a program of “national delimitation,” defined by 
Edgar as process whereby the Soviets drew “administrative borders [corresponding] as 
closely as possible to the boundaries between ethnic groups,” was enacted to physically 
bring national republics into being. Azerbaijan, due to its brief experience with independent 
statehood, presented a more straightforward case for Soviet Nationality Policy.205  
In addition, in Azerbaijan local identity was fluid and alternated between Islamic, 
Persian, Turkic, and local Azerbaijani, Georgia, and Armenian particularities. Furthermore, 
like other national republics of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijan SSR was far from 
ethnically homogenous. Azerbaijan was technically one “sub-republic” in the greater 
Transcaucasia Federative Soviet Socialist Republic (formally abolished in 1936), which 
also included Armenian and Georgia. 
Azerbaijani society was transformed dramatically by incorporation into the Soviet 
Union. Seeking to invest in oil production, Soviet leadership quickly launched industrial 
and urbanization campaigns in Baku. At the same time, the local government was tasked 
with expanding the benefits of socialism (schooling, services, housing). In all this change, 
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Azerbaijani society grappled with several components of its identity, namely Persian, 
Turkic, and Islamic. Furthermore, all of these identities were intimately intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing. As Soviet Nationality Policy became Soviet practice in the 1920s, 
Soviet Azerbaijan moved to subordinate Persian and Islamic elements to Turkic identity. 
Furthermore, the official language of the Soviet Azerbaijan until the 1930s was referred to 
as “Türk dili” (Turkish).  
From Moscow’s standpoint, Islamic and Turkish identity both posed a problem for 
the formation of Soviet identity. After all, Islamism and Turkism continued to claim 
primordial links to groups outside of both Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union proper. These 
links, the Bolsheviks feared, would provide the Muslim Turks of the Soviet Union with an 
alternative and directly oppositional ideology. If Islamic or Turkic identities were allowed 
to follow their natural courses then greater adherence to and participation in the Soviet 
project would be impossible to come by.  
Nevertheless, the 1926 Baku Conference did appeal to the “Turko-Tatar nations” 
of the Soviet Union to come together to decide the future of their own languages. Implicit 
in this arrangement is the assumption that “Turko-Tatars” across the Soviet Union 
represented foremost a distinct national entity, rather than a familial, village, urban, tribal, 
or religious one. This was the assumption among the Soviet Turkic, European, and Turkish 
reformers present at the conference. They there operated within nationalist paradigms to 






4d. The Organization of the Baku Conference  
The lead-up to the Baku Conference was widely reported in the Bolshevik press, 
including the periodical Molla Nesreddin.206 In a January 1926 issue of the newspaper, 
the cover ran a caricature that illustrated the exact stakes of the conference.
 
(Figure 4. Molla Nesreddin, January 1926) 
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In the illustration, members of the Azerbaijani proletariat are throwing both the Arabic 
letters and books printed in this script out of the window and into the trash. The act of 
“trashing” the old script represented the views of the Latinizers, who sought to use the up-
coming conference to institute the New Turkish Alphabet across the Soviet Turkic 
republics. The caption of the image reads “Azerbaijani worker—search and dispose of this 
your oldness. We will clean house, we will have a conference.”207 Whether or not the 
editors of Molla Nesreddin supported Latinization, this image speaks to the growing 
popularity of the movement on the eve of the conference. Soviet modernization meant that 
the non-Russian periphery needed to be transformed both materially and culturally. The 
association of the alphabet with writing, books, and ultimately literacy, meant that 
switching alphabets would require a large educational infrastructure to train the population 
in reading the new script. Thus, the Baku Conference convened not only linguists and 
Turkologists, but also educational officials as well as local party leaders.  
 As the conference attendees entered Ismailiyya Palace, the conference venue, they 
would have passed through an entry exhibit, spanning several rooms, dedicated to 
Turkology. There were rooms in which “books, charts, and placards [were] in Turkish; [as 
well as] a special pavilion dedicated to special Turkic epigraphs possessing different 
models of Turkic writing from the 7th century up until the present day and up to the new 
Turkic alphabet in Latin characters.”208 The attendees, just by moving around in this space, 
could discern which way the wind of the conference was blowing. Not only were the Turkic 
epigraphs, books, and manuscripts on display for intellectual or academic interests, but 
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they were positioned in a continuum in which one could clearly mark the progression of 
the Turkic languages. This continuum ran from the earliest Turkic alphabets, embodied in 
photographs of the Orhon Inscriptions, with the Perso-Arabic script, still marking a 
significant historical contribution to these languages, and ended with the Latin script.  
The location of Baku was significant in this presentation: the Azerbaijan SSR had 
decided, three years before the current conference in 1923, to Latinize Azeri Turkish 
(called “Türk dili” or “Turkish” at the time). But even this was three years after the first 
Turkic language, Yakut (Sakha) was latinized in 1920, thereby making it the first Turkic 
language to undergo this process. 209  Azerbaijani Bolsheviks, such as Ağamalıoğlu, 
Musabeyov, and Hüseynov, could claim that the Latinization of the Turkic languages, even 
as the conference was underway, was an undeniable fact and one that seemed to be 
propelled by the winds of modernization. The Baku Conference’s choice, therefore, was 
whether or not to coopt what was seen as an inevitable process into the official program of 
Soviet National Policy.  
 To the 131 attendees to the conference, the Turkological displays in the Ismailiyya 
Palace added to the gravitas of the event itself, not the least of which was due to the 
extensive coverage the Soviet press afforded the arrival of the delegations. Joseph 
Castagné, 210  an esteemed French ethnographer and historian of the Russian Turks, 
published a contemporary report of the 1926 Conference, stating that “For its part, the 
Soviet press seized upon this idea [to hold the conference] and devoted some articles on 
 
209 Şimşir, 97.  
210 For more of Castagné’s bibliography, see Joseph Castagné, « Étude historique et comparative des 
statues babas des Steppes Khirghizes et de Russie en général » in Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société 
d'anthropologie de Paris Vol. 1, No. 1 (1910), pp. 375-407 ; Joseph Castagné, “Monuments cyclopéens 
dans le Ferghana,” in Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d'anthropologie de Paris VIe Série, Tome 5 
fascicule (1914), pp. 7-10.  
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this grand event. In the first days of January [a month before the conference was to take 
place] Zaria Vostoka in Tiflis announced the opening of the Congress of Turkology in 
Baku, the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan.” 211  The attendees came from different ethnic 
backgrounds: by Castagné’s account, 98 of the 131 attendees were “Turko-Tatar,” and the 
remaining 33 comprised of different nationalities. The Presidium of the conference was 
broken down into, in the estimation of Castagne, “22 members of whom six Russians, three 
Azerbaijanis, two Turkmens, two Bachkirs [a Turkic group residing on either side of the 
Ural mountains], and seven Turko-Tatars of different nationalities, and one Anatolian 
Turk.”212  
 What is interesting about Castagné’s breakdown of the Presidium’s ethno-national 
makeup is his hesitation with the concept of “nationality” itself. Not merely a default in his 
observation, this confusion over nationality versus ethnicity was widespread both in the 
Soviet Union and abroad. True, he does mention specific nationalities—Russian, 
Azerbaijani, Turkmen, and Bachkir—he also does not see it fit to mention several other 
nationalities of the “Turko-Tatar” group he mentions. Who exactly was “Turko-Tatar” as 
opposed to “Azerbaijani” or “Bachkir” remained fluid not only in the account given by 
Castagné, but in the very speeches given by the “Turko-Tatar” participants. This ambiguity 
reflected the constantly-shifting national delineations that accompanied Soviet nation 
building.    
    
 
 
211Castagné, 19.   
212Castagné, ibid. For a second breakdown of the participants, see Kamil Veli Nerimanoğlu, “1926-Bakü 
Türkoloji Kurultayı Üzerine,” in Kemil Veli Nerimanoğlu & Mustafa Öner, 1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı 
Tutanaklar (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), pp. 11-21.  
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4e. “Turko-Tatar Workers and Peasants” within Soviet Socialist Modernization  
Səməd ağa Ağamalıoğlu 
 The principle protagonist in the Baku Conference was no doubt Səməd ağa 
Ağamalıoğlu.  
Serving as both People’s Commissar for Azerbaijan and on the all-Union Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee (1922-1929), Ağamalıoğlu had risen high in Bolshevik ranks 
in the 1920s. During the formative period of Soviet Azerbaijan, Ağamalıoğlu and his 
associates directed the course Soviet modernization in Azerbaijan through the expansion 
of education and print media sectors to achieve mass literacy. Ultimately Sovietization in 
Transcaucasia and Central Asia aimed to transform a society based from one based on the 
rural peasantry to a modern, urbanized, and socialist society.  
Included in this massive transformation of society was the issue of language and 
language education. Not only did Sovietization seek to achieve mass literacy, but it also 
sought to equip the non-Russian republics with modernized, national languages. In seeking 
to transform his own Turkic dialect, Azeri Turkish, Ağamalıoğlu pushed for complete 
Latinization. He helped to establish the New Turkish Alphabet Committee (Yeni Türk Elifba 
Komitesi) in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1922, four years before the Baku Conference.213 This 
committee successfully drafted a modified Latin alphabet for the Azerbaijani Turkish 
language. Subsequently, Ağamalıoğlu’s committee set to work “with an unshaken belief 
and a clean conscience” disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet (Yeni Türk Elifba) 
through educational and print media channels.214 To help in the dissemination of the New 
Turkish Alphabet, the Soviet Azerbaijani government commissioned a weekly periodical, 
 
213 Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurum Yayınları, 2008), pp. 98-154.  
214 Quote from Şimşir, 98. “…sarsılmaz bir iman ve temiz bir vicdan ile bakmalarıdır.” 
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Yeni Yol (The New Path) as well as 15,000 pamphlets and 12,000 booklets all printed in 
the new alphabet.215 In 1923, the Azerbaijani SSR gave equal status to the Arabic and Latin 
alphabets and abolished the Arabic script outright the following year. Included in these 
publications was an explanation of “why the Arabic alphabet was not sufficient for 
Turkish.”216 
A such, Ağamalıoğlu intended for the Baku Conference to serve as the ideal 
platform to promote Latinization not only for Azeri Turkish but for all the titular languages 
of the newly-establish Soviet Turkic republics: Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh 
respectively. Latinization would endow these newly-standardized languages with modern, 
efficient alphabets. This entailed a transformation not only of the print media sphere, but 
also of educational and governmental institutions as well. Latinization, in Ağamalıoğlu’s 
estimation, would underpin the entire project of Soviet modernization in the Caucasus and 
in Central Asia. 
“The East sleeps no longer,” Ağamalıoğlu proclaimed as he opened the first session 
of the Baku Turkological Conference in 1926.217  
The beneficent waves of the Russian Revolution have enveloped the cities 
of the old East, they have spread from seas to oceans, have called the people 
from ignorance to the establishment of a new life, have broken the chains 
of bondage for the peoples of the once colossal empire, and have prevailed 
over death itself.218  
 
215 Şimşir, 98.  
216 “Yeni Elifba Komitesi’nin görmüş ve göreceği işler,” Yeni Yol, Haftalık edebi, içtimai, bitaraf Türk 
gazetesi, Bakü, 7.10.1922, yıl I, No. 3, s. 1-2.” Cited in Bilal Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi, 2. Baskı (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), 99.   
217 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 51.  
218 Kamil Vəli Nərimanoğlu & Əliheydər Ağakişiyev, 1926-cı İl Bakı Türkoloji Qurultayı (Stenoqram 
materialları, bilblioqrafiya və foto-sənədlər) (Bakı: Çinar Çap, 2006), 17. There are two published versions 
of the conference proceedings I will employ in this chapter. The 2006 version, compiled by Nərimanoğlu 
and Ağakişiyev is an Azerbaijani language translation of the Russian-recorded proceedings. The second is a 
Turkish translation published by the Turkish Language Commission (Türk Dil Kurumu): Prof. Dr. Kamil 
Veli Nerimanoğlu & Prof. Dr. Mustafa Öner, 1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı (Tutanaklar) 26 Şubat – 6 




Ağamalıoğlu spoke of a new dawn for the peoples of the East in which they would finally 
take control over their own cultural affairs and decide their own destinies. 219 If the old 
Tsarist Empire had forced policies of assimilation, Christianization, and Russification, then 
the Soviet state promised a new era of socialism where the ethnic minorities—particularly 
Turco-Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia—would enjoy a large degree of 
economic and cultural autonomy. As he stood in front of the attendees seated inside 
Ismailiyya Palace, Ağamalıoğlu claimed that rhetoric was being matched with action in the 
convening of the conference itself.220  
At first glance, it might seem strange to us in the present that Bolshevik leaders 
would choose the Latin script, especially given its association with capitalist Europe. In 
the Caucasus and Central Asia of the 1920s, however, the Latin alphabet was viewed 
mostly as a neutral script that did not carry the baggage of either the Arabic or Cyrillic 
scripts. The Arabic alphabet, Ağamalıoğlu’s group proclaimed, was synonymous with 
Islam, superstition, and ignorance. And yet, they also associated the Cyrillic script with 
Russian culture forced upon the Turkic peoples through the violence of colonialism. For 
the participants of the Baku Conference, neither of the Arabic nor the Cyrillic alphabet 
could assist the Soviet Turkic peoples in their advance towards socialist modernization and 
cultural autonomy promised by Soviet Nationality Policy. The pervasive feeling leading 
 
translated the proceedings from Russian into Azerbaijani, which comprised the 2006 version. Öner, in turn, 
translated Nerimanoğlu’s Azerbaijani version into modern Turkish.  
219 Photograph is of Ağamalıoğlu speaking at the opening ceremony of the conference. Taken from “1926 
Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı Görüntüleri,” in Prof. Dr. Kâmil Veli Nerimanoğlu & Prof. Dr. Mustafa Öner, 
1926 Bakü Türkoloji Kurultayı: Tutanaklar (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008). “Büyük Rus 
İnkılabının şefkatli dalgaları koca Şark’ın şehirlerine yayıldı, denizlerden okyanuslara kadar yayıldı, 
cehalet içinde olan halkları çağdaş hayata çağırdı ve ilk olarak geçmişteki dev imparatorluğun halklarının 
cesaret zincirlerini kırdı, ölümü ölümle üsteledi.”  
220 J. Castagné, Le Congrès de Turkologie de Bakou (Mars 1926) (Editions Ernest Leroux: Paris, 1926), 24.  
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up to the 1926 Conference was that the Latin alphabet, largely free of the cultural baggage 
of the other two scripts, would provide a neutral basis upon which modernization of 
language, and society, could occur.221 
In surveying the speeches given at the first session of the conference, it is clear that 
exactly who comprised “the peoples of the East” was constantly shifting. Ağamalıoğlu 
himself, as well as the speakers after him, used several terms interchangeably: Turko-Tatar 
peoples (Türk-Tatar halkları), national designations such as Azeri, Turkmen, and Uzbek, or 
simply the East (Şark). Ağamalıoğlu’s use of national designations coincided with the 
program of national delineation that was underway across Soviet Central Asia. During this 
process, Soviet ethnographers were charged with scouring genealogical and historical 
records pertaining to the various tribal confederations in Turkestan and, in turn, using these 
records to mold Turkestan into a region of individual national republics based on 
ethnicity.222 Ağamalıoğlu, being a Soviet official in Azerbaijan himself, began to use these 
national categories, where they had previously not existed, in order to help naturalize the 
idea among the Soviet ruling and intellectual cadres.  
The naturalization of national categories did not mean that Soviet officials at the 
Baku Conference lost sight of class issues. On the contrary, Ağamalıoğlu, and other 
participants in the first session, did not merely concentrate on newly-created national 
categories, but also reinforced and even privileged the class element of their concerns. As 
 
221 Jala Garibova & Betty Blair, “Arabic or Latin? Reform at the Price of a Battleship” in Azerbaijani 
International, Spring 2000, pp. 56-61, 
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222 For more about this process, see: Francine Hirsh, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the 
Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Adrienne Lynn Edgar, “Chapter One: 
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such, they made constant reference to revolutionary terms such as proletariat, masses of 
workers and peasants, or the working class, in order to underscore the overall object of the 
Soviet Union of creating national republics not for their own sake, but for the sake of Soviet 
socialist developmentalism in which national identity was seen as a prerequisite for 
proletarian identity. As Gazanfer Musabeyov, a prominent Azerbaijani Bolshevik 
participant at the conference, stated “our singular goal is forming a new socialist society 
and doubtless, to aim for a widespread indigenous civilization in this [non-Russian Soviet] 
society.”223  
The main point of entry as far as identity was concerned, however, was the Turko-
Tatar proletariat and peasants. This category, both national and class-based, encompassed 
the group the conference participants sought to empower in the new Soviet dispensation. 
As such, the conference portrayed the Turko-Tatar proletariat and peasants as a particularly 
marginalized group continually struggling to overcome centuries of Tsarist Russification 
and colonial policies. Ağamalıoğlu himself pointed to two factors that prevented this group 
from advancing towards modernization. The first fact was indeed past Russian colonialism 
(Rus mutlakiyeti or Romanov imperyası in the Turkish and Azerbaijani translations of 
Ağamalıoğlu’s speech).224  
The legacy of colonialism had left a devastating legacy for the Turko-Tatar peoples, 
something that speech after speech emphasized during the first session of the conference. 
The grip of the Tsarist colonial policies had prevented the Turko-Tatar proletariat from 
realizing their own destiny as a national entity. In this regard, the Bolshevik Revolution of 
 
223 Kamil Vəli Nərimanoğlu & Əliheydər Ağakişiyev, 17; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 56. “Bizim tek amacımız 
yeni sosyalist toplumunu oluşturmak ve bu toplumda, şüphesiz, yaygın bir şekilde yerleşmiş medeniyeti 
amaçlamaktır.” 
224 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 21; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 51.  
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1917 was championed by Ağamalıoğlu and others as the event that finally broke Tsarist 
control over the Turkic world and ushered in a new era of socialism and self-determination. 
Now that the empire had collapsed under the might of a socialist revolution, the new Soviet 
state’s principle mission was to reverse colonialist policies and allow the Turko-Tatar 
workers and peasants to acculturate to the new order on their own terms and through their 
own languages.    
The second factor that prevented the Turko-Tatar peasants and workers from 
advancing towards modernization was the prevalence of “ignorance” and “superstition” 
among the Turko-Tatar workers and peasants. One of the prominent speakers of the 
Congress’ first session, Gazenfer Musabeyov, the ASSR’s People’s Commissar of 
Nationalities as well as a member of the Central Executive Committee of the of the USSR, 
who detailed the problems that such an “unscientific” and “ignorant” mentality could have 
for the future development of the Turko-Tatars of the new Soviet order.225 His attendance 
and participation in the Baku Conference was captured and he shows up in the footage as 
the second man from the right in the still below. Stating that the ultimate objective of the 
Congress was to assist in the process of bringing socialism to the non-Russian groups, 
Musabeyov affirmed that “Our single goal is to create a new socialist society and, doubtless, 
to aim for a flourishing civilization as broadly as possible.”226  
 
225 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 21; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 51, 55.  
226 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 22; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 51, 55. In the Azerbaijani edition, the sentence 
reads “…geniş inkişaf etmiş mədəniyyət nəzərdə tutur…” whereas in the Turkish translation, the same 




(Figure 5. Baku Conference Attendees)  
In order to achieve this goal, Musabeyov argued, past superstitious and religious 
mentalities needed to give way to a scientific view of society under the guise of state 
socialism. The Baku Conference, therefore, signaled an instrumental step towards this 
process. In this sense, therefore, it was more of a Conference on how to proceed with 
socialist modernization than it was about the merits of this modernization in and of itself.  
Musabeyov’s speech, therefore, lays out two important stakes. The first is that the 
Baku Conference should assist in the process of creating and empowering the non-Russian 
nationalities to develop their own thing at stake was using science to help direct all Soviet 
society—Russian and otherwise—towards a common socialist future where ignorance, 
backwardness, and superstition would be overcome. Musabeyov highlighted these two 
stakes in his speech 
The Turkological Conference, which proceeds from these 
fundamental conditions, will specify the new roads for the Eastern peoples’ 
complete scientific transition. We, comrades, have witnessed great 
scientific achievements in this field. However, today I should say that we 
still have a lot of deficiencies and [this] Turkology Congress should specify 
the ways and the fundamental stages of investigation of these subjects in the 
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future. The agenda of the Conference is completely suited to all of these 
demands.227    
 
Without the complete leap of the Eastern peoples—especially the Turko-Tatar workers and 
peasants—towards a modernity rooted in the latest scientific and technological innovations, 
the transition from national to socialist identity, upon which the entire rationale and 
justification of the Bolshevik’s nationality policy rested, would be called into question. It 
was thus dire that the participants at the Baku Congress discuss the issue of the alphabet—
the very vehicle that was to bring this scientific socialist modernization to the population—
in as much of a scientific and rational manner as possible.  
Not only would the conference settle important Turkological issue regarding 
language reform and Latinization, but it would also recreate the very methodology used to 
approach Turkological issues in the future. In addition to fostering a social revolution 
whereby in the very script of the language was embedded the socialist modernization 
desired, the conference would mark the beginnings of a disciplinary revolution within the 
field of Turkology meaning that Turkological methodology would be determined by 
academic institutions in the Soviet Turkic republics, Baku, for example. In a sense, 
therefore, the stakes of the 1926 Baku Turkological Conference included taking command 
of the very discipline that had come to define its “Turko-Tatar” participants as well as, 
though in different ways, their Russian colleagues. This meant that the lines between 
 
227 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 22; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 56. “Qurultayımızın gündəliyi bütün bu tələblərə 
tamamilə cavab verir.” “Bu temel şartlardan yola çıkan Türkoloji Kurultayı, Şark halklarının her yönlü 
ilmî çerçevesi için yeni yollar belirleyecektir. Biz, yoldaşlar, bu alanda büyük ilmî başarılara şahit olduk. 
Fakat bugün onu da söylemem gerekir ki, daha birçok eksikliğimiz var ve Türkoloji Kurultayı bu konuların 
gelecekte araştırılmasının temel aşamalarını ve yollarını belirlemelidir. Kurultayımızın gündemi tüm bu 
gerekçelere tamamen uygun düşmektedir.”  
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Russian and non-Russian were to be dissolved during the conference, which was the very 
thing Soviet Nationality Policy was trying to achieve in the first place.  
 Musabeyov indicated the last point in his speech:  
Comrades, it is not a coincidence that the Inaugural Turkological 
Conference of the Soviet Union has chosen the city of Baku, the capital of 
Azerbaijan, as its work site [çalışma yeri olarak]. Azerbaijan, with its 
geographical situation as the gate to the East as well as great cultural and 
economic successes which the workers achieved within the last five years, 
deserved this great honor to host Turkology’s scientific representatives as 
well as the representatives of our brother republics.228 
 
There is no doubt from this that Musabeyov intended Baku, with its relatively well-
established universities and oil industry, to be the new center of Turkology. Azerbaijan, 
according to him, was the “gate to the East” upon which the Soviet socialist modernization 
would pass.  
Other speakers emphasized Azerbaijan’s unique location for different ends. In the 
opening speech of Mirzə Davud Hüseyov, serving simultaneously as the People’s 
Commissar for Economic Affairs and Foreign Affairs, said  
As all of us know, in this Baku, in which we have organized our 
current session, Tsarist politics was carried out with specific attention. The 
politics carried out here were manifest in an effort to erdicate the [Turko-
Tatar] nations by their own hand. Now you all possess a brotherly federation 
of three republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and George—and an independent 
union of Caucasian nations in these same Caucasus today.229  
 
 
228 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 21; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 56. “Yoldaşlar, I. Sovyetler Birliği Türkoloji 
Kurultayı’nın, Azerbaycan’ın başkenti Bakü şehrini çalışma yeri olarak tercih etmesi tesadüfî değildir. 
Şark’ın giriş kapısı gibi coğrafi durumuyla ve son beş yıl içinde emekçilerin kazandıkları büyük kültürel ve 
iktisadi başarılarıyla Azerbaycan aziz konuklarını, Türkolojinin ilmî temsilcilerini ve bize kardeş olan 
cumhuriyetlerin temsilcilerini ağırlamak gibi yüksek şerefli hak etmiştir.”  
229 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 26; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 61. “Hepimizin bildiği gibi Azerbaycan’ın 
başkentinde, şu an oturumumuzu gerçekleştirdiğimiz bu Bakü’de Çarlığın politikası özel bir dikkatle 
gerçekleştirildi. Burada yürüttüğü siyaset Çarlığın esarette olan bir halkı diğerine düşürerek, bu halkları 
birbirlerinin eliyle yok ettirmeye çalışması şeklinde tecelli ediyordu. Şimdi ise aynı Kafkasya’da sizler 
Kafkasya halklarının bağımsız ittifakına, 3 cumhuriyetin, Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve Gürcistan’ın kardeş 
federasyonuna sahip bulunuyorsunuz.”  
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In this, Hüseyov highlighted the particular experience of Russian colonialism in 
Transcaucasia and particularly in Baku. To him, colonialism was not an abstract enemy, 
but had led a direct assalt on all the peoples of Transcaucasia with the expressed aim of 
“erdicating the Turko-Tatar nations.”230 Like Ağamalıoğlu, Hüseynov gives a territorial 
definition of the “Turko-Tatar” nations, stating that they encompass the peoples residing 
“In a general area beginning from the Altay mountains to the great Volga, from the lonely 
deserts of Turkestan, and from the snowy peaks of the Caucasus and ending with beautiful 
Crimea.”231  
The conference offered for revolutionaries like Hüseyov an opportunity to rescue 
the impoverished Turko-Tatar workers and peasants from the brink of erdication. Not 
surprisingly, Hüseyov advocated in his opening speech for the material improvement in the 
lives of Transcaucaisa’s nationalites in addition to their cultural advancement. In this, 
Hüseyov seemed to echo Musabeyov, who advocated for the implementation of science in 
the daily lives of the Turko-Tatar nationality. Though the application of science in all 
sectors of life would no doubt transform and even modernize the traditional patterns of life 
in Transcaucasia, it would not inherently seek to redress the past wrongs of Tsarist 
colonialism.  
Inherent in Hüseyov’s political ambitions for the conference, therefore, was 
material redress or reparations for the Turko-Tatar peoples. 232 Only with material redress, 
which would be allocated to the Soviet periphery, could the greater project of 
 
230 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 26; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 61.  
231Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 26; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 61. “…Atlay dağlarından büyük Volga’dan, 
Türkistan’ın tenha çöllerinden, Kafkasya’nın karlı zirvelerinden başlayan ve güzel Kırım ile sona eren 
geniş bir araziyi kaplamaktalar.”  
232 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 26-27; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 61-62.   
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modernization and cultural transformation take place. The issue of the alphabet for 
Hüseyov was intimately tied to this overall project. Looking towards the future, he stated 
that the issue of the alphabet would no doubt result in “a strong break” with the past. Not 
only would the new alphabet be implemented in Soviet schools, but it would be the very 
vehicle by which the Turko-Tatar workers and peasants would finally achieve this material 
and cultural transformation. For Hüseyov, the stakes of the debate over changing the 
alphabet could not be higher.  
However, rather than stating a preconceived opinion either way, he called on the 
conference participants to analyze the issue of alphabet reform not from an ideological 
standpoint, but from scholarly expertise and as neutral and objective as possible. He 
wrapped up his speech by stating “I think our Turkological Conference, in which the 
representatives of the entire Turkic peoples of our great Union and talented scholars are 
participating, will approach this subject [of alphabet reform] with complete objectivity and 
neutrality and will reach a solution in which our people will reap great benefits 
[çıkarları/mənafə].”233 Stating that the Azerbaijani SSR had successfully implemented its 
own Latin-based alphabet three years prior, Hüseyov alerted the participants to the fact that, 
three years in, the implementation had yielded good results.  
Representatives from the “Turko-Tatar” Soviet republics where not the only ones 
to advocate for the revolutionary nature of the Baku Conference. Nor were they the only 
ones to advocate for both Soviet modernization of the Turkic periphery and material redress 
for the past wrongs of Tsarist colonialism. One such figure was Mikhail Pavlovich, a 
 
233 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 27; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 62. “Bence, yetenekli âlim Türkologların ve 
büyük ittifakımızın tüm Türk halklarının temsilcilerinin katıldıkları Türkoloji Kurultayımız bu konuya 
tarafsız ve tam bir objektiflikle yaklaşacak ve onu kitlelerin, halkımızın çıkarılarının gerçekleştirdiği bir 
şekilde çözüme kavuşturacaktır.”  
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represenatitive of the Moscow-based All-Russian Association of Oriental Sciences 
[Umumrusiya  Şərqşunaslarının Elmi Assosiasiyası] and a member of the Baku 
Conference’s presidium. 234  The roster included in the Azerbaijani version of the 
conference proceedings lists Pavlovich’s nationality to be ‘Jewish” and his academic 
affiliation to be with the All-Russian Association of Oriental Sciences.235 He therefore 
spoke not as a local of Transcaucasia or Central Asia, but from his own Jewish Russian 
nationality, which, like the Turko-Tatar peoples in the past, had suffered great persecution 
at the hands of Tsarist colonial authorities.  
What emerges from Pavlovich’s speech, therefore, is a sense of solidarity with the 
non-Russian Soviet peoples who were struggling to recover from the hardship of Tsarist 
colonialism. What bound Pavlovich and participants such as Ağamalıoğlu, Müsabeyov, 
and Hüseynov together was a common conviction that the Baku Conference represented 
the next step in the Soviet revolution in the Turkic republics in which the Turko-Tatar 
peoples would finally achieve both modernization in the form of Soviet socialism as well 
as last material improvements in their lives.  
Like the other speakers in the first session, Pavlovich believed that the conference 
represented the merger of the nationality question with the overall proletarian revolution. 
The two were synonymous in his speech and, as such, Pavlovich saw Soviet Azerbaijan as 
a vanguard of the revolution in the east: “The convocation of this conference in the 
Azerbaijan [Soviet] Republic, which is included in the structure of the Soviet Union, is 
evidence of the magnitude of the Soviet government’s principles of the worker-peasant 
 
234 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 19, 444. Among the members of the The Presidium of the Baku Conference 
included Ağamalıoğlu, Fuat Köprülü, an academic from Kemalist Turkey, Pavlovich, and Bakir 
Çobanzade.    
235 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 19, 444. 
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sovereignty; oppositely could such a conference take place in another country?”236 For 
Pavlovich, the answer was no. Azerbaijan’s place at the forefront of the implementation of 
Soviet Nationality Policy for the Turkic peoples in the Soviet periphery was of great 
symbolic significance.  
Azerbaijan, and Baku in particular, had played a leading role in the development of 
Turkic nationalism before the World War One when intellectuals such as Alibey 
Hüseynzade (present at the Baku Conference) and Ahmet Ağaoğlu led the charge towards 
fostering a sense of common Turkic identity that could be shared among Turkic-speaking 
peoples both within and outside the former Russian Empire. Pavlovich, therefore, reiterated 
the great symbolic significance of the moment as a Sovietized Azerbaijan would harness 
its past prestige within the Turkic world in order to empower a new generation of Turko-
Tatar workers and peasants towards realizing the bright socialist future that awaited them.    
The goal of the Azerbaijani SSR was now to set down the criteria for how this 
future was to play out. Like Hüseynov, Pavlovich concurred that the reallocation of 
industrial material from the Russian center to the Turkic periphery was a necessary 
requisite for the realization of Soviet Nationality Policy. In other words, he agreed that 
matters of cultural reform, including the alphabet, would be incomplete if they were not 
considered alongside questions of material reparations for the Turko-Tatar peoples. 
Azerbaijan, therefore, stood out as an example where cultural matters and material progress 
were interwoven. Not only had the Azerbaijan SSR implemented a Latin-based alphabet 
three prior to the conference, but, according to Pavlovich, it had also undergone 
 
236 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 23; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 58. “Bu kurultayın büyük Sovyetler Birliği’nin 
terkibine dahil olan Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti’nde toplanması de Sovyet hükümetinin, işçi-köylü 
hakimiyetinin millî siyasetinin prensiplerinin büyüklüğüne delildir; aksi takdirde böyle bir kurultay başka 
bir ülkede olabilir miydi?” 
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breathtaking material, economic, and industrial advances since its integration in the Soviet 
Union in 1920. “I was in Azerbaijan several years prior,” Pavlovich told the audience as 
he spoke in the İsmaliyyə Sarayı:  
I have seen major changes in the city of Baku. In Azerbaijan there 
is a new industrial center, as well as in Ganja [Azerbaijan’s second largest 
city]. Let us see the matters that need to be implemented in your neighbor 
Dagestan, which even yesterday has not developed from a patriarchal and 
feudalist economy. The Dagestan Eagles [a symbol of courage and heroism 
in Dagestani culture] which has remained at the head of the struggle against 
Tsarism for sixty years…has now expended all of its energy for Dagestan’s 
economic and cultural problems.237   
 
To this assertion, the conference records show that Pavlovich received applause when he 
invoked both Soviet Azerbaijan’s successes in industrialization and in remembering 
neighboring Dagestan’s—itself a Muslim society— “heroic” struggle against sixty years 
of Tsarist oppression.  
For Pavlovich, therefore, Azerbaijani and the Caucasus in general represented a 
success story in the struggle against Russian colonialism. To finalize their dominance over 
their oppressive colonial past, both Azerbaijan and its Transcaucasian neighbors needed to 
undergo both cultural revolution, a hallmark of which was to be the new Latin script for 
Azerbaijani and other Turkic languages, and material redress in the form of reallocation of 
industrial goods and technology. These cultural and material reforms would ensure that the 
Soviet Turkic periphery would be removed permanently from of its colonial subservience 
and degradation and move into the realm of empowerment under Soviet socialism.       
 
237 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 25; Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 59. “Ben Azerbaycan’da bundan birkaç yıl önce 
bulundum. Bakü şehirinde büyük değişiklikler görmekteyim. Azerbaycan’da yeni sanayi merkezi Gence de 
var. Sizin komşunuz, daha dün bile pederşahi ve feodal, ekonomik yönden gelişmemiş Dağıstan’da nelerin 
gerçekleştiğine bakalım. 60 yıl Çarlığa karşı mücadele eden bu ülkdede şimdi ise halk kitlelerinin 
zamanında Çarlığa mücadelesinin başında duran ve buna enerjilerini harcayan Dağıstan kartalları…şu 
anda tüm gücünü Dağıstan’ın ekonomik ve kültürel problemlerine harcamaktalar…”  
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Echoing Ağamalıoğlu’s sentiments was one a Kazan Tatar delegate, Qaziz 
Qubaydullin (more commonly referred to as Əziz Ubeydullin), who served as a docent in 
the Azerbaijan State Scientific Research Institute.238 Ubeydullin came to the conference to 
give an overview of the history of the Turkic languages. In this, he served as both a 
Bolshevik revolutionary and as an academic historian. His speech at the conference 
represents the merger of Soviet socialist politics with Turkology thereby changing some of 
the meaning of Turkological research and work. If the Conference sought to renew Turco-
Turkic identity and foster a new cultural era, it would have to, Ubeydullin believed, better 
understand the historical and linguistic roots of the Turkic peoples. This was a necessary 
condition for the development of national consciousness.  
Ubeydullin, therefore, sought to detail the historical development of Turkic writing 
culture and of the importance of ethnographic approaches to the study of Turkic languages. 
He attributed the pre-Soviet historiographic tradition, as well as the studies on Turko-Tatar 
identity that it produced, as belonging to a bygone bourgeois era. As such, writings on the 
subject tended to either serve the interests of the Tsarist colonial authorities “whose will, 
in the end destroyed the magnificent and unique Tatar government and, beginning with that 
moment, advanced Russian domination step-by-step in Tatarstan.”239  
As such, much of the ethnographic and historiographic studies on Turko-Tatar 
identity were produced by the Tsarist colonial authorities and their institutions. Though 
Ubeydullin showed sympathies with the nationalist responses to this colonial intrusion, 
even stating to the early “bourgeois” Turkic nationalists as producing “lovely” and 
“fantastic” works, he nevertheless did not credit them with establishing the foundations for 
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true national identity. This sentiment, one that he would continue to perpetuate after the 
conference, was based on the fact that these nationalists, such as Ismail Gasprinski, were 
often seduced by pan-ethnic movements Ubeydullin and other Soviet-era scholars found 
an anathema to the development of genuine national identity.  
It was only with the success of the Bolshevik Revolution that “a new range of 
possibility was opened to historians” in the pursuit of discovering and ascribing genuine 
national identity to the various Turko-Tatar groups.240  Responding to the universalist 
message of Bolshevism, as well as its promise to liberate all the workers and peasants of 
the East, the post-revolution period was one in which, according to Ubeydullin, scholars 
“encountered the subject of determining their own destinies” and, as such, “learning the 
historical origins [of their nations] was in demand.”241 Ubeydullin, in his capacity as a 
historian, believed the Bolshevik Revolution presented the opportunity to both build and 
empower indigenous nationalities in the Soviet periphery and allow them to reach Soviet 
socialism through their own cultural channels.  
The revolution, and the subsequent Bolshevik policies aiming to create national 
republics, gave Turkology, language reform, and historical research on the origins of the 
various Turkic national identity a new sense of urgency and importance. For Ubeydullin, 
Turko-Tatar Bolsheviks had already seized the opportunity to remake their national 
identities according to the precepts of Soviet indigenization: “beginning from this period 
[of the revolution] Turko-Tatar revolutionaries have begun to write histories within the 
revolutionary movement among the Turko-Tatar peoples. They felt the practical demands 
for the research of the nations of the Turkic peoples who were transformed [by the 
 
240 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 56.  
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revolution] into the undisputed masters of their own countries.”242 Like Pavlovich and 
Hüseynov, Ubeydullin argued that the current moment was not merely one in which the 
cultural questions of the alphabet would be solved, but also one in which a new, Latin-
based alphabet would assist in the “social-economic evolution” of the non-Russian 
nationalities of the Soviet Union.243     
Following Hüseynov and Ubeydullin’s speeches advocating for cultural renewal 
was Bekir Çobanzade. One of the leading Tatar delegates at the conference and the head 
of the Turkology department at Baku State University, Çobanzade believed this renewal 
demanded the creation of a purely Turkic scientific and technical vocabulary. So ardent 
was Çobanzade in advocating for purging Arabic and Persian scientific terms and creating 
a pure Turkic vocabulary that he alienated most of the moderates at the conference.244 In 
his speech on terminology, he offered justification on the basis that the Europeans and the 
Russians all had their own separate scientific and technological terminology. If the Turks 
were to form great nations, they must follow suit and adopt a terminology based on Turkic 
root words. He therefore called upon the conference to assist in the modernization of Turkic 
societies by adopting what he called “pure indigenous terms” for scientific and 
technological concepts.245  Çobanzade argued that such a project was not outside of the 
realm of possibility. The Kazakhs, he stated, had already made the leap towards this goal. 
The Kazakhs, therefore, could serve as a source of emulation for the rest of the Turkic 
world as it moved to indigenize scientific and technological terminology. Indigenization, 
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in Çobanzade’s conception, meant that Turks would assist other Turks in the formation of 
this new terminology.  
 
4f. Debates over Language and Alphabet 
 By the time the Baku Conference was underway, the classifications of the Turkic 
languages into various branches (Oghuz, Karluk, Kirgiz, and Uighur) was common among 
Turkologists and linguists. The participants at the congress, for example Bekir Çobanzade, 
referred to these designations and divisions of the Turkic dialects.246 This section will 
demonstrate exactly how language fit into the revolutionary goals of the Baku Conference.  
 The attendee to make the clearest link between linguistic and socialist development 
was Artur Zifeld-Simumyaqi (referred to as Zifeld in the conference records). Zifeld was 
an Estonian Turkologist and historian who had made his career in Azerbaijan. A member 
of the People’s Education Commissariat, Zifeld focused his attentions on historical and 
ethnographical work on Turkic populations in the former Russian Empire. As he 
participated in the Baku Conference, therefore, Zifeld stood as an academic voice 
espousing Marxist developmentalism through the lens of language reform and Soviet 
Nationality Policy.  
In his speech delivered on March 2, 1926, Zifeld argued that language reform had 
benefits from a Marxist materialist perspective. “The stages of linguistic development,” 
Zifeld stated, “overlap to some extent with the stages of economic and cultural 
development of human societies. Every type of technological and socio-economic reform 
 
246 Bekir Çobanzade, “Türk Lehçelerinin Yakın Akrabalığı Hakkında,” in Nerimanoğlu & Öner, pp. 147-
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naturally pursues language reform.”247 For Zifeld, therefore, the Turko-Tatar languages of 
the Soviet Union were already going to be transformed through socialist technology. The 
1920s were, after all, the time of Lenin’s great electrification campaigns that he laid out in 
a speech dated December 1920.248 Proclaiming that communism meant Soviet power plus 
the electrification of the entire Soviet Union, Lenin put forth a bold new plan to rapidly 
modernize Soviet society. Zifeld, and the other conference participants, no doubt carried 
that spirit with them to the debating floor. Zifeld claimed that Russian had prominence in 
the Turko-Tatar regions simply because of the on-sided exploitation of the Turks by Tsarist 
colonialism. In fact, Zifeld states that this is the reason who so many upper-class Turks 
have turned away from their native languages and have adopted Russian.249 
 Linguistics in the socialist era, according to Zifeld, should be concerning with the 
development of the language to meet the requirements of modernization and mass literacy. 
As such, any reform taken in the domain of language, according to Zifeld, should be do so 
with the input of native speakers. Native speakers, meaning the Turko-Tatar workers and 
peasants, should be consulted to determine that language reform does not stray from its 
intended path to advance mass literacy. In this Zifeld reminded the conference to be ever 
conscious whom the reforms would target and transform. Recommending that the 
Educational Commissariats should consult with the people, Zifeld argued that consultation 
 
247 Nerimanoğlu & Özer, 235. “Dilin gelişme aşamaları insan topluluklarının kültürel-ekonomik gelişme 
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on language reform “would ensure that the Educational Commissariats would not commit 
mistakes” on matters as important as language.250  
With those recommendations in mind, Zifeld endorses the reformist program of the 
Baku Conference, especially pertaining to foreign vocabulary in the Turkic languages. 
Stating that foreign words in Turkic are akin to “barbarian language,” Zifeld divides Turkic 
dialects along class lines: on one side stood “literary Turkic” with its “literary jargon” of 
incomprehensible Arabic, Persian, and French words.251 This dialect of Turkic, in Zifeld’s 
estimation, reflected the upper-class politics of Muslims which divided them into “Pan-
Islamists” and “Westernizers.”252 What is striking about Zifeld’s classification is that it 
reflects in large part how the early Turkish nationalists in both the Russian and Ottoman 
empires had stated decades prior. Reformers such as Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp, 
viewed literary Ottoman in a similar way as a remnant of upper-class Ottoman politics and 
aspirations. In the Turkish case, it was between Ottomanists and Islamists that the political 
struggle of the upper-classes was made manifested. Nevertheless, the negative association 
of literary Turkic as being incomprehensible and riddled with foreign vocabulary and 
grammatical elements was a common talking-point in Latinizing circles.  
Zifeld saw the Ottoman language as a threat to the Turkic languages in the Soviet 
Union. Firstly, Ottoman had, since the emergence of the Turcophone press, dominated pan-
Turkic publications. Zifeld argued that Ottoman Turkish represented a strand of this 
“literary Turkic” which should be discarded for the development of local dialects.253 In this 
way, he echoed Yusuf Vəzir Çəmənzəminli’s writings that stressed the elevation of Azeri 
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Turkish over Ottoman as the Transcaucasian Muslim reformers’ standard of 
communication.  
Zifeld argued that, although past reformers who relied on literary Turkic or 
Ottoman “wanted to become closer to the people because they were revolutionaries or 
democratic in thought, they [were in fact] creating division between people in 
Enlightenment and arriving at negative results with their incomprehensible 
terminology.”254 In order to turn away from this stratification of society based on language, 
Zifeld proposed that the “people’s language,” (halk dili) be promoted over “literary Turkic.” 
“I am against Arabic and Persian words,” Zifeld declared in his speech, “I do not consider 
them any more than religious relics and therefore I see it as possible to save terms expressed 
in religious concepts in the Turkish language.”255 He did not advocate, however, for the 
sudden removal of Arabic and Persian by arbitrary means, again deferring to his idea that 
the populace should be consulted at every stage of the reform.   
In addition to Zifeld, a delegate from Kazakhstan, Omarov, echoed anti-literary 
Turkic and Ottoman sentiment as he pushed for reform. In this speech, Omarov played up 
his Kazakh identity, asserting that the Kazakh language actually required less reform than 
the Western Turkic languages. “I don’t want to comment on the etymological or 
orthographical preferences, but the Tatar and other Turkic languages did not develop as 
our [Kazakh] did...[these languages] have an inclination to flaunt the pronunciation and 
vocabulary of the foreign Arabic or French languages.”256 Like Zifeld, Omarov concurred 
 
254 Nerimanoğlu & Özer, 235-241. “ 
255 Nerimanoğlu & Özer, 235-241. “Şimdi ise Arap ve Fars kelimeleri hakkında…Ben bu kelimelerin 
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that languages such as Tatar or Azeri mirrored Ottoman Turkish in that they too borrowed 
extensively from Arabic and Persian and, in the present-day, French.  
This high-brow Turkic prevented, in Omarov’s estimation, the emergence of 
“language democracy,” in which language would largely reflect the common worker and 
peasant.257 Inherent in Omarov’s estimation, therefore, is the idea that language reform, 
including an evaluation of Arabic, Persian, and French terminology, should proceed 
democratically with the consultation of the general public. Omarov, thus, followed Zifeld’s 
call to foster the “people’s language” (halk dili) as the official standard for educational and 
state functions: “It help[s] to separate the literary language and its etymological 
foundations from the popular language.”258  
When it came to alphabet reform, Şamil Usmanov, another participant to the 
congress, threw his lot in with the Latinizers: “We know that vowels are not makred in the 
Arabic Alphabet,” Omarov reminded his audience, “People learn that when the و and the ز 
are side-by-side, that a ‘vz’ sound results. However, place a گ in front and you have ‘guz.’ 
We can see that this is a complication, not an easing, of the language.” 259  Usmanov 
ridiculted Oghuz Turkic languages for adopting all of these vocabulary and orthographical 
complications. Here, Kazakh became an object of praise for its simplicity as a Turkic 
language and its distance from the “corrupting” influences of Arabic, Persian, French, or 
even Ottoman. This negative influence, for Usmanov, even extended into the script: 
“Comrade Ibrahimov requests that the Conference not give new signs to the Arabic 
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alphabet, but I think the Conference will promote new signs. However, adopting the Latin 
alphabet will solve in a fundamental way all of the problems of orthography.”260  
Zifeld, Omarov, and Usmanov were backed by Professor Lev Shcherba (referred to 
as Şçerba in the conference records), who argued that the Arabic and Persian alphabets 
were an “unnatural” one to base Turkic orthography. 261  Furthermore, Shcherba also 
reinforced the idea of unique nationality when speaking about language reform. It was 
dangerous to borrow from another nation’s alphabet, Shcherba argued, because that 
nation’s language has been built upon its particular foundations. To adopt another 
language’s alphabet, in this estimation, meant to adopt some of foreign foundations. On 
the other hand, Shcherba ridiculed languages that had not undergone any serious state 
reform, singling English out for derision: “English orthography is truly torturous even for 
English-speakers themselves. This is undeniable and a known truth.”262 While he did not 
want Turkic speakers to adopt Latin to take on English, or any Western European 
language’s, particular pronunciation, he nevertheless advocated for a modified Turkic 
variant of the Latin alphabet to solve the spelling and writing difficulties Turkic speakers 
currently faced.    
 
4g. Concluding Resolutions of the Baku Conference 
With the conclusion of the Baku Turkological Conference, several resolutions 
(qətnamə) were passed. Among these was the endorsement of complete latinization for all 
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Turkic languages in the Soviet Union. The resolution leaves no ambiguity about the 
conference’s endorsement:  
…the fact is recorded which belongs to the immense affirmative importance 
as Azerbaijan and the provinces of republics of the USSR (Yakutia, 
Kirghizstan, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkez, Kabardin, Balkar, Ossetia, and 
Chechnya)   undertake the general movement towards accepting the Latin-
based alphabet in the province of Adıgey-Çərkəz and in Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Bashkortostan.263  
 
In other words, the conference endorsed that Latin-based alphabets be implemented for all 
of these locales and languages. What is interesting is that, although the conference was 
communicated as a Turkological conference, its resolutions covered various groups 
residing in Transcaucasia and Central Asia that were not Turkic, including Ingush, 
Circassians, Ossetians, and Chechen. In addition, Tajik—a Iranian language closely akin 
to Dari and Farsi—was also marked for Latinization. Nevertheless, the Turkic languages 
of the Soviet Union, including Uzbek, Turkmen, and Kazakh, were to be Latinized and 
their vocabulary reformed to handle both the influx of technological and industrial 
terminology that would accompany the reallocation of resources and to be useful titular 
languages for the non-Russian national republics.  
 In a subsequent decisions, the Baku Conference laid the groundwork for how the 
orthography of the Turkic languages was to be reformed. The Conference placed heavy 
emphasis on the etymology of words in order to determine their reformed spelling. For 
many republics, as Adrienne Edgar demonstrates in her chapter “Dueling Dialects,” there 
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was not so much a single, unified national language.264 Instead, most national republics 
were home to a variety of Turkic dialects, sometimes mutually intelligible but often having 
large variations across dialects. To address the problem of disparate dialects existing in a 
single national republic (dialectical variation was a problem for the Bolsheviks because 
they believed it would hinder national cohesion and the spread of the Soviet Nationality 
Policy), the Baku Conference recommended that linguists “should rely on documenting in 
some degree orthographic rules for those who speak another variation [of that 
language].” 265  In other words, etymological research on vocabulary and terminology, 
coupled with the effort to standardize the spelling rules of each titular language, would 
make progress in unifying all of the disparate dialects in a republic into a single, national, 
and finally “indigenous” language.     
To achieve these measures, the Baku Conference established the Committee for the 
New Turkish Alphabet that was to coordinate both the efforts to standardize the titular 
Turkic languages and to assist in etymological and pedagogical measures needed in the 
standardization process.  Ultimately, this new committee, which would be convened a year 
after the Baku Conference in 1927, would oversee all these projects. By 1929, three years 
after the Baku Conference, the Arabic script was outlawed across the Turkic republics and 
the New Turkish Alphabet was implemented in every Turkic-speaking national republic.  
3h. Soviet Azerbaijan: Latinization  to Cyrillization and Back Again  
 What became of the alphabet reforms in the Soviet Turkic republics? As the premier 
symbol of Soviet indigenization, the Latin-based alphabet was tied directly to overall 
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support for korenisatsiiya. Until the late 1930s, Latinization and language engineering 
under Soviet Nationality Policy continued with the blessing of both Moscow and of local 
Bolshevik leaders.  In the late 1930s, however, greater political conditions changed across 
the Soviet Union as the Stalinist system sought to push forward collectivization and even 
more rapid industrialization. In this effort, older Bolshevik programs of the 1920s, 
including Soviet Nationality Policy, were sidelined and even reversed for fear that they 
actually obstructed the internal coherence of Soviet society. This was especially true of 
indigenization policies, which were reversed during the Great Purge of 1936 – 38. Amidst 
the backdrop of mass arrests and executions, many of the participants in the Baku 
Conference, including Hüseynov and Çobanzade, would be accused of ‘pan-Turkism’ and 
executed. Between 1939-40, Latinization would be reversed completely and all the 
languages of the Soviet Union were made to adopt a modified Cyrillic alphabet.  
As for Turkey, the language reforms increasingly focused on internal conditions 
and factors as the Kemalist state itself became uneasy with pan-Turkic associations. Not 
wanting to alarm their Soviet neighbors and increasingly seeking to promote a Turkish 
identity tied to the boundaries of the state, Kemalist leaders opted to suppress any 
organization with even the slightest pan-Turkic association. Turkey’s future, the Kemalists 
came to believe, lay firmly in Europe and the West, not in the East.   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, as the post-Soviet Turkic states 
sought to revive Turkic identity, there was a new interest in promoting Turkic identity 
through language. Let’s take our previous example, Heydar Aliyev. As president of an 
independent Azerbaijan after 1991, Aliyev stressed the fact that Azerbaijanis were, in fact, 
Turkic. This new-found interest in the Turkic roots of the nation was due, in part, to the 
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emergence of Turkey as the ‘big brother’ of the newly independent states. Using its clout, 
Turkey pushed for both the re-Latinization of all Turkic language languages and the 
creation of institutions dedicated to research on common Turkic culture and history. The 
end of the Soviet Union and the beginning of 21st century, therefore, has been an era where 
Latinization, and along with it the conception of common Turkic identity, have reemerged 
in full force.  
 
4h. Conclusion: Legacies of Soviet Nationality Policy  
The Baku Turkological Conference and the subsequent victory of the Latinization 
movement in the Soviet Union ran parallel to the Turkish Republic’s own language reform. 
In fact, Turkey was a major focus of the Baku Conference as it sought to extend 
Latinization beyond the borders of the Soviet Union.266 When the Kemalist state abolished 
its own Arabic script in favor of Latin letters in 1928, it was considered “a major triumph” 
for the Latinization  movement in the Soviet Union.267 There was the sense that Turkic 
language reformers and intellectuals on both sides of the divide were working in tandem 
towards a new era of literacy and modernization. This was a sentiment echoed by 
Muharrem Feyzi, a reporter for Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet, in an August 1929 column 
entitled What is Happening in the Eastern World. In this column, Feyzi reported on Soviet 
Latinization, now three years in, and claimed it was “an enormous and widespread 
revolutionary wind sweeping the East.”268 Feyzi’s enthusiasm for the Soviet adoption of 
the Latin alphabet was tied directly to his own country’s decision to enact similar measures. 
 
266 Martin, 192.  
267 Martin, 192.  
268Muharrem Feyzi, “Rusyada Latin harfleri taammüm ediyor: 30,000,000 nüfusu otuz millet yeni alfabeyi 
kabul etti,” in Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, August 3, 1929, p. 4.  
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In fact, Feyzi argued that the common alphabets between Turkish and the Turkic languages 
in the Soviet Union would better provide Turks in Turkey with a window into the 
modernization and societal transformations occurring across Turkey’s eastern border.   
Though Bolshevik leaders from Soviet Transcaucasia and Central Asia played a 
leading role in convening the conference, the actual debate proceedings reveal a wide range 
of participants from different ethnic, national, and linguistic backgrounds.269 Latinization 
was, by 1926, becoming an international movement that had adherents in the neighboring 
Turkish Republic. Turkey, in fact, sent three delegates to the Baku conference.270 At home, 
Kemalist officials, reformers, and intellectuals concurred with their Soviet counterparts 
that Latinization would pave the way for a rapid rise in literacy among their own citizens. 
Like many Soviet language reformers, the Kemalists believed that the Perso-Arabic 
alphabet actually prevented the leap towards literacy, which would, in turn, help lead to the 
breakdown of traditional patterns of life and set the stage for modernization.  
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that Soviet Azerbaijan in particular became 
the center of the Latinization movement from the Baku Conference onward. In both the 
Soviet Union, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, and in the Turkish Republic, 
modernization meant abandoning superstition, religiosity, and subnational identity (those 
based on tribal or sectarian affiliations) and adopting an identity based on nationality, 
secularism, and positivism. Islam, and all of the cultural symbols that accompanied it—
 
269 Nərimanoğlu & Ağakişiyev, 413. According to the conference’s records, there were 131 participants in 
all: 93 were ‘Turks,’ 38 were ‘non-Turks,’ including representatives from Russia, Armenia, and Western 
Europe. In addition, 119 participants were from Soviet member states, whereas 12 were from non-member 
states, including Turkey. Finally, 130 were men and one was female. See also Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Yazı 
Devrimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008), pp. 119 – 120.   
270 These delegates were Hikmet Cevdetzade, Mehmet Fuad Köprülüzade, and Ferid Xurşid. Nərimanoğlu 
& Ağakişiyev, pp. 442, 443, 446.  
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including the Perso-Arabic script—was to be soundly rejected as it was singled out as the 
main culprit that held past Turkic peoples back, making them all the more susceptible to 
European imperialism and domination. The Bolsheviks and the Kemalists, therefore, were 
similar in their belief that language reform would cause the breakdown of ignorance and 







































5. Opposition to Latinization: The Islahatçılar 
 
5a. Introduction 
 This chapter will examine the political discourses and arguments of the 
Islahatçılar, or “reformists.” This group constituted a powerful bloc within the Turkic 
language reform movement and the Latinizers’ main ideological rivals. Comprised of 
academics, religious officials, former Young Turks, and newspapermen, the “reformists” 
argued that Latinization was not the solution to the orthographic and other linguistic 
issues facing the Turkic languages and their speakers in the post-WWI era. Instead, they 
sought to “reform” (ıslahat) the existing Perso-Arabic script to better reflect the spelling 
and pronunciation of Turkic. This chapter will examine the key post-WWI “reformist” 
voices and analyze how they presented an alternative to the New Turkish Alphabet.  
 Focusing on the brief period between 1918 and 1926, I will weave the writings of 
“reformists” from Turkey, including Muhittin Birgen, Fuat Köprülü, and Necip Asim, 
with those from the Soviet Union, particularly I. Jirkov, Ahmad Bayturnsunoglu, and 
Alimcan Şeref. In putting these sources in conversation, I will reconstruct the “reformist” 
debates and networks on the eve of the Baku Turkological Conference. I will show that, 
far from conservative thinkers, the “reformists” framed their defense of the Perso-Arabic 
script within the discourse of nationalism and Soviet indigenization to argue for the 
Turkic people’s “independent” path towards modernization. Nor do I argue that the 
“reformists” were invested in preserving the Arabic and Persian grammatical structures in 
Turkic. As we will encounter in this chapter, the “reformists” viewed these foreign 
language elements as more dangerous to the integrity of the Turkic languages than the 
existing Ottoman alphabet.        
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A much broader group within the Turkic-speaking reformers and intelligentsia, 
the Islahatçıs published in Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia to support other aspects 
of language reform, including purification of Turkish vocabulary, syntax, and grammar 
rules. They did not, however, extend their support to changing the orthography of the 
Turkic languages. As such, they were called the ıslahatçılar (“reformists”), in contrast to 
the Latinizers, because of their belief that reform of Turkic languages should not include 
abandoning the Perso-Arabic script. I will examine the prominent members of this group 
in order to demonstrate how the opposition to the Latinizing projects of Baku and Ankara 
envisioned different horizons for Turkish language reform.  
Writing before the Baku Turkological Conference, the “reformists” in both 
Azerbaijan and Turkey argued that the Ottoman script was a facet of Turkic national 
culture and made the Turks unique among world civilizations. For many, this alphabet 
also had religious significance as the one of the Qur’an and Arabic. In the reformist view, 
adopting the Latin script was merely a “cosmetic” change that would fail to address the 
larger problems preventing the Turkish language from becoming a modernized and 
nationalized idiom. Merely changing the alphabet, this faction within the reform 
movement argued, would do nothing to address the language’s reliance on Arabic and 
Persian grammatical elements and was not convincing as a means towards greater 






5b. Turkish “Reformists” (Islahatçılar), Pre-1928 
 This section will examine the writings of Muhittin Birgin and Necib Asim, two 
“reformist”-minded individuals who argued passionately for the preservation of the 
Ottoman script. Analyzing Birgin’s travelogue through Soviet Azerbaijan and Asim’s 
editorials in the early nationalist magazine, Anatolian Revue (Anadolu Mecmuası), I will 
demonstrate how both thinkers sought to fashion a unique Turkish national identity based 
on opposition to the New Turkish Alphabet, instituted in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1923. 
Asim’s writings, published in 1924, convey a sense of urgency in seeking to defend the 
Ottoman script from the Latinizers. Likewise, Birgen argues at very points in his memoir 
that the Ottoman Turks were best positioned to serve as a cultural and literary beacon to 
the non-Ottoman Turkic nationalities. Latinization, he argued, would undo this rich 
legacy and undermine the national project that seeks to create a unique sense of identity 
based on language and culture.   
 
Muhittin Birgin 
Muhittin Birgen (1885-1951) was a prominent political and journalistic figure 
within the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). An ardent supporter of the 
Young Turk revolution, Birgen served as the chief editor of Tanin (Dissemination), the 
principle organ of the CUP. After the collapse of the Young Turk government after WWI, 
Birgen briefly served as the head of the Turkish General Ministry of Publishing and 
Intelligence (1920-21) before embarking upon his journey through the Soviet 
Transcaucasia the following two years. After his return to Turkey in 1923, Birgen served 
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as the chief editor of Meslek (1924-25), Halk (1925-26), Turkish Cooperation (1930-
1934), and, finally, Son Posta (1936-39). In addition to his contributions to Turkish 
publishing, Birgen was also elected to the Ottoman parliament as a deputy from Çorum in 
1914 and, in the republican period, to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1936 as 
the deputy from Mardin.  
This section will focus on Muhittin Birgen’s extensive travels throughout the 
Soviet Union from 1922 to 1923 by examining his observations on three principle 
subjects: Azerbaijan’s political and social situation, the dissemination of Bolshevik ideals 
in Azerbaijan, and the discourses on language reform and Latinization that Birgen helped 
to shape while in Baku. I will employ the sections of Birgen’s memoir, entitled 10 Years 
in the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki’de On Sene), serialized from 
1936-37 in his periodical Son Posta. This document records many of the Soviet 
discourses on and approaches to Turkic language reform that Birgen encountered and 
debated. Written during Turkey’s own Language Revolution, Birgen’s account of the 
debates in Azerbaijan over language and identity would have been familiar, minus the 
communistic aspect, to his readers in the 1930s.   
Birgen’s accounts of Bolshevik Azerbaijan were written approximately a decade 
after the Baku Turkological Conference and during the most radical phase of Atatürk’s 
own Language Revolution (Dil Devrimi), which moved beyond mere orthographic 
reform to intensive “cleansing” (tasfiye) of Arabic and Persian loanwords from Turkish. 
Writing during this cultural upheaval, Birgen’s observations of Azerbaijan, therefore, 
offered his readers unique insights into the discourses on language reform and national 
identity operating within Soviet Azerbaijan during the early years of its Sovietization. 
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Birgen documented this process not as a passive observer, but an active participant in the 
process. He recounts his dealings with leading communist figures, his students, and 
everyday Azeris through the lens of nationalism.   
Azerbaijan, in Birgen’s memoirs, is a society striving to realize its unique culture 
and language under the banner of Soviet socialism. Birgen, therefore, is a link between 
reformist discourses and ideas on Turkic language reform that circulated between the 
Soviet and Kemalist worlds. In addition, Birgen’s experience as a member of the CUP 
also influenced his experiences of Transcaucasia, as well as how he engaged with the 
debates over Turkic language and identity in Azerbaijan and in Anatolia.   
Birgen was recruited by Baku Commissar of Education, Mustafa Quliyev, to 
teach Turkish language and Ottoman literature at several universities from 1922 to 1923. 
During his sojourn in the Soviet Union, Birgen observed the early workings of the 
Bolshevik revolution on different facets of Azerbaijani society. An admirer of 
Azerbaijani culture, Birgen sought to highlight to his Turkish readers that the Azeris were 
their Turkic brothers and that their political, social, and economic challenges under 
Soviet rule greatly mirror that of Turkey under the Kemalist regime. As he traveled and 
worked during this period, Birgen continued to identify politically with the Ottoman 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Enver Pasha, Cemal Pasha, and, finally, 
Mustafa Kemal. He brought the reformist outlook of the CUP to Soviet Transcaucasia 





5c. Birgen’s Perceptions of Soviet Transcaucasia   
Muhittin Birgen set sail with his family for Tiflis via Batum in May 1921 in what 
would be a two-and-a-half-year journey through the Soviet Union. Anatolia during this 
period was in the grips of the War of Independence (1919-1923), led by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. A member of the now-defunct CUP, Birgen embarked upon his trip at a time 
when Turkey was transitioning between the end of CUP rule and the consolidation of the 
Kemalist bloc that would found the republic in 1923.Though perhaps not as drastic a shift 
in terms of political ideology and outlook, the transition towards Kemalism prompted 
Birgen to self-consciously, yet unsuccessfully he would write, attempt to shed his former 
CUP identity in favor of “new ideas in his mind and new feelings in his heart.”271 What 
we encounter in his memoirs, therefore, is a CUP reformist who witnesses the ideological 
and social realities of Bolshevik rule and how these new experiences under communism 
help shape Birgen’s own reformist narrative.  
As Birgen traveled and worked for two and a half years in Baku, he was able to 
document the life around him from different perspectives. He describes Azerbaijan as a 
“bridge” between the Ottoman Turkish, Iranian, and Russian worlds.272  Birgen 
characterizes the local Azeri Turks as being descended from different Turkic tribes, 
mostly Yörük and Turkmen, who came together to forge a unique Transcaucasian Turco-
Muslim identity centered on the Azeri language. Nevertheless, the unique positioning of 
Transcaucasia has meant that Iranian, Ottoman, and Russian influences have left their 
 
271 Muhittin Birgen, İttihat ve Terakki’de On Sene: 2. Cilt İttihat ve Terakki’nin Sonu, ed. Zeki Arıkan 
(İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), 706; Mühitdin Birgen, İttihad və Tərəqqidə 10 İl Azərbaycan 1922-1923-
cü İllərdə, ed. Vilayet Quliyev (Baku, Qanun Nəşriyyatı, 2015), 30.  
272 Arıkan, 709; Quliyev, 37.  
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impression on the people and cultures. In addition to Azeri and other local languages, he 
documents that Ottoman Turkish, Persian, Russian are also widely spoken by the people. 
Nevertheless, Birgen does see Transcaucasian Turkish (Azeri as he calls it) as a unique 
idiom from which the Azeri people draw their own identity and history.  
The portrait that Birgen paints of Transcaucasia is a region undergoing 
Sovietization and a reshuffling of its administrative and educational institutions. He 
arrived in Baku during the era of the New Economic Program (NEP, 1921-28), instituted 
by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Civil War. This program sought to maintain state 
control over the urban industrial sector while allowing for the countryside to buy and sell 
grain according to private pricing mechanisms. Despite limited privatization of 
agriculture, Birgen describes the NEP policy as one in which “the government places 
restrictions on free trade by employing limiting measures.”273 He complains that this 
policy has caused seventy percent inflation in Tiflis and Baku.274 Although resented by 
many stanch communists on the grounds that it encouraged “private trade and a 
revitalized urban nightlife,” NEP was successful in bringing the Russian countryside to 
economic recovery after the harsh years of War Communism and grain requisition.275 
This temporary release of control over the Soviet agricultural was meant to strengthen the 
industry and signal a laxer approach to Bolshevik governance after the war.  
 
273 Birgen, ed. Quliyev, 143. “NEP siyasətinə üstünlük verən hökumət yenidən məhdudlaşdırıcı tədbirlər 
tətbiq edəreək azad ticarətə qadağa qoymuşdu.” 
274 Arıkan, 783; Quliyev, 143.  
275 Randi Cox, “NEP without Nepmen! Soviet Advertising and the Transition to Socialism,” in Christina 
Kiaer and Eric Naiman, Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking the Revolution Inside (Bloomington 
& Indiana: Bloomington University Press, 2006), 122.  
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For Azerbaijan specifically, Birgen sees Baku’s oil as a major component of the 
country’s economic life and the driver of its urbanization and modernization. At the time 
that he lived and worked in the city, Birgen wrote that Baku had a population of three 
hundred thousand of which two-thirds were Turks. He states that “Jobs connected to the 
oil sector were privatized [in the Tsarist period] or else the Turks [Azeris] were generally 
under the surveillance of the oil companies. The splendid palaces of the oil millionaires 
adorned the city in a particular way. However, in coming to Baku for the first time, there 
remain no wealthy people or palace owners.”276 In addition, Birgen speaks about the 
collapse of the entire oil sector after the revolution. He writes that most Baku inhabitants 
are not able to procure kerosene for their street lamps in the supposedly oil-rich province. 
Nevertheless, he reports that the Bolshevik authorities were attempting to restart the 
collapsed oil industry and to draw people from the countryside to live and work in Baku.  
Birgen also examines the various facets of Azeri identity in his memoirs, 
analyzing the religious divisions between Sunni and Shia Azeris. He writes that all Azeri 
Turks are Muslims, but they are neither fundamentalist in their beliefs nor united under 
the same sect. Religion, therefore, is a source of division among the Azeris. Using the 
Kur River as his demarcation, Birgen divided Azerbaijan between the Shia Azeris living 
south of the river and the Sunni Azeris who settled in the north.277 To illustrate this 
division, Birgen includes an anecdote about the Azeris living in Iran who answer, 
“Thanks be to God, I am a Kizilbash,” when asked if they are “Turkish or Muslim.”278 
 
276 Arıkan, 751; Quliyev, 98. “Bakı tam mənası ilə bəhrəsiz, sadəcə neft və qazla zəngin bir torpaq üzərində 
bina edilmişdi. Amma mən ilk dəfə Bakıya gələndə orada nə zəngin qalmışdı, nə də saray sahibi!”  
277 Arıkan, 710; Quliyev, 39.  
278 Arıkan, 710; Quliyev, 39. “Allaha şükürlər olsun, qızılbaşam.”  
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The term Kizilbash denotes the Turkic warrior elite of the Safavid Empire who forcefully 
spread the Shia faith throughout the domains of Shah Ismail in the early 16th century. In 
Birgen’s time, the term had come to signal strong cultural affiliation with Iran, based on 
shared Safavid-Shia history and literature.  
The Azeris north of the Kur River, majority Sunni, were closely affiliated with the 
Sunni Turkic world, including Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire. It is in the then 
Sunni north that Birgen spent most of his time in Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, like other 
reformers of his period, Birgen sought to overcome sectarian divisions among the Azeri 
Turks by emphasizing and seeking to reform their ethnic identity and language towards 
forging a modern national community. In fact, Birgen states later on in his memoirs that 
the Azeris adhere to Turkism as an identity and see themselves as the same “nation” as 
the Turks in Anatolia. However, he also states that the Azeris have a strong desire for 
independent nationhood. This desire for an independent Azerbaijan, in Birgen’s view, 
takes precedence over intercommunal or sectarian divisions. 
 
5d. Birgen’s Reflections on Communism in Soviet Azerbaijan  
Himself a Young Turk ideologue and revolutionary, Muhittin Birgen’s 
perceptions of Russia’s 1917 Revolution and of Bolshevik rule in Transcaucasia were 
mixed. Living and working in Baku from 1922-23, Birgen’s experience took shape as the 
Bolsheviks were just consolidating their military, political, and revolutionary victory over 
their various enemies in the aftermath of the Russian Civil War (1918-1922).  As a 
teacher and intellectual, Birgen was enlisted by the Azeri Bolshevik government to help 
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transform the Azeri education system by modernizing its teaching methods (usul) and 
theoretical basis. What he witnessed during his stay in Baku, therefore, was the greater 
Sovietization of Azerbaijani society.  
In his memoir, Birgen states that, even though he is not a Bolshevik follower, his 
intention in writing about the revolution is to evaluate its results in a “neutral” (bitərəf) 
and “friendly” (səmimi dostluq) manner.279 “I think that,” he writes, “the observations 
that I have made without pursuing any political objective, [and] from as neutral a position 
as possible, can somewhat pertain the matters of Azerbaijani politics.”280  Birgen’s first 
insight into Bolshevik rule is that the communist party’s presence was “minimal” (çox 
az): “I saw Baku for the first time only two and half years after the revolution. The 
Azeris, who were joining the Communist Party in small numbers to not at all, had fallen 
into a very dispirited state because of the revolution.”281  
He goes on to write that “The revolution abolished Azerbaijan’s political 
existence, brought its economic power to ruin, and destroyed ‘men of culture’ 
[mədəniyyət adamları].”282 Birgen’s negative evaluation of the revolution’s effects in 
Azerbaijan, however, does not extend to the actual Bolshevik leaders themselves. For 
example, Birgen is quite impressed with Soviet commissar Nariman Narimanov upon 
meeting him during his journey. Describing him as the most adept political figure in 
 
279 Quliyev, 250.  
280 Quliyev, 250. “İnqilab dövründəki Azərbaycanda siyasi işlərdən kənarda qalmağım oradakı hadisələrə 
bitərəf nəzəri ilə baxmağıma səbəb olmamış, müşahidə və tədiqatlar aparmağıma əngəl törətməmişdi.” 
281 Arıkan, 751; Quliyev, 99. “Mən Bakını ilk dəfə yalnız inqilabdan iki il yarım sonra görə bildim. 
Kommunist partiyasına çox az, hətta yox deyiləcək sayda üzv vermiş Azərilər inqilabdan çox mütəəssir 
vəziyyətə düşmüşdülər.”  
282 Quliyev, 102. “İnqilab milli Azərbaycanın siyasi mövcudluğunu aradan qaldırmış, iqtisadi qüdrətini 
tənəzzülə uğratmış, mədəniyyət adamlarını məhv etmişdi.”  
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Azerbaijan, Birgen sees Narimanov, the individual, in a good light while believing that 
the regime he has come to represent has enacted many destructive and regressive 
[tənəzzül] measures. The first step back, according to Birgen, came when the Bolsheviks 
destroyed Azerbaijan’s hopes of independent statehood in 1920.      
While he says that Azerbaijan did not put up the fierce military resistance to 
Soviet rule as in neighboring Georgia, Birgen states that the unfolding revolution has 
prompted a massive upheaval in Azerbaijani society. Firstly, he notes that the Azerbaijani 
intellectuals and literary figures have either been executed or sent into exile by the Baku 
Soviet.283 This has created, in Birgen’s recounting, an indifference on the part of Azeris 
that he encountered in the shops and bazaars of the city for Soviet politics and for the 
ideals of Vladimir and Lenin and Lev Trotsky. In fact, he describes the ideological reach 
of the Bolshevik party over Baku’s bazaars and shops as nothing more than a “vitrine.”. 
Instead, Birgen writes that the Azeri merchants and shopkeepers he encountered followed 
Mustafa Kemal, Enver Pasha, and the political developments happening in Turkey very 
closely and asked him endlessly about them.  
Like Birgen, the Bolshevik party was all too aware that its reach in society was 
greatly limited during the initial years of Sovietization. Furthermore, there was a need to 
recover from the militant policy of War Communism that was enacted during the Russian 
Civil War. Under this arrangement, Baku’s oil and agriculture output was placed under 
tight control in order to assist the Red Army in the war. When Birgen arrived in Baku 
after the war, he was also witnessing the Bolshevik regime’s transition from War 
 
283 Arıkan, 753; Quliyev, 101.  
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Communism to the ‘New Economic Policy’ (NEP), which allowed for agricultural 
producers to set the selling price of their products to the state. Nevertheless, Birgen says 
that this new policy has “outlawed private enterprise” by placing heavy restrictions on 
merchants. In addition, he complains of the high prices in Baku: “A monthly hotel 
expenditure of thirty liras was raised to one hundred liras.”284   
In the midst of economic and political uncertainty, the Bolsheviks attempt to 
institutionalize their rule through the education system. Birgen writes that “the [Azeri] 
communists in this difficult position sought to win affection from the people by at least 
developing the national education system.”285 Birgen states that the question over 
language and identity were central to the building of this new Soviet education system. 
Birgen comments that, when the Soviet Commissar of Education hired him to teach, he 
“knew that one of the reasons that is insufficient on the path towards creating a national 
education system in Azerbaijan was that there was no cadre of teachers who were able to 
give instruction in philosophy and sociology in [Azeri Turkish].”286 Believing that Azeri 
language instruction was essential for the preservation of Azeri national culture and 
history, Birgen sought to craft a network of teachers and students who were dedicated to 
learning in their mother tongues over Russian or French.   
 
 
284 Arıkan, 783; Quliyev, 143. “Əvvəllər 30 lirə ilə həll edilən aylıq otel xərcləri qısa zamanda yüz lirəyə 
qalxdığından oteldən çıxıb xüsusi evə danışmışdıq.”  
285 Arıkan, 783; Quliyev, 143. “Çətin vəziyyətdə qalan ölkə kommunistləri heç olmazsa milli maarifi inkişaf 
etdirməklə kütlə arasında müəyyən rəğbət qazanmaq istəyirdilər.”  
286 Quliyev, 144. “Bilirdim ki, Azərbaycanda milli maarif siyasətini dolğun şəkildə həyata keçirmək 
yolunda çatışmayan cəhətlərdən biri də fəlsəfə və ictimai fənləri ana dilinde tədris edə biləcəck müəllim 
kadrlarının olmmasıdır.”  
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5e. Birgen and Language in Transcaucasian Society   
In traveling and working in Soviet Transcaucasia, Birgen devotes much of his 
memoirs to the discussion of language politics in Soviet Azerbaijan. Hired by Baku’s 
Commissar of Education, Mustafa Quliyev, to teach at both the Advanced Pedagogical 
Institute and Baku University, Birgen’s hiring letter stated that he was being called upon 
to help reform the Baku educational system.287 Over the next year, 1922-1923, Birgen 
taught Turkish language and Ottoman literature and served on the High Council of the 
Educational Commissariat to help reshape the Soviet education system in Azerbaijan.  
Birgen supported and enacted two points of reform in this period. Firstly, he 
pushed for a new educational approach based on Western social sciences (ictimai 
fənlər/ixtisaslar).288 In arguing for Westen social sciences to take center stage in a 
revitalized education system, Birgen consciously patterned his arguments off Ziya 
Gökalp. A fellow member of the Ottoman CUP, Gökalp helped to cultivate the early 
stirrings of Turkish nationalism by arguing, from a Western sociological perspective, that 
the Turks constituted a distinct national entity with a unique language. Transposing this 
sociological perspective onto his classes in Baku, Birgen stressed that his students obtain 
a modern and sociological education and apply it to Ottoman and Turkish literature and 
history. Like other educational reformers of his generation, Muhittin Birgen believed that 
replacing traditional pedagogical methodologies and approaches, which were closely 
linked to the madrasa system, with modern “scientific” ones would lead to a renaissance 
of Azeri culture and knowledge.  
 
287 Arıkan, 783; Quliyev, 143.  
288 Arıkan, 783; Quliyev, 143. 
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There are insightful moments in Birgen’s description of his pedagogical duties 
and of faculty life that demonstrate the warm reception of his reformist ideas and praxis 
in these universities. Amidst greater reforms to these institutions of higher learning, 
Birgen operated amidst an influx of Russian academics to help oversee the transition to 
the new schooling system. With the increase in Russian-speaking academics, the debate 
over whether Russian or Azeri should serve as the official language of instruction heated 
up. For Birgen’s camp, the use of Russian in the Azeri system signaled a continuation of 
the Tsarist colonial policies, particularly of Russification. Reminding his readers that the 
Bolsheviks had promised self-determination for the non-Russian nationalities after 1917, 
Birgen argues that using Azeri Turkish in higher education was a step towards realizing 
the ideals of the revolution.  
The multilingual nature of Transcaucasia presented a challenge to Soviet 
leadership in the 1920s and 30s. Within the Soviet Communist Party, as outlined in the 
previous chapter, there was debate about the future of the non-Russian nationalities of the 
Soviet Union. On the one hand, there were Bolsheviks that wanted to adopt Russian as 
the sole language of the new Soviet state. This faction argued that shared Russian 
language throughout the entire Soviet Union would unify the society better around the 
ideals of the October 1917 Revolution. Birgen writes about the debate over Russian, 
called the “Language of October” (Oktyabr dili), versus Azeri Turkish. He writes that 
“The revolutionaries want to strengthen Russian, the language of October, not various 




The issue over language reflected the greater challenges facing the Bolsheviks 
once they had emerged victorious in the civil war. As they moved to consolidate 
communist control over the former Tsarist empire, their rule was at first concentrated in 
urban centers with varying degrees of control over the countryside. According to Birgen, 
Azeri Bolsheviks were still in process of consolidating Soviet rule over Baku and, in 
many parts of the city, their authority was nothing more than a “vitrine.”289 The new 
Soviet commissars therefore pursued a policy of winning the population’s “affection” 
(rəğbət) over to the cause of socialism, in part through the education system and use of 
the local language. In Baku, these Soviet reformers argued that, in order to gain the 
support of the population, the local Azeri language should become the official language, 
as it was during Azerbaijan’s brief independence (1918-1920).  
Birgen threw his support behind those who wanted to make Azeri Turkish the 
official language of instruction. He argued that all the social, economic, and cultural 
problems facing Soviet Azerbaijan stemmed from the fact that the Azeris were prevented 
from learning in their own language. In pushing for Azeri-language education, Birgen 
aligned himself with a larger network of reformers, journalists, and intellectuals in Baku, 
including Nariman Narimanov and Semed aga Agamalioglu. For this group, the official 
use of Azeri Turkish in Azerbaijani governmental, educational, and cultural affairs was a 
basic demand from the 1917 revolution that had yet to be delivered. To push for this 
change, the pro-Azeri reformers challenged the use of Russian as a “pre-revolutionary” 
hangover from the Tsarist period.   
 
289 Arıkan, 867; Quliyev, 251. 
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5f. Birgen’s Views on Turkic Language Reform  
As he taught Ottoman language and literature in Baku, Birgen also played an 
active role in the debate over language reform and national identity. In a series of articles, 
serialized in the journal Maarif ve Medeniyet (Education and Culture) in 1923, Birgen 
outlined his thoughts on how an Azeri language reform should proceed and what 
principles should guide such a movement. Coupled with his observations on the state of 
the Azeri language in his memoirs, Birgen’s writings offer key insights into Bolshevik 
and communistic discourses on language and identity, as they operated the Azerbaijan in 
the 1920s. He also records many of the pre-reform speech patterns of “Turkish” speakers 
in Baku. I will summarize his observations on language, identity, and reform to provide a 
fuller picture of the pre-1926 Azeri Turkish language 
A valuable insight that Birgen offers is the multilinguistic nature of Soviet 
Transcaucasian society in the 1920s. Not only was this region home to several indigenous 
languages—including the titular languages of Azeri, Armenian, and Georgian—but 
Russian, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish were also widely spoken and dominant in print 
and media sectors. Of this, Birgen states that Russian and “Turkish” (Azeri Turkish) were 
the dominant languages when he was working in Baku. During the Tsarist period, 
Russian had become the language of higher education and the colonial administration and 
Azeri was used as the lingua franca between local ethnic groups. For example, Birgen 
observes that when Georgians or Armenians converse outside of their communities, they 
often did so in Azeri Turkish, rather than in Russian, Persian, or their native languages.290  
 
290 Arıkan, 710; Quliyev, 39.  
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 As he analyzed the Azeri Turkish language, however, Birgen noted that Persian 
and Russian exerted heavy lexical and grammatical influences: “The influence of Iranian 
culture is more strongly felt among the Caucasians. For example, while we say mavi 
[ اویم ] for blue, which in Arabic means ‘the color of water,’ the Azeri Turks gravitate 
towards the Turkificed word abı, based on the Persian word for water, ab [291”.[اب Birgen 
attributes the Azeri’s preference for Persian words to their shared Shia religion stemmed 
back to the Safavid dynasty (1501-1736). Led by Shah Ismail Xetayi, the Safavid shahs 
converted large swathes of their subjects in Persia, Mesopotamia, and Transcaucasia to 
Twelver Shiism. Bitter rivals to the Sunni Ottomans, the Safavid shahs battled their 
counterparts in Istanbul for control over Mesopotamia and Transcaucasia. In the 1920s, 
Birgen notes that Shah Ismail’s Turkic-language poetry has formed the basis of Azeri 
literature and infused it with Shia mores that are largely absent from Ottoman literature.  
 As he circulated around Baku in the Soviet era, however, Birgen noted that the 
Azeri Turkish spoken around him had fallen in prestige from the literary idiom of Shah 
Ismail. “The basest dialect of Turkish,” Birgen wrote, “is in Baku. However, I heard 
similar charges many times from the tongues of the Bakuvians [about our Turkish]. [They 
say] ‘You Istanbulites speak very bombastically.’”292 In documenting this exchange, 
Birgen picks up on a key difference in perception between Azeri’s “crudeness” versus 
Istanbul Turkish’s “refinement” that many language reformers from Turkey harbored for 
the extra-Anatolian Turkic languages.  
 
291 Quliyev, 38. “Məsələn, biz su rəngi mənasında ərəb dilindən su mənasını birdirən kəlməni alaraq mavi 
dediyimiz halda, Azəri türkü farsca su mənasını ifadə edən ab sözünü əsas götürərərk abi deyir və bu 
zaman kəlməni daha da türkləşdirərək abı şeklinə salır.”  
292 Quliyev, 99. “Türkcənin ən kobud tələffüz şəkli Bakıdadır. Amma bununla belə bakılıların dilindən 
dəfələrcə belə ittiham eşitmişdim. Aydın məsələdir ki, hər kəs danışdığı dili daha çox beyənir.”  
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 Nevertheless, in the same manner as the Bolshevik language reformers, Birgen 
used the general term Turkish (Türkçe/türkcə) to refer to both Anatolian, Caucasian, and 
Central Asian Turkic languages. One prominent current of reformist thought, to which 
Birgen’s writings ascribe, held that there was a single Turkish language that unified the 
pan-Turkic peoples. These same reformers viewed Azeri and Anatolian Turkish not as 
separate languages, but as dialects of a common Turkish idiom that was shared by Turkey 
and Azerbaijan alike. “There is not doubt,” Birgen wrote as he launched his reformist 
articles in Maarif və Mədəniyyet [Education and Culture] in 1923, “that Turkish will 
become one of Europe’s most beautiful languages. However at present, Turkish is still 
undergoing a turning-point and, within a very short amount of time, is changing by a 
process of continually evolving [itself].”293 These articles are all entitled “Methods in 
Turkish Reform” (Türkcəyi Düzəltməkdə Üsul) and operated on Birgen’s conception that 
the Turkish language was an Indo-European idiom undergoing necessary reforms to 
modernize.  
 Believing that all Turkic languages constituted the same idiom with various 
dialects, Birgen nevertheless sees the Istanbul variant as the most eloquent and best 
equipped to lead the Turks into the modern world. This is because, as Birgen explained 
that “within ten years, Istanbul Turkish has been greatly changed, rejuvenated, compiled, 
and purified” of much of its Arabic and Persian elements. Furthermore, he makes the 
argument that Istanbul Turkish should be emulated because of “a team of young poets, 
authors, and teachers who are being cultivated in Istanbul and who have committed 
 
293 Quliyev, 267. “Şüphəsiz, türkcə gələcəkdə Avropanın gözəl dillerindən biri olacaqdır. Ancaq bugünlük 




themselves to the duty (vəzifə)” of language reform and dissemination (my italics).294 
Thus, it is the reformist cadre, based in Istanbul, that best equips this particular dialect to 
become standardized throughout the entire Turkic world.  
 The role of the language reformer was paramount for Birgen. In the same article, 
he goes on to argue for a cross-border “union of experts” (ittifaq) whose “first objective 
is to rescue Turkish from bondage so that it is not completely destroyed by the tyranny 
and attachment to other languages. The power that brings us to this conclusion is the 
conviction that Turkish is based on sound roots, a clean serif, and an essential syntactic 
structure. [With these characteristics], Turkish will beautify, perfect, and enrich itself in a 
short amount of time.”295 Thus, the prime objective and duty of the language reformers 
was to wage a “war of independence,” as Birgen puts it, against the foreign elements 
from Arabic, Persian, and Russian. An advocate for language purification, Birgen argued 
that Turkish should be purged off all the “needless Arabic and Persian words” (lüzumsuz 
ərəbi və farsi kəlmələrdən) that it had collected since the Middle Ages.296 In a subsequent 
article for the same publication, entitled The New Literature (Ədəbiyyati-Cədidə), he uses 
the verb təmizləmək/temizlemek, meaning to clean or, politically, to purge, to refer to the 
process of “language purification.”  
 Among the literary generation in Istanbul at the turn of the 20th-century, there 
was a tremendous effort to purify the Turkish language. In a general sense, these 
 
294 Quliyev, 267. “Son on sənədən bəri İstanbulda yetişən bu taqım gənc şairlər və ediblər və bir taqım 
gənc müəllimlər bu vəzifəyə xeyli diqqət ediyorlar.”  
295 Quliyev, 268. “Bizi buna götürən qüvvət, türkcənin sağlam kökləri, təmiz bir sərfi, çox əsaslı bir 
nəhvinin bulunması qənaətdir. Bu sağlam köklərə malik olan türkcə bu təmiz sərf bə bu əsaslı nəhv 
sayəsində çox az zaman içində kəndi-kendinə gözəlleşir…”  
296 Quliyev, 318.  
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reformers sought to purge the language of its needless foreign elements and push for a 
nation idiom that would reflect the speech of commoners. The emphasis on those words 
or phrases that are “needless” absolved the reformers from having to commonly-used 
Arabic and Persian words, such as kitap (book), pazar (market), and kalem (pen). What 
they regarded as “needless” (lüzumsuz) were archaic Islamic loanwords that had fallen 
out of usage by the 20th-century. The language reformers in Istanbul sought to replace 
these out-of-date words with words from Turkish or a heavily Turkified Arabic or Persian 
equivalent.   
 Though he advocated for the purification of the Turkish language, Birgen 
passionately argued against Latinization of its alphabet. In a follow-up article in Maarif 
və Mədəniyyət, entitled The Subject of the Alphabet (Əlifba Məsələsi), Birgen publically 
addresses Ferhad Ağazadə, an Azerbaijani intellectual, founder and editor of the popular 
periodical Azerbaijan, and a leading pro-Latinization voice. Ağazadə was also a 
participant in the 1926 Baku Turkological Conference, siding with Səməd ağa 
Ağamalıoğlu’s faction. Calling Ağazadə his “dear colleague” (əziz məsləkdaş), Birgen 
writes, “You attribute all the evil of the world to the [Perso-Arabic] alphabet and, if 
nothing else, those who possess these troubles to the Turks. I am sorry to see that you 
have fallen into excess in a very important scientific matter.”297 Accusing Ağazadə of 
allowing his pro-Latin fanaticism to obscure a scientific inquiry into the question of 
 
297 Quliyev, 330. “Öylə gördüm ki, mədə pozulmaq, yaxud havanın iyi və ya fəna olmağı gibi hadisələrdən 
sərf-nəzər, siz də dünyanın bütün fənalıqların türklərə aid olanlarını...Əziz məsləkdaş, çox mühüm bir elm 




alphabet reform, Birgen calls upon his “esteemed colleague” to “examine the reality [of 
the alphbet] with scientific, methodical, verified, analytical, and critical means.”298       
 For Birgen, denying the Perso-Arabic alphabet was tantamount to disowning large 
elements of Turkic national identity. Like other alphabetic “reformists,” Birgen argued 
that the Perso-Arabic script (الفبا) preserved the national culture of the Turks. In fact, his 
article addresses the issue of culture (mədəniyyət) and language by addressing two points. 
Birgen argues that the Latinizers’ assumption is that “Culture is not made with the Arabic 
alphabet” and that the “Turks have remained cultureless and uneducated” as a result of 
their adoption of this alphabet.299   
Necib Asim 
 Muhittin Birgen was not the only language reformer to advocate preserving the 
Perso-Arabic alphabet. Outside of the Soviet Union, many of his Turkish contemporaries 
also argued that getting rid of the Arabic script would be detrimental to the development 
of Turkish language and literature. Necib Asim, a leading founder of the Turkish 
Association (Türk Derneği) during the Young Turk era and professor of Turkish 
Language History at Istanbul University during the Kemalist period, was one of the 
leading Turkologists in Ottoman/Kemalist Turkey. In the early 1920s, Asim had 
contributed a series of articles to the short-lived publication Anadolu Mecmuası (The 
Anatolian Periodical), which sought to instill a unique sense of Turkish national identity 
 
298 Quliyev, 331. “Fəqet, əgər həqiqəti aramaq tərəfini iltizam etmiş olsaydınız, yəni məqsəd yalnız latin 
əlifbası davasını müdafiə etmək olmuyub da türklərin ən mühüm bir həyat məsələsi haqqında elmin, üsullu, 
kontrollu, təhlilçi və tənqidçi yolları ilə həqiqəti görüb ona görə bir yol tutmaq bulunsaydı, əlbəttə, başqa 
dürlü yollar arar və başqa dəlillərə də təsadüf edərək bizi bu qədər ağır ittihamlar altında əzməzdiniz.”  




within the new Kemalist state based on a shared Anatolian, as opposed to Pan-Turkic, 
characteristics.  
 In the second issue of Anadolu Mecmuası, published in May 1924, Asim wrote an 
article entitled “Our Letters” (Harflerimiz) in which he argued in favor of preserving the 
Ottoman script and charged the Latinizers with not understanding that their reform would 
dislodge Turkish identity, not reinforce and strengthen it. “In the immediate aftermath of 
every revolutionary movement in Turkey,” Asim writes in this article, “the amendment of 
our alphabet becomes a topic of either artificial or genuine conversations. A lot of people, 
hiding behind the façade of [language] regeneration, are suggesting that we write our 
Turkish language with the Latin letters, instead of the ones we use now.”300 Thus, Asim 
recognizes from the outset of that the national revolution that birthed the Kemalist 
republic was in tune with past movements in Turkey’s history where a certain segment of 
reformers call for the adoption of the Latin script. In arguing for a change in alphabets, 
these Latinizers have invoked the “preference for “regeneration” (teceddüdperverlik) to 
argue for their cause.  
 Though he comes out against Latinization, Asim also proposes reforming the 
current Ottoman script to better reflect the written language. Juxtaposing Turkish with 
Farsi, Asim writes that “the Iranians added the letters  پ، چ، ژ and گ, which are found in 
their own language, among those of the time when they adopted the Arabic script. We 
Turks have [also] adopted the Arabic letters. However, we have not adapted these letters 
 
300 Necib Asim, “Harflerimiz,” in Anadolu Mecmuası, ed. Arslan Tekin and Ahmet Zeki İzgöer (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2011), 68. “Zâhirî veya hakikî olsun bizde her inkılap hareketinin akabinde 
harflerimizi tebdili mevzubahis oluyor. Kim bilir nasıl bir fikir ile birkaç kişi teceddüdperverlik perdesi 
arkasında saklanarak Türkçemizi şimdiki haflerimiz yerine Latin harfleriyle yazmamızı tavsiye ediyor.”  
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to the structure of our language.”301 Further stating that the Turks have not changed their 
script since the eleventh century, Asim’s reformist vision continually referenced Farsi, 
not European languages, as the model for a modernized Turkish language.  
In addition to being the source of many loanwords into Turkish, the Farsi alphabet 
represented a successful case of adapting the outside Arabic alphabet to Iran’s specific 
linguistic particularities. In addition to citing the new letters invented when Iranians 
adopted the Arabic alphabet, Asim also states that Iran never adopted a character for a 
sound not authentically in its language and, as such, assimilated many letters into the 
same sound. Asim hoped that, ostensibly, Turkish language reform would achieve the 
same results.  
 Like Birgen, Asim viewed the principle goal of language reform as “modifying” 
(ta’dil) and “improving” (ıslah) the language in order to promote national literacy. He 
conveyed the Turkish language as one that was rooted in its origins (manşe) but 
continually undergoing a process of evolution (tekamül). Asim’s term for evolution is 
tekamül, from the Arabic تكامل, meaning “to mature” or “become perfected.” This choice 
in terminology provides insight into Asim’s argumentation, as he saw the purpose of 
reform as perfecting or evolving a previously existing thing, specifically the Ottoman 
alphabet. Thus, looking for alternative alphabet was not a “reform” to Asim, but a radical 
break from the past.  
 
301 Asim, 68. “İranîler, Arap harflerini kabul ettikleri vakit bunların arasına kendi lisanlarında bulunan p, 




Thus, for Asim, Latinization meant substituting a new alphabet, rather than 
merely reforming the existing one. Furthermore, he associates the Latinizers with the 
process of “Westernization” (Garplılaşmak) that began in the nineteenth century. By the 
Kemalist period, Turkish Westernization had become an indigenous movement, with its 
homegrown intellectuals, political cadre, and reform program. Not completely critical of 
Westernization in spheres such as journalism, education, and science, Asim and others 
who sought to preserve the Ottoman alphabet believed that adopting the Latin script too 
obvious a move for the Westernizers. Concluding his article for Anadolu Mecmuası, 
Asim writes that “Westernization and renewal does not mean isolating [ourselves] from 
our nationalism and our national customs. We are obligated to make sure that our societal 
organization is not grieved as we attempt to westernize and change our eastern 
garments.”302 At the time of this article’s publication, the Kemalists were in the process 
of abolishing the Caliphate and instituting the Hat and Clothing reforms that would 
outlaw the fez and other Ottoman dress and, in their pace, mandate European attire for 
the Turks.  
 
5g. The “Reformists” at the Baku Turkological Conference  
This section will examine “reformist” discourses as they intersected with the 1926 
Baku Turkological Congress. Focusing on Turkish, Kazakh, and Russian voices, this 
group of ıslahatçılar made use of the press and the conference venue itself to argue 
 
302 Asim, 69. “Garplılaşmak ve yenileşmek, milliyetimizden, millî an’anelerimizden tecerrüd etmek demek 
değildir. Üzerimizdeki Şark libâsını değiştirir ve Garplılaşmaya çalışırken bünyemizin müteessir 
olmamasına dikkat etmek bocrumuzdur.”  
 
180 
against adopting the New Turkish Alphabet and, instead, in favor of adopting a 
“reformed” Perso-Arabic alphabet for the Turkic languages. Though the Baku 
“reformists” came from diverse political and ideological backgrounds, they were united 
in their call for the “independent path” of development for the Turkic languages. In 
arguing for each language’s right to develop sui generis, the “reformists” resisted the all-
encompassing approach of the Latinizers on swift and wholescale linguistic engineering. 
Examining diverse voices, such as Kazakh SSR leader Ahmad Baytursunoğlu, Turkish 
academic Fuat Köprülü, the Tatar Turkologist and academic Alimcan Şeref, and the 
Russian Turkologist and ardent Bolshevik, Professor Jirkov, I will reconstruct the 
“reformist” movement at the Baku Conference and show how it drew from transnational 
links to move forward.  
The 6th session of the congress was convened on the subject of “The 
Fundamental Principles of Spelling and its Social Importance” (İmlanın Temel 
Prensipleri ve Sosyal Önemi). Presided over by the Cəlaləddin Qorxmazov (or 
Korkmazoz), leader of the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, this 
particular session was noted for the number of speeches against Latinization, led by 
Kazakh SSR leader Ahmad Baytursunoğlu, as well as the number of speeches given in a 
Turkic language, rather than Russian. Focusing on this particular session and its 
discussants, I will examine the Islahatçı (“reformist”) bloc of the Baku Conference and 
the alternative to Latinization that they proposed for Turkic language reform.  
 One of the speakers in that session, the Azeri intellectual and academic 
Fərhad Ağazadə, outlined the three roads laid out before the conference participants. 
“The first of the three existing alphabets in the Turko-Tatar world,” Ağazadə proclaimed 
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as he made his case for Latinization to the sceptics, “is the unchanged Arabic alphabet 
that does not meet the request for a phonetic writing system for Turkish [and] the second 
reformed Arabic alphabet that also does not recognize this request.”303 Only the third 
option, the New Turkish Alphabet devised in Azerbaijan, would be able to make the 
Turkic languages more phonetic and spark mass literacy. He stated that “the thrid 
[option] answers without exception all the requirements of phonetic writing.”304 The 
Islahatçıs, who spoke before and after Ağazadə, would use this session to make the case 
for an alternative approach to these issues other than Latinization.  
 
Galimcan Şeref 
One important ıslahatçı at Baku was the Crimean Tatar Turkologist and delegate 
to the Baku Conference, Galimcan Şeref. Even before the Baku Conference, Şeref had 
argued in previous language conferences that, if the Turko-Tatar nationalities of the 
Soviet Union had to adopt the Latin script, then all the Soviet nationalities, including 
Russians, should also transition to the new alphabet as well.305   
After the Conference was convened, Şeref had penned and submitted for 
publication a report entitled “In Defense of Our Alphabet” (Harflerimizin Müdafaası). 
Published as a book in 1926, Şeref addressed his Turkish colleagues at the Baku 
Conference, Fuat Köprülu and Alibey Hüseynzade, in order to rally opposition against 
 
303 Nerimanoğlu and Öner, 218. “Türk-Tatar dünyasında mevcut üç alfabenin ilki, şeklini değiştirmeyen 
eski Arap alfabesi Türkçenin fonetik yazı taleplerini karşılamıyor, ikincisi, ıslah olunmuş Arap alfabesi bu 
talepleri tam karşılamıyor; üçüncüsü, Azerbaycan’da kabul edilmiş yeni alfabe ise fontetik yazının 
istisnasız gereklerine cevap veriyor.”  
304 Nerimanoğlu and Öner, 218.  
305 Barış Metin, “Sovyet Belgelerine Göre Tataristan’da Kiril Alfabesine Geçiş (1939),” 138.   
 
182 
the now-Soviet project of Latinization for the Turkic languages. In his quest to preserve 
the Perso-Arabic alphabet used by the Crimean Tatars, Şeref forged connections with 
scholars and academics from Turkey, such as Köprülü and Hüseynzade, who were still 
hold-outs after the Baku Conference decided to ratify the Latin script.  
In his treatise, one can detect Şeref’s apprehension about the mandate from Baku 
to Latinize all Soviet Turkic languages, including his own Crimean Tatar tongue. In his 
1926 treatise, he recognized that “Changing the alphabet has great importance for a 
country’s cultural, economic, and societal features” and, based on the effect to these other 
areas of national life, did not agree with the wholesale switch of all the Turkic languages 
to the Latin alphabet.306  
Like other “reformists” (ıslahatçılar) at the Baku Conference, Şeref argued that 
each Turkic language should be free to pursue its own path towards development as well 
as the writing system that best suited its needs and those of its speakers. In arguing for 
independent development, Şeref grounded his principles in the 1917 revolution by 
arguing that the different Turkic nationalities of the Soviet Union have already pursued 
separate paths towards linguistic reform. For example, he writes that “The Kazan Turks, 
after the revolution, in deciding in their own conferences, officially threw out the Russian 
alphabet and began to use the Turco-Arabic script; as for the Yakut Turks, they officially 
transitioned to the Latin letters. This means that they are the first Turkic nation to accept 
the Latin alphabet for its people [my italics].”307 He even recognizes that the issue of 
 
306 Şeref, 7. “ بوندن ماعدا الیفبه سی ده کیشد بریلن قومک کنیش کتله لرینک اجتماعی حالت روحیه سینده عظیم بر صارصینتی
   ”وقوعه کله جکدو...
307 Şeref, 7. “ بونکله برابر خریستان قازانلیلر انقالبدن صوکرا کندیلرینک قونفرانس و قونغره لرنده قرار ویره رک بالفعل روس
التین حرفلرینه انتقال ایتدیلر.تورک حرفلرینی قولالتمغه باشالدیلر، یاقوتلر ایسه روس حرفلرندن بالفعل -حرفلرینی اندیلر و عرب ” 
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language reform has formed large divisions among the Turks themselves, as one group 
advocates for Latinization, another for preserving the Arabic script, and a third smaller 
faction in favor of adopting the Russian Cyrillic script.  
Equally against the adoption of Cyrillic, Şeref makes a savvy defense of the 
former alphabet by stylizing it the “Turco-Arabic” script to give it more of an indigenous 
feel. His treatise is “savvy” in my view because Şeref recognized the logic at work in 
Soviet Nationality Policy, namely the effort to indigenize communism through local 
languages, and cast his arguments to preserve the old alphabet within this new Soviet 
ideological idiom. Labeling the former alphabet as “Turco-Arabic,” a unique move in the 
general reformist literature of the era, Şeref makes the case that this script is the 
indigenous Tatar alphabet and harbors the essence of their national identity and literary 
traditions.  
At the tenth session of the Baku Conference, Şeref’s fellow ıslahatçı, the Russian 
Turkologist Prof. Y. Jirkov, expounded on the question of the alphabet for the Soviet 
Turkic languages and that question’s centrality within the larger scheme of Soviet 
indigenization. Crediting the 1917 revolution with delivering the Turkic peoples a new 
way of living, Jirkov hailed the coming decades as constituting a “springtime” of 
economic, cultural, educational, and political uplift for the non-Russian minority 
nationalities of the Soviet Union. Invoking the principles of indigenization, Jirkov stated 
in his speech that “This early springtime of national life is not nationalism, [rather], it is 
tied our perspectives and hopes for a beautiful future where national culture will develop 
and flower. The products of this culture will nourish its own people above all; however, 
they hope for more beyond that. Throughout the history of culture, there is no 
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unimportant or small nation that has not produced some sort of cultural achievement that 
is beneficial to all of humanity.”308  
With this main point in mind, Şeref spoke subsequently, affirming multiple times 
in his speech Jirkov’s view of language as a “technology.” As a tool for society,  Şeref 
stated that “the topic of alphabetic change has great importance for people who have had 
a lot of cultural success, such as Turkey’s Turks, Azerbaijanis, Kazan Tatars, Uzbeks, 
Kazakh-Kirgiz both in the past and presently.”309 Şeref’s concern with Latinization is 
that the New Turkish Alphabet had no cultural and historical precedent in Turkic history 
and, as such, was not the correct “technical tool” to renew the education, literacy levels, 
and literature of the Soviet Turkic peoples.  
In arguing that the alphabet and language of a country reflect the greater facets of 
its identity and personality, Şeref presented a counter argument to the modernization 
drive of the Latinizers. In the previous chapter, we discussed how the Latinizers viewed 
alphabet reform and Latinization as a means to modernize the Soviet Turkic nationalities. 
For them, the very act of Latinization was a step on the road towards fostering new 
secular identities within Soviet Nationality Policy. Şeref, on the other hand, does not see 
change in such a sweeping and uniform way. For him, it was counterproductive to insist 
that all Turkic languages should adopt the same Latinized script when they already used a 
standardized Perso-Arabic script. This transition from the older to the Latin script, in his 
 
308 Narimanoğlu & Öner, 283. “Milli hayatın bu erken baharı milliyetçi değil, milli medeniyetin gelişeceği 
ve çiçekleneceği güzel geleceğe ümit ve görüşümüzle bağlıdır. Bu medeniyet ürünleri ile ilk başta kendi 
halkını, kendi kavimi besleyecek; fakat onların daha çok şeye de ümidi var. Kültür tarihleri süresince hem 
maddi medeniyet alanında, hem de halk masalları, manileri, tezhibi vs. alanda tüm insanlık için değerli 
olan her hangi kültürel bir başarı ortaya koymayan küçük veya önemsiz bir halk yoktur.”  
309 Narimanoğlu & Öner, 294.  
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estimation, would destroy this alphabetic “harmony” between the Turkic nationalities 
“who have close relations from the standpoint of economics and geography and who 
speak related languages.”310 He viewed the existing Perso-Arabic script, therefore, as 
the truly international one for the Turkic, and great Muslim, world within the Soviet 
Union. Addressing Ağamalıoğlu, Şeref concluded his speech by stating that “replacing 
Arabic with Latin writing will not help cultural and economic progress; on the contrary, 
[Latinization] will stall our economic and cultural progress by a couple of years. Thus, let 
us not deviate from the true path which has taken us, the Turko-Tatar nationalities, to 
cultural and economic progress.”311   
 
Ahmet Bayturnsınoğlu  
Taking the side of Şeref at the Baku Turkological Conference, another vocal 
opponent of the New Turkish Alphabet was Ahmet Bayturnsınoğlu, a renowned scholar 
and professor of Turkic literature and language at the Kazakh Pedagogical Institute in 
Tashkent from 1922-1928. Born in present-day Kazakhstan in 1873 Bayturnsınoğlu 
studied in a Russian-Kazakh language school where he was introduced to the 
revolutionary and liberal atmosphere sweeping the Russian Empire during the era of the 
Norodnichestvo movement. Like his contemporaries, Bayturnsınoğlu turned to political 
agitation against Tsarist colonial exploitation. In taking up this political cause, Ferhat 
 
310 Narimanoğlu & Öner, 309.  
311 Narimanoğlu & Öner, 312. “…Arap yazısının Latin yazısıyla değiştirilmesi kültürel ve ekonomik 
ilerlemeye hizmet etmeyecek tam tersi kültürel ve ekonomik ilerleyişimizi birkaç, yıl daha geciktirecektir. 




Tamir states that Bayturnsınoğlu’s attention was drawn to “enlightening” his local 
Kazakh society in their national and cultural identity and to the pressing issue of language 
and alphabet reform.312  
A pioneering figure in the development of Kazakh nationalism, Bayturnsınoğlu’s 
mission was to awaken the Kazakh people’s national identity through reforming and 
uniting the languages and dialects they spoke. Prior to the 1926 conference in Baku, he 
had devised his own reformed Kazakh alphabet, based on the Perso-Arabic script. At the 
Baku Conference, therefore, Bayturnsınoğlu argued for the separate development of each 
Turkic language that would untether his reformed Perso-Arabic alphabet for Kazakh to 
the demands of the Azeri language reformers who pushed for the abandonment of this 
alphabet in favor of Latinization. At the 6th session of the Baku Conference, 
Bayturnsınoğlu warned that Latinization would not be appropriate for Kazakh and that 
the Turkic languages were distinct from one another and did not constitute dialects of a 
international Turkish language.   
One of the central arguments that Bayturnsınoğlu makes with regard to 
Latinization is that blindly adopting a foreign writing system would expose the Turkic 
languages to all the orthographic and spelling problems that these alphabets harbor. In his 
speech, he focuses on the problems of the Cyrillic alphabet and the reasons why such an 
alphabet would not be appropriate for Kazakh. For example, he lists the lack of letters in 
the Cyrillic alphabet to represent the full range of sounds in Kazakh. Citing three Russian 
words to make his point, Bayturnsınoğlu argues “let’s look at the words “tene,” “çtenie,” 
 
312 Ferhat Tamir, “Ahmet Bayturnsınoğlu ve 1926 Bakû Türkoloji Kongresi,” in 1926 Bakû Türkoloji 




or “dobroe. At the end of these words there is an “e” sound, but when we say “tebe,” it’s 
as if one says “tibie.””313 By citing this example from Russian, Bayturnsınoğlu was 
making an allusion to Latinization, which he believed would import many of the 
deficiencies of that script to the Turkic domains. In arguing for reforming the existing 
Perso-Arabic script, Bayturnsınoğlu drew upon his experience with Kazakh to make the 
case that it would be more beneficial to fix what was already familiar to the Turks than to 
import a little-known alphabet with many kinks to be worked out.  
For Bayturnsınoğlu, the first principle to be observed was phonetics. He stresses 
that “if an alphabet is not good, this will influence the foundations of writing; it is an 
entirely different issue to have each letter correspond to every sound in an alphabet and 
for an alphabet to be perfect.”314 He goes on to state that “In my view, phonetics is the 
most ideal foundation for writing. If the appeal is made to another writing system, then it 
evolves completely based on different principles. The foundations of writing are tied to 
more than the characteristics of a language.”315  
Commenting on his own experience reforming the Persianized Kazakh-Kyrgyz 
alphabet, Bayturnsınoğlu stated that “We Kazakhs have been implementing phonetic 
writing for several years and we are achieving good results…Thus, from the standpoint of 
social importance, it is necessary that education be disseminated and that it be eased for 
society. A phonetic system [as in Kazakhstan] eases what education offers not only to 
 
313 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 219.  
314 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 219. “Eğer alfabe iyi değilse bu yazı kaidelerini etkileyecektir, alfabede her ses 
için uygun harf olması ve hiçbir zaman değişmemesi bakımından alfabenin mükemmel olması ise başka bir 
mesele.” 
315 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 219. “Fikrimce en ideal yazı kaidesi fonetik kaidedir. Eğer başka yazı kaidelerine 
müracaat edilirse, bu tamamen başka esaslara göre oluyor. Yazı kaideleri ise daha çok dile, dilin 
özelliklerine bağlıdır.”  
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children, but also to adults.”316 In his estimation, the Persianized alphabet was best able 
to achieve these objectives due to its literary and cultural heritage for the Kazakhs, as 
well as embodying Islamic culture. He argued, therefore, that Turkic Perso-Arabic 
alphabets should be reformed, in the manner that he had done in Kazakhstan a few years 
prior, not discarded for an outside system. The current script was not “perfect,” as 
Bayturnsınoğlu stated, but it was familiar and had roots in the local cultures. The answer 
to the challenges of modernization, especially mass literacy, could be met by modifying 
the Persian script to show the range of sounds in the various Turkic languages.   
In contrast to this vision, Bayturnsınoğlu identified the rival faction of Latinizers 
at the conference as “those wanting to sever the Turkish people from their traditions.”317 
Navigating between this faction and the conservatives, who saw the alphabet as a “holy 
one” connected to Islam, Bayturnsınoğlu stressed again that the principle should be 
towards phonetics and ease of reading for the masses. As such, Azeri Latinization was 
viewed as a foreign imposition on all the Turkic languages as an all-encompassing 
solution to the problem of literacy and education in the Soviet Turkic republics. In a 
subsequent session at the Baku Conference, he promoted Kazakhstan’s recent alphabet 
reform as a model that the rest of the Soviet Turkic nationalities could use. “Works were 
undertaken,” he stated, “towards establishing a reformed grammar according to the 
 
316 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 220. “Biz, Kazaklar fonetik yazıyı birkaç yıldan beri uygulamaktayız ve güzel 
sonuçlar da kazanıyoruz. Bizim alfabemizi bir yılda öğrenenler dört yıllık Rus okulunu bitirenlere, dört 
yıllığı bitirenler ise dokuz yıllık Rus okulunu bitirenlere eşit düzeyde bilgili yazıyorlar.” 
317 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 220-21. 
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phonetic requirements of the alphabet. In a word, within a short period of time, 
[Kazakhstan] established conscious control of its language.”318 
For Bayturnsınoğlu, the key idea to advocate at the Baku Conference was one of 
“separate development.” In this same speech, he outlined the work of Tashkent’s own 
language conference, convened in 1924, on which he successfully pushed for a reform of 
the Kazakh alphabet. The best way to argue for separate development was to demonstrate 
that Kazakhs had already taken it upon themselves, independently of Baku, to address the 
linguistic and orthographic problems of Kazakh. One of his major arguments for separate 
development was that the needs of a particular language do not necessarily correspond to 
those of another language. Furthermore, he extends this reasoning to the education levels 
of the Soviet Turkic nationalities. This discrepancy between the different Turkic peoples 
required, in Bayturnsınoğlu’s view, separate and independent methodologies for language 
and alphabetic reform.  
Emphasizing Kazakhstan’s own problems, Bayturnsınoğlu stated that “Among us 
[Kazakhs] the education level is very low [and] presently no social organizations or 
conferences are to be found.”319 Since the Sovietization of Central Asia, local 
Bolsheviks were faced with the task of delineating territorial republics according to the 
principle of Soviet Nationality Policy (or indigenization).    
 
318 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 258.  “Aynı zamanda Kazak dilinin özelliklerinin fonetik ve gramatik açıdan 
öğrenilmesi alfabenin fonetik taleplere uygun şekilde ıslah edilmesi gramerin oluşturulması yönünde 
çalışmalar yapılıyordu. Bir sözle, kısa süre içinde Kazak dili kendi üzerinde şuurlu kontrole yol veren, 
üzerinde çalışılmış durumunu aldı.”  
319 Nerimanoğlu & Öner, 258. “Bizde halkın eğitim düzeyi çok aşağıdadır, halk için iyi teşkil edilmiş 
içtimai kıraat ve konferanslar şimdilik bulunmuyor; bizim hem dinleyicilerimiz, hem de okuyucularımız 
kelimenin tam anlamıyla tesadüfî kişilerdir.”  
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İsmail Şükrü  
 Two years after Asim’s article, another anti-Latinization treatise, called Let’s Find 
Better than the Latin and Arabic Letters (Latin ve Arap Harflerden Daha İyisini Bulalım) 
was published by İsmail Şükrü. A deputy to the National Assembly from Izmir, Dr. 
İsmail Şükrü Bey, as he is referred to in both the primary and secondary literature, had 
been a staunch opponent of Latinization, arguing as other “reformists” did that such 
measures were cosmetic and ideological, rather than really addressing the linguistic 
obstacles of Turkish. Before his 1926 treatise, Dr. Şükrü had published his anti-
Latinization views in various national newspapers, including İçtihat and Akşam.     
In the opening of his 1926 treatise, Şükrü addresses “his distinguished comrade 
Dr. Alibey Hüseynzade,” one of Turkey’s three representatives to the Baku Turkological 
Conference.320 As discussed in the previous chapter, Hüseynzade was an Azeri émigré to 
Turkey who was the foremost theorist of Turkish nationalism and the founder of the 
Turkic newspaper Füruset. By the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Hüseynzade 
was a citizen of the new state and continued to advocate for Turkification of language, 
education, and national identity. As Turkey’s representative to the conference, 
Hüseynzade’s status as a leading nationalist intellectual and reformer merited him a spot 
as an honorary guest of the Baku Conference as a voting participant. Before his colleague 
attended the proceedings, Şükrü sought to influence him through this treatise to promote 
other areas of language reform that veered away from the question of the alphabet. 
 
320 İsmail Şükrü, Latin ve Arap Harflerden Daha İyisini Bulalım (Istanbul: Kadir Matbaasi, 1926), 1.  
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 As with Birgen and Asim, Şükrü advocated for the Baku attendees to view the 
question of the alphabet “with a more modern, thorough, and scholarly” lens than what he 
viewed as the approach and discourses of the Latinizers. This type of approach, in 
Şükrü’s view, would “facilitate a path [to literacy] for the common villager” whom the 
reformers invoked as the mainstay of their efforts.321 Believing that the Baku Conference 
as an “event that witnesses a lot of progress for the world’s future,” Şükrü’s advice to 
Hüseynzade was to avoid the decisive issue of Latinization and, instead, focus on other 
aspects of language reform. Specifically, he sought to advocate for the “purification of 
the Ottoman language” and “the correction of our orthography.” Thus, Şükrü uses the 
same term as Birgen, tasfiye, to denote the need for Turkification of the existing Ottoman 
language. 
 Extending his reformist platform further, Şükrü argued that Turkey’s 
representative to the Baku Conference should advocate for the following reforms in lieu 
of Latinization:  
First, let us correct our alphabet and orthography.  
Secondly, let us take complete control of the grammar of our dear 
language.  
Thirdly, let us cleanse our pronunciation from foreign lexicons as 
much as possible.322    
For Şükrü, as with Birgen, the task of language reform in the post-Ottoman era was to 
improve upon the existing Ottoman language by solving the orthographical issues that 
 
321 Şükrü, 7. 
322 Şükrü, 7. “ ،اوال، حروف و امالمزی دوزه لته لم. ثانیا دیقسیونلرمزی ممکن الدیغی قدر یاپانجی لغتلردن تمیزله یه لم. ثالثا
دوشوندکلرمدن بر قسمی یه تیشدره بیلدم. شیمدیلک یالکزحروف و امالمزحقنده ” 
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was blamed for mass illiteracy and carrying out Turkification to Ottoman vocabulary and 
grammar. From the beginning, Ismail Şükrü is not sure how, if at all, his three-point 
program would be received at the conference. He asks Alibey Hüseynzade to “bring up 
these points just once as the congress debates the issue of the alphabet, even if they are 
not successful.”323 Şükrü’s reformist agenda thought beyond the boundaries of 
Anatolian Turkey to address the entire “Turkic world” (umum Türklük alemi). In fact, 
like Birgen, Şükrü’s conception of the Turkic languages was that they were dialects of a 
single Türkçe dili to which all Turkic peoples spoke fluently and naturally.  
In his articulation, Şükrü echoed fellow reformists in representing the Ottoman language 
as the most “evolved dialect” of single Turkish language, due to its historical and literary 
development in the Ottoman period. In doing so, he viewed Ottoman Turkish as the 
native language of all Turkic peoples and the “dialect” that would best be universalized 
throughout the Turkic world. This argumentation enabled reformists, such as Şükrü and 
Birgen, to find an exalted place within nationalist paradigms for the Ottoman language. 
They sought to standardize and Turkify Ottoman, purging it of its Arabic and Persian 
accoutrements, in order to universalize the idiom to Turks outside of Anatolia. With these 
objectives in mind, Şükrü argued that Latinization would destroy the historical and 
literary legacies of Ottoman and render them obsolete to the next generation of Turks.  
5h. Enver Pasha’s Alphabet  
We continue our examination of the “reformists” but turning to the Young Turk 
period and the 1917 treatise of Dr. Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, entitled The Alphabet with New 
 
323 Şükrü, 6-7.  
 
193 
Letters (Yeni Harflerle Elifba). Published during the end of the First World War, Hakkı’s 
treatise was dedicated to presenting and disseminating Enver Pasha’s reformed Ottoman 
alphabet. According to Bilâl Şimşir, Milaslı İsmail Hakkı was an academic and 
intellectual who joined the “reformist” (ıslahatçı) camp within the Turkish language 
reform movement. As they debated linguistic and alphabetic issues, reformers who 
argued for Latinization, meaning abolishing the Ottoman Perso-Arabic script and 
implementing the Roman alphabet, were led by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and referred to 
themselves as Latinciler (Latinizers).324 In opposition to the Latinizers stood the 
ıslahatçılar (reformers), led by Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, Prof. Mecmettin Arif, Cihangirli M. 
Şinasi, and Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, who argued that, instead of abandoning the 
Ottoman script for Latinization, the Perso-Arabic alphabet should be reformed to better 
reflect Turkish pronunciation and that Persian and Arabic loanwords should conform to 
Turkish pronunciation and spelling.325 As Şimşir writes, “Nearly everybody saw that the 
Arabic letters did not fit with the Turkish language. [So] They exerted energy to adjust 
[the Arabic alphabet].”326      
Within the ıslahatçı camp, there were diverse opinions as to how this adjustment 
of the Ottoman script should proceed. Milaslı İsmail Hakkı’s side advocated for 
abandoning the cursive structure of Perso-Arabic letters in favor of writing them 
separately. Furthermore, they sought to introduce new markings to indicate the Turkish 
vowels. This program, both writing the Ottoman letters separately and creating new 
vowel markings, distinguished Milaslı İsmail Hakkı’s faction within the ıslahatçı camp. 
 
324 Şimşir, 47.  
325 Şimşir, 44-45.  
326 Şimşir, 45.  
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In his 1908 Circular on Education and Alphabet Reform (Tamim-i Maarif ve Islah-ı 
Huruf), İsmail Hakkı maps out his vision of separating the Arabic letters. Introducing his 
reformed alphabet, he writes that his circular is “the solution to teaching reading and 
writing to the nation and to our women.”327 Under the Young Turk regime, Ottoman 
women—particularly middle and upper class women—witnessed a period of social 
reforms that established the Society for the Employment of Women (Kadınları Çalıştırma 
Cemiyeti), which sought to bring women into the workplace, instituted compulsory 
female primary education,  and amended the family code to give women divorce rights, 
raised the marital age to sixteen, and legislated that marriages be conducted in front of a 
secular state magistrate.328 This meant that, as Turkish nationalism and debates over 
language reform gained steam, they melded with the debate over Ottoman women and 
their place in a modernized national community.  
Thus, by stating that the reformist alphabet should be disseminated to both “the 
nation and our women,” İsmail Hakkı displays an organic, if masculinist, understanding 
of the Turkish nation that argued for women’s full participation in public and civic life. 
As the future Latinizers would claim at the end of the 1920s, the Young Turk ıslahatçılar 
of the 1910s argued that women played an integral role in the nurturing of the Turkish 
nation and the education of its citizenry at home. Thus, İsmail Hakkı and other language 
reformers advocated for women’s literacy as a necessary supplement to the 
transformative social legislation they embarked upon. Thus, İsmail Hakkı views women 
 
327 Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, Tamim-i Maarif ve Islah-ı Huruf, 1.  
328 Zürcher, 122.  
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as an integral and special category within the greater halk (people or nation) to be 
emphasized in discussions over alphabetic reforms and its beneficiaries.  
In order to analyze İsmail Hakkı’s proposal for the reformed Ottoman alphabet, I 
have included the first page of his Circular in Figure 1 below. The top half of the page is 
written in the Ottoman script and states the author, publisher, title, and pledge of the 
Circular. The bottom half explains the author’s proposals for separating the Perso-Arabic 
letters. In this section, İsmail Hakkı demonstrates how to write each Perso-Arabic letter 
separately and uses the French phonetic system to indicate his reformed vowel markings. 
Under the French letters, the page concludes with an example sentence in the reformed 
Ottoman alphabet, distinguished by separate letters, and, underneath, its transliteration 
into the current Ottoman script. The sentence reads, according to İsmail Hakkı’s own 
chart,  
Cenabi haqqa youz biñ shoukrlar olsun ki hourriyete nail olduq 





(Figure 6. Ismail Hakki’s Alphabet Manual)329  
Thus, in his example sentence, İsmail Hakkı instructs the reader both in the 
reformed alphabet and in the political rhetoric of the Young Turk regime. He invokes the 
concept of freedom (hürriyet) in keeping with the discourse of the Committee of Union 
and Progress that the Second Constitutional Era was one in which the principle of liberty 
abounded and guided social transformation. He follows this up with another message 
centered on education.  
 




(Figure 7. Ismail Hakki’s Alphabet Manual 2)330 
Shimdi eñ ziyaade chalishacaghimiz cehet ta’mimi maarifdir 
(Right now, the course that we will work the most towards is the generalization of 
education). 
Like the concept of freedom, İsmail Hakkı draws upon education as a social force that 
will ensure freedom to all Ottoman citizens, including women. A reformed Ottoman 
alphabet, therefore, was central to İsmail Hakkı’s efforts to institute a modern education 
system (tamimi-i maarif) and promote mass literacy.331 For this objective, İsmail Hakkı 
writes that his reformed alphabet will give the Turks “possession of a more perfect script 
than the Latin letters all for [their] needs.”332 Thus, İsmail Hakkı’s 1909 treatise 
demonstrates that debates over Ottoman alphabet reform were connected to larger 
educational and political projects in the Young Turk period.  
 It was under the authority of Enver Pasha, leader of the Three Pashas regime that 
came to power after the 1913 coup d’état and, subsequently, Ottoman Minister of War 
(1913-1918), that İsmail Hakkı’s reformed alphabet would gain prominence within 
governmental and military circles. During his tenure as war minister, Enver Pasha 
attempted to institute İsmail Hakkı’s alphabet within the military. The alphabet, therefore, 
 
330 Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, Tamim-i Maarif ve Islah-ı Huruf, 1.  
331 İsmail Hakkı, Tamim-i Maarif ve Islah-ı Huruf, 3.  
332 İsmail Hakkı, Tamim-i Maarif ve Islah-ı Huruf, 2.  
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became known as “the new writing” (hattı cedid), “the Army alphabet” (Ordu elifbası), 
and “Enver Pasha’s script” (Enver Paşa yazısı) and manuals were distributed throughout 
the military.333 Though Enver Pasha’s efforts were unsuccessful, his experiments with the 
ıslahatçı script within the army was a turning point in the debate over institutionalized 
alphabet reform and its connection to educational reform.  
 According to a 1917 manual, entitled The Alphabet with New Letters (Yeni 
Harflerle Elifba), the ıslahatçı script was prepared by the Society for Alphabet Reform 
and Arrangement (Tertip ve Islah-ı Huruf Cemiyeti) and ratified by the medical, 
scientific, and national defense divisions.334 After introducing the writing system, 
focusing on its consonants and vowels, the 1917 manual featured a section on vocabulary 
and example sentences. In addition to animals, household items, the vocabulary section 
featured military and patriotic terminology, including flag (bayrak and sancak), mosque 
(cami), crescent (hilal), cannon (top), soldier (asker), sword (kılıç), rifle (tüfek), officer 
(zabit), and gendarme (jandarma).335  
 In the Sentences section (Figure 3), İsmail Hakkı provides some examples of 
simple sentences in the ıslahatçı alphabet. Like the vocabulary section, these sentences 
largely focus on military and patriotic concepts. Some example sentences read:  
Askerlerimiz Kafkas dağlarına sancağımızı diktiler. 
(Our soldiers will plant our flag in the Caucasus).  
Mısır bizimdir. 
(Egypt is ours).  
 
333 Şimşir, 53.  
334 Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, Yeni Harflerle Elifba (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1917), 1.  
335 İsmail Hakkı, 1917, 11-41.  
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Karadeniz Osmanlılarındır.  
(The Black Sea belongs to the Ottomans) 
Bütün Akdeniz adaları devletimize tabidir ve tabi kalacaktır.  
(Each one of the Mediterranean islands are subject to our state and remain subject). 
Her Osmanlı asker olmağa, vatan için can verircesine çalışmağa mecburdur.  





(Figure 8. Enver Pasha’s Alphabet Manual) 336  
These example sentences provide insight into how the Ottoman military was to be 
educated with “Enver’s Alphabet,” namely that literacy was meant to enhance loyal to the 
Ottoman state and its war effort. These sentences also show the lingering desire of the 
Young Turk regime to reconstitute many of the lost Ottoman Muslim domains. Both 
Egypt and the Mediterranean islands are claimed as rightfully Ottoman, despite having 
 
336 Milaslı İsmail Hakkı, Yeni Harflerle Elifba, 45.  
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lost them to the European empires. In addition, the sentence about the Caucasus betrays 
many of the Pan-Turkist proclivities of the Young Turk leadership and their strategy to 
expand the Ottoman borders to encompass the Azerbaijani Turks in Transcaucasia.   
5i. Conclusion  
 This chapter has analyzed the vision of language reform as espoused by the 
ıslahatçılar (“reformists”). In contrast to the Latinizers, the “reformists” sought to modify 
the existing Perso-Arabic alphabet, rather than adopt the Romanized New Turkish 
Alphabet (Yeni Türk Alfabesi). This wing of the Turkic language reform movement 
defended the traditional script using appeals to national identity and the unique Turkic 
culture. The Perso-Arabic script, both Turkish and Azeri “reformists” argued, preserved 
the unique historical development of the Turkic peoples, in addition to being the alphabet 
of centuries of Turco-Islamic literature. To change the alphabet, these “reformists” 
reasoned, would mean discarding the national, culture, and literary traditions of the past 
and undermine the project of nationalism itself.  
 This chapter has demonstrated how a substantial number of ıslahatçılar appealed 
to modern notions of nationalism, rather than religious traditionalism, in their defense of 
the old alphabet. Tellingly, they generally supported other, and more radical, programs of 
language reform. Among these was a general endorsement on the part of the ıslahatçılar 
for tafsiye, or the purification, of the Turkic languages from cumbersome Arabic and 
Persian grammatical and lexical elements in favor of Turkification. This is to say that this 
wing of the reform movement thought two ways about the connection to the outside 
Islamic world. First, it sought to maintain cultural and literary connections to the Arabic 
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and Persian classics. Secondly, however, this group sought to “free” Turkish from the 
conventions of these other two languages in order to foster independent development in 
the era of national states.  
 The ıslahatçılar and their discourse should be included when evaluating the 
progress of Turkic language reform for a number of reasons. Firstly, analyzing their 
writings complicates our understanding of the factions in the language reform movement. 
The “reformists” sought to achieve everything the Azeri Bolsheviks and other Latinizers 
did: mass literacy, modernization, and indigenization. They attended and argued at the 
Baku Conference not because they were skeptical of language reform in toto, but of 
Latinization and its ability to deliver on these promises.  
Secondly, their arguments demonstrate that not all language reformers associated the 
Perso-Arabic script with “backwardness” or “medieval conditions.” Instead, the 
“reformists” viewed their script to be superior in many ways to the Roman and Cyrillic 
alphabets. Their speeches at the Baku Conference are rife with examples of 
inconsistencies in Russian, English, and French spelling, pronunciation, and grammar. 
They, therefore, did not look to Europe in terms of language reform as the Latinizers did. 
Instead, the “reformists” viewed their alphabet to be no more or less “deficient” than any 
other and, therefore, able to be salvaged through minor variations of the existing script.  
As with the case of Ahmad Bayurnsınoğlu, the “reformists” could prove just as open to 
innovation in the realm of alphabet reform. Rather than shunning the Perso-Arabic script 
entirely, Bayurnsınoğlu’s work before the 1926 Baku Conference had been to reform, 
indeed invent, a new Kazakh alphabet based on the existing Arabic letters. Likewise, 
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Ismail Şükrü, Necib Asim, and Muhittin Birgen all wrote in favor of modifying the 
existing “Ottoman” script to better mark authentic Turkish pronunciation. The 
“reformists,” therefore, were wedged between the Latinizers and those who felt it 
imprudent, even sacrilegious, to change the Arabic script at all. For the “reformists,” the 
question was not if language reform should be enacted. Instead, their fight against the 
Latinizers was over the method of reform.  
With the victory of Latinization in 1926, the “reformists” in the Soviet Union largely fell 
silent. In neighboring Turkey, however, the new Kemalist state was still carefully 
weighing the issue of alphabetic and language reform. Figures such as Fuat Köprülü, the 
Turkish deputy to Baku and an ardent supporter of the Ottoman script, would return 
home to stand against any potential Latinization of Turkey’s own alphabet. As they did in 
Baku, the “reformists” couched their critiques of Latinization in terms of hindering the 
national project of forming a unique Turkish community.  
The tide after Baku, however, was with Latinization and, a mere two years after the 
declaration to Latinize all Soviet Turkic languages, the Kemalist state embarked upon its 










6. Constructing the Turkish Nation During the Alphabet Revolution  
 
(Figure 9. Karagöz December 1928)337  
6a. Introduction 
On 1st of Birinci Kanun (December) 1928, the satirical periodical Karagöz printed 
a caricature of its namesake characters: the comical Karagoz and Hacivat duo from the 
traditional shadow plays once popular across the Ottoman Empire. Like the anecdotes of 
 
337 Ali Fuad, editor, “Bu Günden İtibaren Arap Harfleri Tarihe Karışıyor!”, in Karagöz, Istanbul, 1 Birinci 




Nesreddin Hoca, the Karagöz-Hacivat stories were popular among the Turkish public for 
their satire and humor that operated on the fact that both characters were perfect foils of 
each other. Hacivat’s character represented piety, intellectualism, and spoke in the high 
Ottoman language of the sultan’s palace. Karagoz, on the other hand, embodied the 
common man: worldly, literal-minded, quick to temper, and a scrappy fighter. Karagoz, as 
befitting his character, did not speak in the high Ottoman language but in the Turkish idiom 
of the common man in Anatolia. This was a language held in contempt by the upper 
echelons of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, considered ignorant, uncultured, and crass.  
This December 1928 issue of Karagöz, however, was released in political 
conditions that had greatly shifted since the founding of the Turkish Republic five years 
prior. The Ottoman Empire had collapsed in 1922 after a decade of warfare spanning the 
Italo-Ottoman War (1911), Balkan Wars (1912-13), First World War (1914-1918) and War 
of Independence (1919-1922). Filling the void caused by imperial collapse, the new nation-
state of Turkey was declared and its Kemalist leadership worked vigorously to uproot all 
former remnants of the Ottoman past. By 1928, the Kemalists had set their sights on the 
high Ottoman court language of the now defunct sultanate-caliphate. Operating on its 
nationalist ideology, the Turkish Republic sought to elevate the Istanbul dialect of Turkish 
to the level of the state’s official language. This idiom was spoken by the common people 
whom the state considered to be indelible members of the new Turkish nation. The 
Republic’s first step towards discarding the Ottoman language was to enact the Alphabet 
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Revolution, which abolished the Ottoman alphabet (based on Arabic and Pesian) and, in 
its place, instituted the New Turkish Alphabet, composed of Latin-based letters.338    
The headline of this edition of Karagöz introduced the New Turkish Alphabet and 
signaled the formal end of the old Ottoman alphabet: “From this Day Forward, the Arabic 
Letters Become a Thing of the Past.”339 In the image, Karagöz and Hacivat are depicted as 
gravediggers at the Arab alphabet’s graveside interment. This graveyard scene is not 
melancholy as Hacivat, ever the optimist, points to a glowing sun and declares, “Look 
Karagöz, at how brightly the sun of the Turkish letters is born after the burial of the Arabic 
letters.”340 Karagöz responds to Hacivat in his characteristic worldly and literal manner of 
thinking, “God willing, there will remain no corner of our nation that we did not illuminate 
with this light.”341  
What was remarkable about this particular exchange between Hacivat and Karagöz 
was that both the idealistic and the pragmatic had, for the first time, both endorsed the New 
Turkish Alphabet as necessary for the enlightenment and betterment of the Turkish nation. 
As such, the periodical played on the familiar juxtaposition of Hacivat and Karagöz to 
show that everyone, from intellectuals and bureaucrats to workers and peasants, should 
 
338 The Kemalist leadership was quite pragmatic as they abolished the Ottoman Alphabet and instituted a 
Latin-based alphabet in its place. As Sinan Meydan states in his five volume examination of Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk’s intellectual project during the Kemalist period (1923-1945), the Kemalists officially used 
the term “New Turkish Alphabet” (Yeni Türk Alfabesi) or “Turkish Letters” (Türk harfleri) rather than 
“Latin alphabet” or “Latin letters.” By insisting that the new alphabet was essentially a Turkish one, the 
Kemalists were able to deflect criticisms that the Alphabet Revolution was a westernizing one that sought 
to sever the Turkish people from their Islamic roots. Instead, the Kemalists argued that the “New Turkish 
Alphabet” would better reflect Turkish pronunciation and bring the written and spoken languages together. 
See, Sinan Meydan, Türk Aydınlanması Akl-ı Kemal: Atatürk’ün Akıllı Projeleri (Istanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi 
Yayın Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ, 2014), 130-132.  
339 Fuad, “Bu Günden İtibaren Arap Harfleri Tarihe Karışıyor!”, ibid.  
340 Fuad, “Bu Günden İtibaren Arap Harfleri Tarihe Karışıyor!”, ibid. 
341 Fuad, “Bu Günden İtibaren Arap Harfleri Tarihe Karışıyor!”, ibid. 
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strive to adopt the New Turkish Alphabet as soon as possible. The adoption of the Latin 
alphabet signified a “new dawn” for the Turkish government and society at large.    
The character of Hacivat had always represented the more pristine and educated 
class that sought to civilize the common man through appeals to progress. Ingeniously, the 
periodical associated him with the state and with the alphabet reformers. Turkey, in 
Hacivat’s view, suffered from a great “darkness” characterized by illiteracy and lack of 
education. The Alphabet Revolution played to his concerns by promising a rapid 
turnaround of illiteracy. Karagöz, representing the common man, also had a stake in the 
success of the Alphabet Revolution because it was he and others like him who were to be 
the main beneficiaries. Literacy and education, the new Republic promised, promised to 
improve the standard living for rural peasants and urban workers alike.   
The only question that remained was how exactly the state was to enact the spread 
of the New Turkish Alphabet in an efficient and practical way. As such, this particular 
issue of Karagöz, anticipated an important shift in state-society relations brought about by 
the implementation of the New Turkish Alphabet. This shift reformulated the interaction 
and relationship between the republican elites and the society at large. For the New Turkish 
Alphabet to be successfully and rapidly disseminated, both groups would have to work 
together in solidarity. This called for mass mobilization of the Turkish population on an 
unprecedented scale not only to learn the new alphabet but to take up the responsibility of 





6b. Kemalist Language Reform in Historiographical Perspective  
The article in Karagöz was published a month after the Grand National Assembly 
in Ankara voted to authorize the full adoption of the New Turkish Alphabet as nation’s 
official script (November 1st, 1928). The implementation of the New Turkish Alphabet, 
referred to as the Alphabet Revolution or Reform, signaled the first phase of Turkey’s more 
comprehensive Language Revolution (Dil Devrimi), which was to continue in various 
phases over the course of the 1930s and 1940s.  
This chapter will focus on the Kemalist alphabet reform by relating it to larger 
themes of state-directed nation building and identity formation. I will, therefore, analyze 
the 1928 Alphabet Reform within the nexus of state-society relations to demonstrate that 
their success was determined by the political hegemony of Kemalist leadership and its 
ability to coopt key groups in Turkish society to fulfill its goals. In order to disseminate the 
New Turkish Alphabet throughout the republic, the Kemalist cadre mobilized all arms of 
the state, as well as key independent groups within society. Together, they forged a new 
coalition of Latinizers who publically argued that nation’s future hinged on mobilizing the 
entire nation to achieve mass literacy. Mass literacy, this coalition held, would serve as the 
catalyst for social transformation and the redefinition of the ideal citizen and their place 
within the nation. By disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet throughout the country, the 
Kemalist leadership sought to mold the population according to its own ideology, seeking 
to forge a new collective consciousness about what it meant to be Turkish.  
The 1928 Alphabet Reform formed part of a larger statist project of nation-building 
and modernization. Scholars have located the origins of Kemalist modernization to earlier 
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epochs of Ottoman history: beginning with Selim III’s attempts to institute a modern, 
European-style army (Nizam-i Cedid) and continuing with the reign of Mahmoud II (1808-
1838), the era of the Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1876), which restructured the Ottoman state 
and its relationship to its subjects through reforms in private property, land tenure, military 
conscription, and limited constitutionalism. 342  By the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923, these scholars contend, the Kemalist leadership inherited a state that had 
been subject to extensive and sweeping modernizing reforms. The problem, however, was 
that Ottoman modernization was enacted to protect and preserve a multiethnic, multiethnic, 
and multilingual empire. This empire had collapsed, however, after World War One. The 
task facing the Kemalists, therefore, was how to mold the existing state and society into a 
homogeneous nation-state based on exclusive Turkish ethnicity. The Kemalists set to work 
transforming both the logic and structure of the state they inherited into one that would 
foster the development of a homogeneous society of Turks. This was the underlying factor 
in Kemalist nation-building in the 1920s and 1930s.  
Nation-building in early republican Turkey marked a tremendous shift in continual 
reconstitution of the state and the society in Anatolia. Historiographic debates over the 
continuity of the Kemalist modernization project with previous Ottoman efforts, or lack 
thereof, often gloss over the fact that the attempt to forge a modern nation-state out of a 
multiethnic empire itself marked a significant rupture in Turkey’s modernization process. 
The abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in March 1924 decisively shifted the political focus 
 
342 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Niyazi 
Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1998); Şerif Mardin, The 
Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000); Erik Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London & New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1993); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993).  
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to the form this new Turkish nation-state would take. As such, the Kemalists were 
successful in legitimizing the nation-state as the paradigm reorienting Turkey’s political, 
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic future. The reaction to the Kemalist project of nation-
building, and to the Alphabet Revolution in particular, was in keeping with divisive splits 
on exactly which type of nation should be built.  
Scholars have proposed many reasons for the adoption of the Latin alphabet: the 
Kemalist drive towards modernization and westernization, the desire to foster mass literacy 
using an alphabet that could be learned “easily and quickly,” and the need to make a rupture 
with the Ottoman past by forging a new linguistic course for the young Turkish nation.343 
In addition, the Kemalist implementation of the New Turkish Alphabet has been analyzed 
by scholars as a tool to separate the new Turkish state from Islam as a force for social 
cohesion and identity.344 As S.N. Eisenstadt argues, the Kemalist revolution in Turkey 
entailed most of all “a shift in the bases of political legitimation and the symbols of political 
community.” 345  The New Turkish Alphabet, therefore, served multiple roles for the 
 
343 Books: Bilal N. Şimşir, Türk Yazı Devrimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1992); Geoffrey 
Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); 
Nergis Ertürk, Grammatology and Literary Modernity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
Articles: Scholarly Articles include: Frank Tachai, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform,” 
The Review of Politics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr. 1964), pp. 191-204); Diana Spearman & Naim M. Turfan, 
“The Turkish Language Reform,” History Today, Vol. 29 Issue 2 (Feburary 1979), pp. 88-97; İlker Aytürk, 
“Turkish Linguists Against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk’s Turkey,” Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 6 (2004), pp. 1-25; Jale Parla, “The Wounded Tongue: Turkey’s Language 
Reform and the Canonicity of the Novel,” PMLA 123, no. 1 (2008): 27-40; İlker Aytürk, “The First 
Episode of Language Reform in Republican Turkey: The Language Council from 1926 to 1931,” Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 18, Issue 3 (July, 2008), pp. 275-293; Zeynep 
Korkmaz, “Alfabe Devriminin Türk Toplumu Üzerindeki Sosyal ve Kültürel Etkileri,” International 
Periodical for the Languages, Literature, and History of Turkish or Turkic, Vol. 4/3 (Spring, 2009), pp. 
1469-1480; Kaya Yılmaz, “Critical Examination of the Alphabet and Language Reforms in the Early Years 
of the Turkish Republic,” Journal of Social Studies Education Research, 2[1], (2011), pp. 59-82.  
344 Amin Bein, Ottoman Ulema, Turkish Republic: Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); M. Brett Wilson, Translating the Qur'an in an Age of 
Nationalism: Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).   
345 S.N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Ali Kazancıgıl and Ergun 
Özbudun, ed., Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State (Hamden: Archon Books, 1981), 135.   
 
211 
Kemalist revolutionaries as they began to enact societal transformation. The expansion of 
literacy meant the proliferation of schools to teach citizens the new alphabet, the majority 
becoming literate for the first time. This newly-established literacy, in turn, allowed for 
new symbols of political legitimacy—the Turkish nation, the flag, portraits and sculptures 
of Atatürk, and the New Turkish Alphabet—to take root within the new nationalist 
paradigm.    
As examined in Chapter Three, pre-republican debates over language reform and 
identity was largely confined to a group of Russian and Ottoman Turco-Muslim 
intellectuals who expanded their platform through the trans-imperial Turcophone press. 
What demarcated the republican period of language reform from the nineteenth century 
was the statist and revolutionary orientation of the Kemalist movement. Previous debates 
over language reform divided the Latinizers from reformers (ıslahatçılar). The Kemalist 
period, however, injected an altogether new current in the conversation on language. In 
addition to directing language reform to serve the interests of the Turkish nation-state in 
shaping an ideal citizenry, the Kemalist intervention in the debates over language reform 
was to apply a self-described revolutionary component to it. In other words, unlike their 
Ottoman predecessors, the Kemalists steered language reform towards revolutionary 
objectives of breaking down Ottoman-Islamic symbols and replacing them with ones based 
in the Turkish nation.   
The New Turkish Alphabet, therefore, served multiple roles for the Kemalist 
revolutionaries as they began to enact societal transformation. As Yeşim Bayar notes, “It 
was only during the Kemalist era that the language issue was brought to center stage and 
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its relationship to nation-building clearly articulated.” 346  Soon after legislating the 
Alphabet Reform, the Kemalists sought to use the new script to expand literacy through 
the proliferation of national schools (milli mektepler) that would teach all adult and child 
citizens the new alphabet. This newly-established literacy, in turn, allowed for new 
symbols of political legitimacy—the Turkish nation, the flag, portraits and sculptures of 
Atatürk, and the New Turkish Alphabet—to take root within the new nationalist paradigm.  
Though the Kemalist Alphabet Revolution, and greater modernizing reforms, were 
enacted from above, it is also valuable to understand how the Turkish Republic and the 
Kemalists themselves were, to use Joel Migdal’s words, “constructed and reconstructed, 
invented and reinvented, through [their] interaction as a whole and of [their] parts with 
others.”347 In other words, it is crucial to historical understanding of the Kemalist period to 
analyze the state’s relationship with various groups in society as well as its relationship 
with its own parts: the bureaucracy, educational institutions, the military, etc. Along this 
vein, this chapter will examine how the Alphabet Revolution marked one such moment of 
reinvention for both the state and societal groups. What this chapter argues, therefore, is 
that the Alphabet Revolution relied not only on the Kemalists’ ability to use force in 
advancing the New Turkish Alphabet throughout the country, but also on their ability to 
coopt, convince, and accommodate various groups within society in the process. As such, 
the Kemalist leadership believed that mass participation in the reform process was a crucial 
way not only to advance the new alphabet, but, at the same time, to build and develop a 
Turkish identity whose ultimate loyalty lay within the new Turkish nation. As S.N. 
 
346 Bayar, 38.  
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Eisenstadt argues, the Kemalist revolution in Turkey entailed most of all “a shift in the 
bases of political legitimation and the symbols of political community.”348  
This chapter will examine how the Alphabet and Language revolutions determined 
state-society relations in the Kemalist period (1923-1938). By doing so, I demonstrate that 
the Alphabet Revolution was determined not only by the political will of the Kemalist 
leadership, but also operated and was advanced through the active participation of key 
groups in Turkish society. By disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet throughout the 
country, the Kemalist leadership sought to mold a collective consensus about what it meant 
to be the ideal Turkish citizen. In order to achieve this, the Turkish Republic sought to 
mobilize all arms of the state and various groups within society in the pursuit of learning 
and internalizing the New Turkish Alphabet and then to disseminate it throughout the 
country. The New Turkish Alphabet was viewed as a tool to achieve mass literacy, which 
would bring momentous societal changes and help define the ideal citizen with in the new 
nation-state.       
In examining this pivot towards nationalism and revolutionary thinking, I will 
explain the key concepts used to describe the Kemalist language reforms: inkılap and 
devrim. The former term was used before the Arabic and Persian vocabulary purges of 
1930s. Coming from the Arabic term inqalaba ( َاِْنقَلَب ) meaning to be changed or 
transformed, the Turkish word inkılap denoted a change that would bring about a 
fundamental change in the system. This, therefore, was to be distinct from the previous 
ıslahat that sought to enact a reform to the existing structure and strengthen its efficiency. 
 
348 S.N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Ali Kazancıgıl and Ergun 
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In adopting the term inkılap, the Kemalists were staking their claim within the debates over 
language and identity by insisting, after 1928, that the path towards merging to the two and 
deploying them for nationalist ends was to completely revolutionize the Turkish language. 
This began with the Harf İnkılabı, the English equivalents of which are the Letter 
Revolution or, hence, Alphabet Reform.   
The second term, devrim, was coined in the 1930s from the Turkish word devirmek, 
meaning to topple, take down, subvert. Of the two terms here, devrim is a closer 
approximation to the word revolution in that, in the political sense, it refers to a complete 
reversal of the previous regime and its replacement by a new political force. Hence, 
revolutionary groups, such as the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, Maoists, and Khomeinists have 
been referred to in Turkish-language literature as devrimci or revolutionary. Beginning 
with the 1928 Alphabet Reform, the Kemalists began to expand the idea of revolution to 
encompass all areas of Turkish life. Thus, they began to conceive of their language program 
as a devrim.  
Nation-building in early republican Turkey constituted a revolutionary shift in the 
development of Anatolian society. By the time the New Turkish Alphabet was declared, 
the Kemalists were indeed working towards the image of the Turkish Republic as the 
dominant force for modernization and restructuring of society and identity. 349  The 
 
349 My conception of the Kemalist single-party state is largely informed by the Introduction of Mete 
Tunçay’s Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931) (Ankara: Olgaç 
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on the pragmatism of the Republican People’s Party that trumped ideological orthodoxy. The rule of the 
CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party) was also different from authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes in that it tried twice to create a loyal opposition party in order to speed up the process 
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Kemalists had transformed the Republic into a single-party state by enacting the Law for 
the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) in February 1925 to grant the state 
extraordinary powers to prosecute all internal dissent in the wake of the Sheikh Sait 
Rebellion. 350  Once the rebellion had been crushed, the state revived the ad hoc 
Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri), first established during the War of 
Independence (1919-1922), to root out all internal dissent coming from newspapers, 
intellectual circles, academic institutions, and disenfranchised clerical establishment. The 
tribunals shut down the only legal opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party, and 
tried and imprisoned its leaders for treason.351 Likewise, the Kemalist state suppressed all 
socialist, communist, and trade unionist organizations it believed sought to divide the new 
Turkish nation into warring classes. Thus, the Kemalists launched an attack on all religious, 
 
350 The Sheikh Sait Rebellion broke out in February 1925 as a reaction against the abolition of the Ottoman 
Caliphate a year earlier in March 1924. Upon the establishment of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, 
the Kemalist cadre in power sought to limit the power of the ulema as they were the only group organized 
well enough to counter Kemalist power. The abolition of the caliphate, and subsequently the Ministry of 
Sheriah, the pious endowments, and the Sheikh ul-Islam, was a crushing blow to the organizational power 
of the ulema. The Caliph and his family were exiled from the new Turkish Republic and the new republic 
took sole control of the educational institutions, which were formerly in the hands of the ulema. As a 
reaction against these measures, a rebellion broke out in the southeastern part of Turkey. Though the 
rebellion had a distinctly Islamic objective (to restore the Caliph and the Shariah), it was also marked by a 
surge of Kurdish nationalism reacting against the empowerment of Turkish national identity over Islamic 
unity. Once the rebellion was put down, the leaders, including Sheikh Sait himself, would be tried and 
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political, intellectual, and socialist opponents believed to be an anathema to their vision of 
a single nation in solidarity working as an organic whole. 
To establish, and then entrench, their position as the sole guide of this new nation-
state, the Kemalist leadership established itself as a vanguard responsible for facilitating 
the spread of Turkish national identity among the Anatolian masses. By adopting Turkish 
national identity, the Kemalists believed that the new nation would be propelled towards 
“contemporary civilization” that would bring rapid modernization of all sectors of life, 
including technological, economic, legal, educational, and social advancements. The 
Kemalist current of populism (halkçılık), which would be enshrined in the constitution as 
one of the six core principles (Altı Ok) of Atatürk’s ideology, ensured the state’s trusteeship 
over the masses. The Kemalists were to lead “the people” towards modernization and self-
identification as a Turkish national community. At the same time, Kemalist-style populism 
offered idealized images of the Anatolian peasant as the true representative of the Turkish 
halk, or nation. In all, as Feroz Ahmad states, “Populism suited the new [Kemalist] ruling 
classes because it legitimized their power by making them trustees of ‘the people’; at the 
same time populism neutralized the concept of class conflict and class struggle...”352  
Suppressing all internal dissent, however, would not be sufficient for fostering 
solidarity among the members of the new Turkish nation. During the Alphabet Revolution, 
the Kemalist leadership focused its energies on creating new forms of political engagement 
for various groups within society. Not merely seeking to repress dissidents, the leadership 
within the state sought to secure the loyalty, through a process of accommodation, of 
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different societal actors for the spread of the new alphabet throughout the Turkish nation-
state. This chapter will analyze, therefore, Kemalist attempts to forge relations with other 
groups during this period to mobilize all of society to adopt and disseminate the new 
alphabet. The ultimate success of the Alphabet Revolution hinged on the participation of 
all elements of the new Turkish nation, including peasants, urban workers, landlords, 
teachers, civil servants, newspapermen, the military.  
Though the Kemalist Alphabet and Language reforms were enacted from above, it 
is also vital to understand the state’s relationship to various groups in society through the 
bureaucracy, educational institutions, and the military. Along this vein, this chapter will 
examine how the Alphabet Revolution marked one such moment of reinvention for both 
the state and societal groups. What this chapter argues, therefore, is that the Alphabet 
Revolution relied not only on the Kemalists’ ability to use force in advancing the New 
Turkish Alphabet throughout the country, but also on their ability to coopt, convince, and 
accommodate various groups within society in the process. As such, the Kemalist 
leadership believed that mass participation in the reform process was a crucial way not 
only to advance the new alphabet, but, at the same time, to build and develop a Turkish 
identity whose ultimate loyalty lay within the new Turkish nation. 
 
6c. Historical Approach and Sources 
 In order to analyze state-society relations during the Alphabet Revolution, and 
focus specifically on how the state sought to transform various social groups into loyal 
political actors, I will focus on three separate social groups—intellectuals, women, and 
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peasants—as case studies to illustrate the process of political transformation under the 
Kemalist Language Revolution. The first set of sources I will employ come from 
contemporaneous newspapers, published during the period of the Alphabet Revolution 
(1928). These newspapers were at the forefront of the Alphabet Revolution because it was 
their duty to not only make a rapid transition to the New Turkish Alphabet, but also to 
report on the status of the building and functioning of national schools (milli mektepler).  
I have obtained these newspaper periodicals from Beyazit State Library (Beyazit 
Devlet Kütüphanesi), located near Istanbul University. Beyazit State Library houses most 
of the newspapers issued during the early years of the Alphabet Reform, including the 
leading government organs (Cumhuriyet and Hakimiyet-i Milli) and more regional 
newspapers, such Yeni Adana. In addition, Beyazit State Library houses the first issues of 
Karagöz, Son Sanat, Vakit, which also provide insight into the early years of the Alphabet 
Revolution. By examining these periodicals, this chapter will demonstrate how the Turkish 
Republic was able to implement its linguistic measures in the realm of print media, as well 
as show how the readership was mobilized to learn the new alphabet, as well as internalize 
the “purification” of Turkish vocabulary, through a network of national schools and 
people’s houses.  
 In addition to newspapers from Beyazit, I will use a number of newspapers from 
the period before the actual implementation of the New Turkish Alphabet to show how 
various intellectuals began to use their public voices to argue for the state’s reforms. These 
articles, written in the Ottoman script, demonstrate that, for many intellectuals, the process 
of language reform offered unprecedented opportunities to restructure educational 
institutions, including schools and libraries. Many intellectuals argued that the new 
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alphabet would grant Turkish society unprecedented access to these institutions and would 
be instrumental for any societal modernization. Various intellectuals, therefore, lent their 
voices to this effort in order to promote the idea of a literate society that would lead to 
greater involvement of the masses in the work of the state. These articles were made 
available through the Ottoman Language Articles collection in the Islamic Research Center 
(İslam Araştırma Merkezi or İSAM for short), affiliated with affiliated with 29 Mayıs 
Ünversitesi in Üsküdar.  
Analyzing journals and newspapers from the period of the Alphabet Revolution 
will also shed light on the effort to mobilize women through literacy campaigns and 
schooling. In fact, in the sources I have located, women—much more than men—were a 
central focus of the Kemalist efforts to disseminate the New Turkish Alphabet throughout 
society. Newspapers reported tirelessly on the progress of women’s literacy and often 
measured the success of the Alphabet Revolution itself by women’s enrollment in the millet 
mektepleri as well as the rates of their graduation from these institutions. Women, therefore, 
became one of the most important targets of the state’s language reforms. Simultaneously, 
newspapers reported on the development of some women’s groups into political actors—a 
process shaped by street demonstrations and convening political meetings. Along with 
intellectuals, therefore, the Alphabet Revolution marked a moment in which women were 
transformed into political actors through interaction with the state.  
The Islamic Research Center also houses various periodicals of the halkevleri, or 
people’s houses, established to provide villagers and peasants with locations and materials 
both to continue readings and to stay connected to the state and its ideologies. Various 
people’s houses published their own periodicals that supplied peasants with a steady stream 
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of state ideology. Among these were Ülkü: Halkevleri Mecmuası (Ideal: The Periodical of 
the People’s Houses) and Kaynak (The Source), which was produced by the Balıkşehir 
People’s House beginning in 1933. I will draw upon these periodicals to foster a discussion 
of how the peasants were intended to be molded into political actors through the ideologies 
of nationalism and populism. 
 
6d. Question of Alphabet Reform or Latinization 
 Though the issue of alphabet reform (ıslahat) or Latinization was a feature of the 
pre-WWI Turcophone press, the earliest implementations of alphabet reform came with 
the establishment of the Committee of Scientific Reforms (Istılahât-ı İlmiye Encümeni) by 
the Ottoman Education Ministry. This institution, which was divided into a subcommittee 
in 1911 called The Society for Alphabet Reform (Islah-ı Huruf Cemiyeti), began to debate 
a central platform within the reformist camp: should the Ottoman script remain joined 
together (as in Arabic and Persian) or should the letters be written separately to better 
denote the sounds of the Turkish language.353 Leader of the reformers who wanted to break 
up the Ottoman alphabet and write the letters individually and separately was Dr. İsmail 
Hakkı (also referred to as Milaslı İsmail Hakkı). Born in 1870 in the city of Milas, province 
of Muğla, İsmail Hakkı became a doctor of medicine and took up residence in Istanbul. 
Here, he became an important voice of the alphabet reformers, not only publically 
advocating for huruf-u manfasıla (writing Ottoman letters separately) but also 
 
353 Ercan Uyanık and İrfan Davut Çam, “Arap Elifbası’ndan Latin Alfabesine Geçiş Süresinde Garpçı 
Söylemler,” in Journal Of Modern Turkish History Studies [Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi] 
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systematizing this “New Writing” (Yeni Yazı) in 1917 with the publication of The Alphabet 
with New Letters (Yeni Harflerle Elifba).354 This would prove to be an important step in 
the direction of alphabet reform as, during the First World War, the Ottoman Minister of 
War, Enver Pasha, adopted İsmail Hakkı’s alphabet for all military manuals. Under Enver’s 
leadership, this new alphabet adopted from İsmail Hakkı’s model was called the “Military 
Alphabet” (Ordu Yazısı) or “Enver Writing” (Enveri Yazı).355  
 Examining the 1917 manual The Alphabet with New Letters (Yeni Harflerle Elifba) 
confirms that the new script was adopted by the Committee of Scientific Reforms (referred 
to as the Encümen-i İlmiye) “for Ottoman national defense.”356 Changing the alphabet used 
by the Ottoman military, it was believed, would make communications harder to decode 
for people who were not privy to the new script. Furthermore, adopting so-called “Enver 
Pasha” allowed for the waning Young Turk regime to make a decisive break with the Perso-
Arabic script and forge a new, unique alphabet for the Turkish language. Though this break 
would not be as decisive as the 1928 Alphabet Reform, it marked a brief yet important 
intervention in the debates over alphabet and language reform.  
 Not only were the Ottoman letters separated in this new script, but diacritics were 
abolished in favor of extra letters to denote vowels. For example, the word basket (sepet in 
modern Turkish) was written سپت in the Ottoman alphabet. Yet İsmail Hakkı’s system 
spaced the letters out, the ت taking on a new form and the sound E moving from a diachritic 
to its individual letter.   
 
354 Resul Çatalbaş, “Milaslı Dr. İsmail Hakkı’nın Hayatı, Eserleri, ve İslam İlgili Görüşleri,” [The Life and 
Works of Dr. Milasli Ismail Hakki and His Views On Islam], 2014/1 (1), 99-129. 
355 Uyanık and Çam, 193.  
356 İsmail Hakkı, Yeni Harflerle Elifba (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Hayriye ve Şerikası, 1917).  
 
222 
6e. The Alphabet Revolution and the Mobilization of Turkish Society Through Populism   
 From its inception, the Alphabet Revolution (Harf İnkılabı,   انقالبیحرف ) was 
intended to reconstitute the relationship of the Turkish Republic with the society it 
governed. This reconstitution was to take place along the lines of mobilization of the 
population under the direction of the Kemalist state. This mobilization, which was to be 
transformative for society, was a major step in the state’s revolutionary vision for the 
complete overhaul of Turkish society through language reform. By adopting the new Latin 
letters, Kemalist officials and language reformers saw the potential to mold society into 
that which was ‘enlightened’ ‘educated’ and thoroughly ‘modern.’ Achieving these aspects 
of what the Kemalists termed ‘contemporary civilization, in turn, would strengthen the 
nationalist sentiment of the population and push them towards identifying themselves 
solely by Turkish markers.357  
 
Mobilization of Intellectuals for Widespread Social Change   
 One of the most crucial groups the new republic deployed in the effort to justify 
and then enact the New Turkish Alphabet were the intellectuals. As stated before, no social 
group was coherent in the political objectives it sought to pursue and the intellectuals 
(writers, poets, academics, scientists, linguists) were no exception. In fact, the intellectuals 
were by far the most divided group when it came to debating, accepting, and disseminating 
the New Turkish Alphabet. This had to do with their particular interaction with the 
Kemalist state in the wake of the Law for the Maintenance of Order (1925) and the revival 
 
357 Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), 53.  
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of the Independence Tribunals to prosecute all internal dissent. The ultimate relationship 
between the Kemalist state and the intellectuals was ambiguous: sometimes they converged 
in their objectives, at other times they were in opposition. The Alphabet Revolution was 
no exception. Nevertheless, the Kemalist elite did seek to mobilize loyal intellectuals 
through patronage and sponsorship which provided them a public voice to advocate for its 
particular brand of societal modernization.     
For many intellectuals, the belief in the power of a reformed Turkish language to 
enact massive social change was too important an opportunity to pass up. Since the mid-
1800s, Ottoman intellectuals had vigorously debated the project of sweeping social reform 
and modernization. These concerns over the form modernization should take gave rise to 
fierce debates about the Ottoman language and, in particular, if the Perso-Arabic alphabet 
was an appropriate on to represent all of the sounds in the language. Now, with the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, intellectuals sympathetic to the Kemalist brand of 
modernization seized upon the opportunity to advocate publically for instituting the Latin-
based New Turkish Alphabet. They therefore set to work arguing for the merits of the new 
alphabet in various government publications, newspaper entries, and book, pamphlets, and 
treatises that were in circulation throughout 1928. Their objective was to align their 
intellectual voices with Kemalist populism, and its stress on national solidarity, to assist 
the state in its call for the mass mobilization of Turkish society to implement the new 
alphabet. 
On main arena where the alignment of intellectual voices with Kemalist populism 
was print media. Consequently, print media was also to serve as a “ground zero” for the 
dissemination of the New Turkish Alphabet. A striking example of this alignment came 
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with a May 1928 issue of Içtihat in which the periodical’s editorial board argued for mass 
mobilization in disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet. Içtihat took its name from a 
concept in Islam called ijtihad (اجتهاد), which refers to the deployment of independent 
reasoning in making legal decision on matters of law. The term was subsequently 
secularized in the 19th and 20th centuries to carry the meaning of intellectual, cultural, 
scientific, and national renewal, or break from “superstitious” religious traditions believed 
to prevent inherently rational Muslim societies from achieving Enlightenment 
modernization. Içtihat, following this trend of thought, promoted itself as a “scientific, 
literary, economic, and artistic periodical,” and, as such, sought primarily to reach an 
intellectual and academic audience sympathetic to discarding tradition and restore and even 
rehabilitate Islam in secularist Turkey.358  
In İçtihat’s May 1928 editorial, entitled “The Decision Was Made for the 
Acceptance of the Latin Letters” (Latin Harflerinin Kabulüne Karar Verildi;  التین حرفلرینك
 the editorial board “welcomed with sincere respect the brightest triumph ,( قبولنه قرار ویریلدى
pertaining to the area of [national] renewal as well as to the revolution of the [Turkish]  
government.”359 Both national renewal and revolution would hinge, in İçtihat’s view, on 
“the Educational Ministry and the work of state authorities [both] subject to the desires of 
[modern] life which come from the soul of the nation.”360 The article, therefore, drew 
strong connections between the adoption of the new alphabet and the demands of Turkey’s 
modernization drive. Modernization (the attainment of scientific, technological, and 
 
358 İctihad, “Cumhuriyetimizin Hars Sahasında Bir Feth-i Mübini: Latin Harflerinin Kabulüne Karar 
Verildi,” (  رس ساحسنده بر فتح مبینىجموریتمزك ح  ), İstanbul: İctihad Matbaası, cilt: XXIII, 15 Maysı 1928, 
sayı: 252, sayfa: 4787. Source: Islamic Research Center (İslam Araştırma Merkezi, İSAM), Osmanlı 
Makaleler Veri Tabanı. 
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cultural renovation) was propagated not as a mere desire of the Kemalist elite external to 
the nation, but instead as originating from within the soul of the nation itself.361 The role 
that both the Kemalist elite and sympathetic intellectuals were to play, therefore, was the 
vanguard in implementing the desires of the nation. As such, adopting the New Turkish 
Alphabet would take both the dedication of government officials, its intellectuals, and the 
commitment of the masses that embodied Turkey’s national spirit.  
With an eye toward the soul of the nation, İçtihat came out strongly in favor of the 
effort to revolutionize the alphabet and urged state ministries and state employees to play 
a leading role in the rapid dissemination of the New Turkish Alphabet among the populace. 
In achieving a full revolution of the alphabet, İçtihat believed that more than just the 
language would be transformed; rather, because the Alphabet Revolution originated from 
“a will deep within the nation,” the state and its intellectuals, in acting according this will, 
were “instituting measures to bring the nation to social welfare, ascendency, and [even] to 
life.”362 İçtihat, therefore, envisioned that a revolution of the alphabet would not remain 
within the realm of the civil servants or the government officials. Instead, it would spread 
to all corners of the country and transform the lives of all Turkish citizens. To ensure the 
successful dissemination of the new alphabet, the article argued that “in order to be able to 
obey the dictates [of the state] no one had any boundaries.” 363 Every Turkish citizen, 
therefore, was free to take necessary measures to ensure the new alphabet spread 
throughout the country.   
 
361 İctihad, ibid. 
362 İctihad, ibid. 
363 İctihad, ibid. 
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For the editors İçtihat, the stakes of the Alphabet Revolution for individual citizens 
in the new Turkish Republic were high. Literacy, they believed, would be the key to an 
individual’s advancement in education and their participation in social life as citizens. 
Without literacy, the Turkish state would be unable to transform the Anatolian population 
into a nation of Turkish citizens. The editors of İçtihat, therefore, wrote with a sense of 
urgency in advocating for the Alphabet Revolution. In particular, they focused on children 
in their estimation of how remaining illiterate would be dangerous for Turkish society. 
They stressed that the Alphabet Revolution would primarily benefit the children and future 
generations of the new republic: “A person who does not know how to read and write, for 
example, is never considered a child of the nation or even a child of humanity by those 
who are Turkish…”364 The Alphabet Revolution was to alleviate this marginalization by 
promising access to citizenship for everyone through literacy. The first step towards 
delivering on this promise was “to register the number of literate people” and, in turn, 
deploy them in “the national endeavor” of bringing the New Turkish Alphabet and literacy 
to the masses.  
İçtihat, in short, used its intellectual platform to advocate not only for the adoption 
of the New Turkish Alphabet, but also for the widespread societal changes it would foster. 
The Alphabet Revolution was to be a momentous task that would redefine the relationship 
between the populace and the state through notions of citizenship and modernization. It 
would also help the Turkish Republic cement its authority and legitimacy in Anatolia, as 
the republic was to bring the new alphabet, and new patterns of life, to the masses through 
literacy campaigns. The New Turkish Alphabet, the editors of İçtihat argued, would be the 
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best way to ensure this necessary step toward nationhood. In addition to their literacy skills 
and ability to make rapid shifts in the actual type of their publications, intellectuals 
sympathetic to the Kemalist brand of modernization had an important role to play in 
communicating to the masses why such momentous changes were necessary. This was a 
task that İçtihat took up with vigor.  
In addition to the editorial board at İçtihat, other intellectuals published articles 
touting the necessity of full social mobilization to accept the New Turkish Alphabet. For 
example, in an August 1928 article in the newspaper Hayat (حیات), Mehmed Emin 
(Erişirgil) argued that the new Turkish letters had to potential to mobilize Turkish society 
to recreate all educational and cultural intuitions in the pursuit of scientific and 
contemporary knowledge. Mehmed Emin’s attention to the reform of educational 
institutions stemmed from his tenure as a professor of sociology and philosophy at Istanbul 
University, and subsequently, head of the Department of Language History and Geography 
at Ankara University. Mehmed Emin proved to be instrumental figure in the Alphabet 
Revolution: he even served on the Language Commission (Dil Encümeni), established by 
order of Mustafa Kemal in June of 1928, that was tasked with drawing up and then 
implementing the New Turkish Alphabet.   
Mehmed Emin’s interest in the Alphabet Revolution, however, went beyond mere 
reform of the language. The Alphabet Revolution, he argued in his article for Hayat, called 
for a complete renewal of the entire education system in Turkey, including all libraries, 
universities, schools, and curriculum. This overhaul would entail nothing less than a social, 
institutional, and cultural revolution to usher in the new educational, institutional, and 
societal order. Emin begins his article, entitled The Educational Mobilization of the 
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Alphabet Revolution (Harf İnkılabı Maarif Seferberliğidir,  حرف انكالبى معارف سفربرلیكیدر), 
by stating that “in order to spread the new alphabet to the masses of halk and of intellectuals, 
it is not sufficient to merely have them read the new forms of [the letters].”365 Instead, Emin 
argued, an entire program of mobilization (seferberlik in Turkish, سفربرلیك in the Ottoman 
alphabet) was needed to coopt the masses into the literacy program of the state. This 
cooption of the masses, however, would not be an easy task according to Emin and, as such, 
the intellectuals of the new Turkish Republic should act selflessly, tirelessly, and even 
heroically to spread the new alphabet to all corners of the nation. Emin wrote in his article 
that “it is necessary to institute [good] habits for the ignorant that will establish in everyone 
an intellectual link between these letters and [voluntarily learning them] as well as 
accustom their eyes to words written with the [new] letters.”366 By ‘ignorant,’ Mehmet 
Emin meant ‘illiterate’ and, thus, trapped in backwards lifestyles and poverty. The 
intellectuals, therefore, had a duty to work tirelessly to overcome illiteracy and set the 
masses, the entire nation, on the course towards modernization and betterment.  
In advocating for the participation of intellectuals in the process of revolutionizing 
the alphabet, Mehmed Emin also played into Kemalist notions of populism and national 
solidarity. The intellectuals, in his estimation, were not the only social group to work 
tirelessly for the adoption of the New Turkish Alphabet. Instead, their participation was to 
be part of a greater mobilization of all segments of the society (government officials, 
intellectuals, newspapermen, and citizens alike) to engage in learning the new letters with 
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revolutionary zeal. “This has come to mean,” Emin wrote in his article, “that everyone who 
believes in the great and bountiful revolution, which our new alphabet will bring about 
[tevlid], is required to increase the time they will dedicate towards studying how to 
implement [good] habit[s] needed for everyone [to succeed].”367 It would be only through 
this revolutionary zeal, the result of which was dedication and persistence to increasingly 
literacy, that the populace would internalize the new alphabet and disseminate it through 
cultural, scientific, and literary works. The spread of the new alphabet both among the halk 
and the country’s intelligentsia would, in turn, foster the cultural and educational revolution 
the new republic sought. The New Turkish Alphabet would be the catalyst for perpetuating 
the Turkish nation on the path towards the modernity and contemporary civilization.  
Emin argued that national duty [vazife, ظیفهو ] went hand-in-hand with revolutionary 
zeal. Without a sense of national duty, the entire project of the state-sponsored language 
revolution would fail. “The duty which has befallen every citizen,” Emin argued, “is to 
continually publish useful periodicals and books for every level [of society] in the task 
which belongs to the government and to show zeal [tehalük, تهالك] for continual reading of 
newspapers, journals, and books which will be written with these [new] letters.”368 Here, 
Emin called on publishers and book printers in particular to play recognize their role in the 
shift towards the New Turkish Alphabet and act according to their national duty in helping 
to implement it. Instituting the New Turkish Alphabet would, after all, demand that all print 
media be transformed through abandoning Ottoman type and switching to a completely 
new type for print materials. In calling upon all print media to be overhauled, Emin wrote 
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quite optimistically that such changes would be beneficial for both the populace and the 
publishers themselves as these changes would “increase the determination to sponsor 
publications [by the state] in order to enrich national ideals and to achieve positive results 
[in the direction of literacy] directly from the Turkish Alphabet.”369 
 
The Mobilization of the Halk during the Alphabet Revolution  
Mehmed Emin’s call for instilling a sense of “national duty” (vazife, وظیفه) and 
“good habits” (itiyad, اعتیاد) for the population at large was essential one which required 
the state and the intellectuals would work in tandem to achieve. After all, as Mehmed Emin 
declared in his article, “unifying our alphabet mean[t] instituting popular education,” which 
would take the solidarity of both state actors and intellectuals to achieve.370 In arguing for 
“popular education,” Emin employed the term halk-i maarif (خلق معارف). The key term in 
this phrase is the word halk, which Emin and other intellectuals used to signify the members 
of the new Turkish nation-state. The revolutionary discipline Emin and others advocated 
meant that the halk would be thrust into the spotlight of the Kemalist project of mass 
mobilization. The halk, in the estimation of the language revolutionaries and other 
Kemalist reformers, would simultaneously be the bearers and beneficiaries of the new 
alphabet.  
For this reason, Emin mentions the halk numerous times in his article. The word 
halk came to Turkish from the Arabic trilateral root خلق, a verb meaning ‘to create, to shape, 
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or to form.’371 In its noun form, marked by a sukun over the خلق ,ل designates creature or 
people. According to Sir James W. Redhouse’s authoritative 1890 A Turkish and English 
Lexicon, the term  خلق was defined in Ottoman as “1. A man’s body, his substance; also his 
figure, form, proportions. 2. Created, all created things; especially mankind. Hence, 3. The 
common people.”372 It was only the fifth definition in Redhouse’s dictionary in which  خلق 
was taken to mean “A people, a nation,” but that definition was followed by “ خلق هللاGod’s 
creatures; creation,” indicating that the term was only tenuously used to mean the members 
of a specific nation.373 Finally, Redhouse’s dictionary defines halk dili (دلى  as “The (خلق 
idiom of the vulgar.”374  
Thus, by the time Emin and other nationalists employed the term halk in 1928 and 
beyond, the meaning and usage of the term had been revised significantly to denote the 
‘integral members of the nation (vatan).’375 As such, the term halk dili had also been 
transformed from the “idiom of the vulgar” or vernacular to the “national language.”376 
Though halk was an Arabic loanword, the Turkish nationalists Turkified it and built new 
concepts according to the conventions of the national idiom. For example, they were able 
to articulate the position of a halkçı, or partisan of the people, hence a populist, as well as 
the Kemalist principle halkçılık (populism).  
 
371 To help trace the etymology of the term halk, I used the online etymological dictionary Nişanyan 
Sözlük: Çağdaş Türkçe’nin Etimolojisi. Entries: halk1 and halk2. July 10, 2016,  
http://www.nisanyansozluk.com/?k=halk1&lnk=1.  
372 Sir James Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon (1890), 861.  
373 Redhouse, 861.   
374 Redhouse, 861.  
375 The term vatan (وطن ) is also an Arabic word and its trilateral means “to dwell, to reside.” Thus, its 
noun form connotes a place where one dwells or resides.  
376 My previous chapter explains how nationalist writers, including Ziya Gokalp, brought new meanings to 
the term halk through concepts such as halka doğru (going towards the people).  
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By using the term halk, the Turkish nationalists and language revolutionaries 
imagined at once both the primordial embodiment of the nation and the blank canvas upon 
which they sought to continually form or shape the character of this nation. These two ways 
of understanding the populace would play an integral role in the unfolding of the Alphabet 
and Language revolutions. Being the primordial embodiment of the Turkish nation meant 
that the language the halk spoke became the standard for the construction of the new 
national idiom.  
As the Alphabet Revolution progressed, the primary concern of the state and 
intellectuals vis-à-vis the halk centered on how to mobilize them for the cause of learning 
and then disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet. Returning to the periodical Karagöz, 
we can see that the mobilization of the halk to learn the New Turkish Alphabet became a 
preoccupation. In the 22nd Birinci Kanun 1928 issue, the periodical depicted on its front 




(Figure 10. Karagöz December 1928 2)377 
The caption of this caricature boldly states that “Everyone from 15 to 45 years’ old will 
read!” The mobilization of the population was depicted as a military mobilization: Mustafa 
Kemal, as president of the new Turkish Republic, stood stoically in the foreground pointing 
to the bright sunlight, which symbolized the New Turkish Alphabet in earlier issues. All 
around him marched the Turkish halk, not in military garb, but instead equipped with 
backpacks and large pencils used as sabers as they made their charge towards the sun. On 
the horizon stood a factory, its chimney bellowing smoke, which was a symbol of Turkey’s 
modernization through rapid industrialization. Below the caption, there is an address 
 
377 Ali Fuad, editor, “15 yaşından 45 yaşına kadar herkes okuyuacak!”, in Karagöz, Istanbul, 22nd Birinci 




directly to Mustafa Kemal himself: “Dear Gazi Father, the direction is [towards] reading 
and writing, the light, knowledge, [and] civilization, march!”378      
 The imagery of military mobilization for the cause of the Alphabet Revolution was 
extended in a second caricature printed below the first.  
  
(Figure 11. Karagöz December 1928 3)379 
This depiction, entitled “Weapons of the Army of Knowledge,” sought to use the image of 
military mobilization in advocating for the Turkish Republic’s “war” against ignorance and 
illiteracy. Such a war, it was conceded by the Kemalists, was not a conventional one. The 
weapons of the war on illiteracy and ignorance, therefore, had to be redefined, as was 
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depicted in the caricature: “the pen [was equated to] a bullet, the typewriter a machine gun, 
the ink well a bomb, the pencil a bayonet, and books ammunition.”380  
The imagery of military mobilization was furthered in the companion article to both 
of these caricatures. This article took the form of a dialog between Karagöz and Hacivat in 
which Karagöz instructs Hacivat to prepare to war: “Ey Hacivat, there is a mobilization, 
prepare!”381 Hacivat responds that he fears war. Karagöz, in turn, eases his friend’s fears 
by explaining that this particular mobilization is not for war against an external enemy, but 
against the internal threat of illiteracy: “It is a mobilization for reading and writing, a 
mobilization to rescue [the nation] from ignorance, each of us will put our hearts and souls 
into this mobilization.”382 When Hacivat agrees to prepare for the mobilization of the 
alphabet, Karagöz declares “Be sure that the entire nation, like you, is prepared. This nation, 
which has broken the chains of servitude and shown miracles under the command of our 
Great Gazi Father [Mustafa Kemal], will defeat ignorance by traveling on the road our 
great savior has shown.”383  
Both caricatures and the accompanying article sought to communicate the Alphabet 
Revolution in terms that would be familiar to the halk. Karagöz, therefore, sought to use 
the imagery of a military mobilization to convince the Turkish nation that spreading the 
new alphabet and eliminating illiteracy would take place on a scale that previous wars were 
played out on. As such, the Alphabet Revolution—just like in the First World War or the 
War of Independence—would require that all citizens of the republic mobilize for the cause 
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of the new alphabet. This mobilization would be directed by the Kemalist leaders with the 
assistance of sympathetic intellectuals. It was to be a “state-directed mobilization” in which 
the halk would demonstrate their commitment to the new alphabet in specific forums. Of 
these forums, the emerging network of national schools (millet mektepleri), which were set 
up specifically to teach the new alphabet to all Turkish citizens, became the most important 
site of mass mobilization.    
Because mass mobilization was to take place through the network of national 
schools, the press during the Alphabet Revolution reported almost daily on the progress of 
building the schools and then opening them for enrollment. In addition to Karagöz, other 
periodicals and newspapers began both to call for and report on the mass mobilization of 
Turkish society centered around the establishment of national schools. The national 
schools focused primarily on adult literacy and, with the adoption of the new alphabet by 
the parliament, rapidly spread throughout the country. In addition to the network of 
national schools, existing educational institutions—including primary and secondary 
schools, colleges, and universities—began to open national classrooms (dershaneler) to 
assist in the effort to teach the new alphabet to the population.  
What emerged, therefore, was a situation in which the parameters of engagement 
with the Alphabet Revolution were being established. By the end of 1928, therefore, state 
actors and the population at large were expected to operate within the confines of these 
parameters. There was not chance, by the end of 1928, of the alphabet remaining in the 
Ottoman script. Any engagement on that front, while not being obsolete, was nevertheless 
suppressed and relegated to the private sphere. Public discourse and engagement, therefore, 
operated on the assumption that the new alphabet was the desired alphabet of the new 
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Turkey and that the entire population should endeavor to spread this new alphabet. The 
terms of engagement now became how to spread the new alphabet and Turkish citizens—
from intellectuals as we have seen to ordinary peasants—should publically engage in that 
cause. Most, if not all, contemporary newspapers and publications in Turkey shifted their 
focus to engagement within the parameters set by the state. This was a shift that took place 
in the large cities of Istanbul and Ankara, but also at a more local level.  
To demonstrate commitment to the shift in alphabet, regional newspapers and other 
publications were eager to report not only on the large numbers of people attending classes, 
but also on the cooperation of all sectors of the state to accommodate the growing 
enrollments. Cooperation between all segments of local government, it was believed, 
would produce a more efficient dissemination of the New Turkish Alphabet. It would also 
demonstrate the engagement of both local governments and populations in the parameters 
set by the Alphabet Revolution. For example, the first issues of the regional newspaper 
Yeni Adana (New Adana) printed a series of articles reporting not only on the local 
authority’s progress in setting up the learning facilities (schools, classrooms, libraries, and 
reading rooms) for the population, but also focused on the cooperation of various segments 
of the local government in reaching these goals.  
Yeni Adana’s leading headline, in fact, from its 2 Kanunu Sani 1928 issue, entitled 
“National Schools: Students Met Last Evening in Namik Kemal School; Speeches Made,” 
focused on the collaboration of the regional governor (Vali Bey Effendi in Turkish) with 
the local education officials and even with the police to establish local branches of national 
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schools.384 Subsequent articles cited the “fervency” (hararetle) of the population to quickly 
disseminate the alphabet as well as their eventual “success” (muvaffakiyet) in meeting the 
demand of growing enrollments in local schools.385     
Any deficiencies or shortcomings in the work of spreading the alphabet were also 
raised by Yeni Adana. However, like the stories of triumph, these concerns were framed 
within the parameters set by the state. One problem that became a preoccupation was that, 
initially, local governments struggled to provide facilities that could absorb the growing 
number of adults enrolling in the alphabet classes. What is more, there was a disparity in 
the gender breakdown of enrollments. For example, by February of 1929, just four months 
after the declaration of the New Turkish Alphabet, Yeni Adana reported that “15 thousand 
people were [now] reading” thanks to the establishment of national schools in the region.386  
This was taken as a major success given the short duration of time local actors had 
to organize the facilities. The article then proceeded to break down the number of men and 
women enrolled in classes as well as the number of students in surrounding villages. As of 
February 1929, the number of men’s schools, according to the article, numbered seventy-
four. This however outnumbered the number of women’s schools (estimated to be fifty-
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four).387 The disparity of men and women’s schools stemmed from the fact that the number 
of male students surpassed the number of female students by only sixty enrollees.388  
The article did not state the reason for the disparity in the number of men and 
women’s schools, but report that “several teachers, along with school officials, were hired 
for inspection [positions] many of the national schools in Adana were found lacking.”389 
The promotion of teachers into inspectorate positions was meant to address infrastructure 
and enrollment issues. The article printed the names of the teachers who were promoted to 
inspectorate positions who all came from different high schools, secondary and primary 
schools, and even from a commerce school (ticaret mektebi). Hiring inspectors from among 
these diverse schools was intended to make the process of enrolling, as well as 
administering the exams, more efficient and reach a broader segment of the population. 
Promoting teachers to the level of inspectors ensured that they worked closely with officials 
in the local educational ministry to reach these objectives.  
 Contemporary papers to Yeni Adana focused on different segments of the society 
that were participating in the Alphabet Revolution. For example, nearly a year after the 
initial drive for literacy, the Istanbul-based newspaper Akşam (Evening) ran a story about 
the establishment of reading rooms (okutma odaları) in every village of the country. The 
reading rooms were set up to provide a space for the peasants (köylüler in Turkish) to 
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continue putting their knowledge of the New Turkish Alphabet into practice. As the state 
began mobilizing peasants for the Alphabet Revolution, it sought to find outlets where they 
could read and congregate even after receiving a certificate from the national schools. The 
reading rooms, therefore, were a forum through which peasants could be continually 
mobilized for the cause of the Alphabet Revolution and could continue to read in the New 
Turkish Alphabet. The mobilization of peasants was especially important as they formed 
the backbone of the Turkish halk. Any ideology of populism or national solidarity, 
therefore, hinged on the participation of the peasants in the state’s modernization programs. 
The Alphabet Revolution was an important example of the effort to reach the villagers and 
coopt them into the program of building a new Turkish nation.  
The article, entitled “The Peasants Will Read: The Education Ministry Will Open 
Reading Rooms,” proclaimed that such spaces “would motivate the peasants to read by 
having newspapers, periodicals, and books dispatched” to reading rooms around the 
country.390 The establishment of the reading rooms became a priority for the Education 
Ministry, the article state, “[as] it [was] understood that 350 thousand people would 
continue their education at the national schools.”391 The enrollment of 350 thousand people, 
however, would only be the beginning. Soon, both the Education Ministry and the 
newspapers increased their estimate for the number of people enrolled in alphabet classes. 
To successfully complete the alphabet course, those enrolled had to pass an exam (imtihan) 
that would certify them in the new alphabet.   
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Increased enrollment would eventually bear fruit as the number of people able to 
read steadily increased. However, facing increasing levels of literacy did not mean that the 
state was always able to provide facilities such as libraries and reading rooms. Critique of 
the state came in the form of pressuring it to expand, update, and improve its libraries so 
that people could use them more efficiently. Akşam reported on the 12th of Kanunuevvel 
1930, two years after the Alphabet Revolution was launched, the state was struggling to 
keep up with the growing literacy rate. In an article entitled “The Pleasure of Reading is 
Increasing: General Libraries Are Becoming Very Crowded,” Akşam reported that two of 
Istanbul’s main libraries (Beyazit and Ali Emiri Efendi, both located in the Fatih district of 
Istanbul) were facing a situation in which “there were no financial allotments to keep up 
these libraries’ book publishing.” 392  As such, both libraries were unable to meet the 
demand of “more than 150 readers” who used both facilities daily.393  
The reason for the popularity of these two libraries, the article reported, was that 
they housed reading materials (books, magazines, newspapers) that were recent (yeni): 
“together with the Ali Emiri Efendi Library, the reason why Beyazit Library has become 
crowded is that recent works are found in them.”394 Having recent works was important for 
the spread of the Alphabet Revolution because literacy’s sustainability depended in part on 
finding the “pleasure of reading” (okuma zevki) and incorporating time to read into one’s 
daily life.  
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In many ways, Akşam’s critique of the lack of facilities and materials played on the 
same ideas about nationalism that intellectuals such as Mehmed Emin proposed. The state 
and the intellectuals in society were supposed to be acting as the vanguard for this national 
revolution. As the vanguard, as Emin wrote, intellectuals should model the ideal citizen, 
stressing a sense of national duty, commitment to nationalist values, and demonstrating 
“good habits” that could teach the halk how to conduct themselves in the new Turkey. 
However, as Akşam so acutely pointed out, “Beyazit Library is a little dark [to read in]. 
The city needs a spacious and brighter library. The Education Ministry and the municipality 
should supply this.”395 In other words, without the proper facilities, lighting, and up-to-
date materials available modeling the ideal citizen in terms of literacy and reading would 
be almost impossible. It was the tangible and physical aspects of the Alphabet Revolution 
(reading facilities, books, etc) as well as access to them that, in Akşam’s view, would really 
determine the success or failure of the movement.  
Without the proper facilities, the mobilization of the halk in the cause of the 
Alphabet Revolution would not be possible. This was a danger far greater than any 
resistance to the Alphabet Revolution that could come from various segments of the 
population. The speed with which the new alphabet was disseminated through a network 
of national schools and reading rooms was staggering; however, the state’s insistence on a 
speedy transition also opened it up to problems of funding new schools and keeping up 
with infrastructure demands to support its vision of a society literate in the New Turkish 
Alphabet. Though the state had set the parameters for political engagement, newspapers 
such as Akşam nevertheless found room to manoeuver within these parameters by 
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reporting on the deficiencies in actualizing the Alphabet Revolution. Their push-back was 
not against the Alphabet Revolution, but, instead, stemmed from a frustration centered on 
the limited capabilities of the state to reach all corners of the nation.    
Women as an Integral Component of the Alphabet Revolution    
 From the very beginning of the Alphabet Revolution, the Turkish press reported on 
the progress of the milli mektepler, or national schools, that were charged with teaching 
the new alphabet to the Turkish nation. The objective of the national schools was to 
disseminate the new alphabet to every citizen; as such, every citizen of the Turkish 
Republic was required by law to attend classes and earn a certificate to prove they were 
now competent in the new official alphabet. Women—in particular—were a major focus 
of the national schools and the Kemalist-controlled press followed women’s advancement 
in learning the new alphabet with considerable attention. In a front page article in 
Cumhuriyet dated the 4th of Kanunu Sani [roughly the equivalent to January] 1929, the 
newspaper reported on the successes and shortcomings of women’s enrolments in the 
national schools in Istanbul. The headline of the article, “National Schools are on the Move: 
Starting Yesterday, Classes in the National Schools [Now] Open to Women Have Begun,” 
hinted that the system for teaching new alphabet had been expanded to encompass Turkish 
women.396  
Yet the expansion of the schooling system to include women meant that the state 
now had to deal with overcrowding. In Istanbul, the problem of overcrowding was an 
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especially difficult problem to address. The article reported that “A lot of schools were 
required to reject people who had applied to be enrolled” in classes and that, in one instance, 
“even a person from the Christian halk was not enrolled in school upon request.”397 To 
solve the problem of overcrowding in Istanbul national schools, the Education Ministry 
(the very same Maarif Müdüriyeti that was to act as the vanguard of the Alphabet 
Revolution in the estimation of Mehmed Emin and the editors of İçtihat) was forced to 
make other arrangements to accommodate the mass of people seeking enrollment in classes. 
One solution was to allow women students to take day classes and to schedule those classes 
on Monday and Thursday afternoons.398 These classes would be held two days a week for 
a quarter of the year [çeyrek fasıla] and would help free up the space for other classes 
scheduled for longer durations.399 Another solution, which the same article reported, taken 
by the Educational Ministry was to simply make room for more classrooms in each national 
school. The article reported that the ministry had already taken steps to do this in both the 
School of Commerce and the national school located in the Bezezya neighborhood in 
Istanbul. 
Despite the overcrowding that came with the influx of women’s enrollments, the 
state remained committed to the spread of the alphabet among the female members of the 
nation. In Istanbul, Cumhuriyet reported that in the neighborhood of Üsküdar, on the Asian 
side of the city, space in the local girls’ school was being was being allotted for women to 
take alphabet courses. The opening of courses for women carried with it great optimism 
about the direction the Alphabet Revolution was taking. The article reported that the head 
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of the local school, an administrator by the name of Aliye Hanım, “by giving a speech, 
applauded and mentioned the importance of the national schools and of the greatness of 
the Alphabet Revolution,” during the opening of one national school in Üsküdar.400 Finally, 
as the article states, “the ceremony came to an end after the pupils of the girls’ school sang 
a series of marches and recited poems” in celebration of the opening of alphabet courses 
for women.401  
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(Figure 12. Cumhuriyet January 1929)402 
The Turkish press made sure to bring women to the forefront of the Alphabet 
Revolution by printing pictures of women attending classes, taking exams, and meeting 
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with educational officials. This gave women unprecedented visibility in the public realm 
and demonstrated the commitment of women to fulfilling what was, after all, a national 
duty: internalizing the new national alphabet. The first picture was taken in a women’s 
classroom as the New Turkish Alphabet was being taught. This photograph was juxtaposed 
with the middle photograph of a civil servant taking an exam to prove his competence in 
the new alphabet.403 The two photographs reflected the very call that Mehmed Emin and 
other nationalists had called for, namely, to use populism as a mobilizing force in bringing 
about cultural and social change in Turkey. In this light, the proliferation of women’s 
classes served to ensure women’s participation in the project of the state and of the 
linguistic revolution it sought to enact. 
The third picture depicts women showing up for class with children. This picture 
represented the realities of the Alphabet Revolution: women were to play an integral role 
in the dissemination of the new alphabet partially in the role of mothers. This ethos, that 
women were to serve the nation through mothering, was not a deviation from secular 
nationalism as it was experienced in Europe or the United States before Turkey. In fact, 
nationalism had often envisioned the nation itself to be a feminine, mother-like entity. The 
word nation is, after all, a feminine concept and stems from the Latin word natio meaning 
birth. Though this concept of the nation as feminine was grafted upon a Turkish linguistic 
context that had no grammatical gender, the idea of the role of women as the bearers of 
national culture and traditions absolutely transferred.  
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The Turkish press was quick to promote this image of women’s roles in the new 
nation and in learning the new alphabet. The photograph below is one of many that depict 
women learning the new alphabet in the presence of their children. The caption, which 
reads “A mother who is studying along with her child,” demonstrates the exact role women 
were expected to play in the new national revolution. The modernization of society, 
therefore, was to transform the public role of women into active participants in the 
internalization and dissemination of the Turkish national identity. Modernization, however, 
was not intended to extract women from their duties as wives and mothers so much as 
reconfigure those duties for the state’s ends. Here, learning the new alphabet almost 
becomes a sacred act, a birthright that is passed down from mother to child. This was 
exactly the type of powerful imagery the state and intellectuals sought to evoke: that 





(Figure 13. Cumhuriyet January 1929 2)404 
The Turkish state’s priority of disseminating the New Turkish Alphabet to women 
coincide with the development and expansion of the overall public sphere in the Turkish 
Republic. It was the expansion of the public sphere that the ideology of populism sought 
to govern. The public sphere is defined as “a modern institution and set of values that bring 
persons together in public to engage in a context of reasoned debates.”405 As Moghadam 
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and Sadiqi state, the public sphere is traditionally studied within the context of the 
emergence of nation-states. Public spheres, however, from their inception were understood 
to be male-dominated spaces as the very notion of public sphere was tied to citizenship and 
belonging to the nation. In the 20th century, however, the public sphere was greatly 
“expanded, democratizied, and [even] feminized” as the definitions of citizenship and 
membership in the nation-state gradually opened to include a larger demographic.406 In the 
case of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist state sought to expand its public sphere to 
incorporate women in the society. This made the state, in the words of Jenny B. White, a 
“feminist” state, meaning a “a male-dominated state that made women’s equality in the 
public sphere a national policy.” 407  The equality of women in the public sphere, the 
Kemalists believed, would propel Turkish society forward on the path towards 
modernization and allow it to take its place among the “advanced” nations of Europe. In 
reality, the Turkish state’s mobilization of women as a cornerstone of its modernization 
movement was a forerunner for many countries in Western Europe.  
The Alphabet Revolution, therefore, became the state’s optimal vehicle to begin 
mobilizing women as an integral part of the Turkish halk. By internalizing the new alphabet, 
Turkish women would begin, the state hoped, to internalize the values of the new republic: 
modernization, secularism, and Turkish nationalism. As White explains, the state was not 
interested in women’s mobilization for emancipatory ends, but instead, to craft the ideal 
“citizen woman” who could pass on the values of the revolution to her children.408 This 
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meant that the Kemalists were not interested in reforming the private sphere of the family 
and the home that was taking place in Western Europe and the United States.  
In fact, the Kemalists remained highly suspicious of changes in the private sphere, 
especially when it concerned women’s status in this domain. For many Kemalists, “the 
young Republic need not look to the West, with its dangerous notions of romance and 
individualism, for a model for feminism and egalitarianism, but could look to its own semi-
mythic past in pre-Islamic Central Asia.” 409  In other words, the Kemalist Republic’s 
mobilization of women was to achieve its own revolutionary ends—the mass literacy of 
the greater population—rather than to lead Turkish women towards personal emancipation.  
Women were, after all, part of the greater Turkish halk and, as such, had an integral 
part to play in the functioning of the nation as a whole. As emancipation in the private 
sphere was thought to jeopardize women’s participation in the functioning of the nation, 
the Kemalists did not pursue measures that would change their situation at home. Kemalists 
saw women as a totality, not as set of individuals and, as such, affirmed women’s equality 
in terms of the collective rather than the personal or individual. In this pursuit, the 
Kemalists invoked the pre-Islamic Turkic past to “prove” how Turkic society had always 
been based on egalitarianism between the sexes.  
The ideology of populism—which sought to foster mobilization based on 
nationalist solidarity rather than divisions based on class, gender, or status—had its first 
experience of mass mobilization through the mobilization of women during the Alphabet 
Revolution. This was to be a controlled mobilization in which women would show their 
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appreciation—and more importantly their loyalty—to the state for granting them the 
opportunity to advance by learning the New Turkish Alphabet. Individual women could 
even play larger roles in the dissemination of the new alphabet by becoming teachers, or 
in the case of Aliye Hanim in the local girls’ school in Üsküdar, serving as administrators 
of girls’ schools charged with teaching girls and women the new alphabet.  
Within seven days of Cumhuriyet’s article on women’s enrollments in alphabet 
class, the newspaper ran an article tallying the number of schools open in Istanbul as well 
as the number of enrollees based on gender. The number of schools was counted to be 
2,197 throughout Istanbul.410 The official estimate for the number of students was tallied 
at 87,895 with 48, 453 female students and 39, 442 male students.411 The result of the 
state’s mobilization of women to internalize the new alphabet was that, within a week of 
new women’s schools opening in Istanbul alone, the number of women students greatly 
outnumbered the number of male students. Though different factors most definitely 
contributed to this, for example men’s responsibilities to support their families financially, 
the state was nevertheless successful in quickly mobilizing a demographic that, with the 
exception of women from elite family backgrounds, had previously resided primarily 
within the domestic sphere. Much of the historiography of the early Kemalist period has 
focused on the limitations of the state to enact social change outside of the large urban 
centers.412 However, the mobilization of the halk—and especially the women for whom 
the Alphabet Revolution was a prelude to their further presence in the public sphere—I 
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believe, demonstrates both the power of the Kemalist state to mobilize people from diverse 
segments of the society and to expand membership into the nation and open the nationalist 
project up to these differing segments. Thus, by extending its linguistic objectives to 
segments of the population that were previously absent from the public sphere, the 
Kemalist state demonstrated the legitimacy and the monopoly of power that is 
characteristic of the modern state.   
The Alphabet Revolution, especially in Istanbul itself, fostered the unprecedented 
mobilization of the halk to achieve mass literacy. These numbers, Cumhuriyet reports, were 
staggering to the language revolutionaries and “in order to supply the course materials in 
the newly opened national schools, the Ministry of Education [was now] running at full 
capacity.”413 This meant, in part, that the Ministry of Education received weekly reports 
that poured in from across the nation that brought updates on the Alphabet Revolution’s 
progress. These reports “announced that the halk was flocking to classes with longing and 
zeal [heves ve iştiyakla] and that teachers were working, always with attention towards the 
halk’s different levels, with an idealistic passion.”414  
 
6f. Conclusion  
 The Alphabet Revolution was a pivotal event in the formation of the Turkish nation-
state and for the propagation of nationalism throughout the country. In the space of several 
years (1928-1930), the Kemalist leadership, along with intellectuals committed to their 
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brand of nationalism and modernization, sought to enact a complete overhaul of the 
language in order to make it appear more “Turkish.” A more self-consciously Turkish 
language meant one in which remnants of the Ottoman court language, written in a Perso-
Arabic script, would be abolished and a language reflecting the new national ethos would 
be disseminated throughout the new Turkey. To achieve this, the Kemalist sought to elicit 
the participation of society more broadly. They did this by appealing to various social 
groups—intellectuals, women, and ordinary members of the halk, including peasants—and 
redefine the public role for each. The Kemalist state, therefore, sought to politicize these 
groups through mobilization. But politicization, as seen in the case of women, was to 
happen within paradigms the Kemalists had predetermined. Everyone was encouraged to 
spread the New Turkish Alphabet; no one was free to oppose it. Thus, Kemalist 
expectations for political engagement were limited only to the state’s ultimate goals.  
 Using the lens of state-society relations, this chapter has sought to argue that the 
Alphabet Revolution, while still enacted from the top, was one that engaged with these 
societal groups to foster genuine enthusiasm for and acceptance of the new script. In 
adopting the new script, the population was to see their own transformation into citizens of 
a modern nation-state that was based exclusively on Turkishness. Though the Ottoman past 
had enacted far-reaching modernizing reforms, the shift from a multiethnic empire into a 
singularly Turkish nation-state constituted a major shift in the process of modernization. 
The Alphabet Revolution, and the attempts to bring the population into the fold of the 
state’s linguistic program, demonstrate that Kemalist modernization, while inheriting past 
attempts at reforms, ultimately broke from the past with the adoption of the nation, as 
opposed to an empire, as the object of reform. In the next chapter, I will extend this argue 
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further to discuss the second phase of the Language Revolution that came when the New 













































7. Dissertation Conclusion 
 
 Turkic Language Reform and Latinization have often been presented in the 
historiography as events unique to the Turkish or Soviet locales they were enacted in. As 
such, the common networks of reformers and intellectuals as well as the international 
nature of Turkic language debates is lost amidst these narratives. My dissertation has 
sought to place the Turkic language reforms within a more global history, taking into 
consideration the trans-national and trans-imperial networks that debated the issue of 
orthography, grammar, and language purification for Turkic. By placing the history of the 
Soviet and Kemalist language reforms within a global frame, I sought not only to highlight 
the interactive nature of the reforms themselves, but to show that reforms as drastic and 
revolutionary as these were nevertheless situated within a specific moment. That moment 
was the advent of European modernity and its spread across the globe through empire. 
Modernization—and by extension the creation of modern nations—preoccupied the Turkic 
language reformers from both sides of the Russo-Turkish border. They nevertheless 
launched debates, and eventual measures, to lead their societies into the modern world. 
Language reform, they believed in both Turkey and the Soviet Union, was an essential 
component of this process.  
 My dissertation first traced the origins of Turkology, a European academic disciple 
aimed at researching the ancient Turkic languages, and its influence on the next generation 
of nationalists and reformers. Turkology provided for them “scientific” and disciplinary 
proof that the Turks were first distinct from the rest of the Muslim World and that, secondly, 
this distinction was based on unique language. Turkology, I have shown, provided the 
vocabulary for future reformers to inject their remedies onto the Turkic languages. 
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 Next, I examined the rise of the Turcophone press at the end of the nineteenth 
century and its connect to the language reforms in the post-World War One period. It was 
in this “space of discussion” that issues such as Latinization and purification were debated. 
Implicit in these debates was the idea that the Turks constituted a global linguistic entity 
(thanks to Turkology) and that Turkic distinctness should be reflected in both the writing 
and the vocabulary of the Turkic languages. Furthermore, the Turcophone press also called 
attention to the need to establish a modern education system for the Turkic peoples in order 
to disseminate their national language widely and follow the path towards acquiring a 
national identity.  
 Chapters Four and Six focus in on the Soviet and Kemalist reforms themselves. 
Taking each as a case study, I show how Latinization and purification in the 1920s and 
1930s largely inherited both the Turkological and Turcophone debates. Operating on 
assumptions about the History of the Turkic language and their uniqueness within the 
Muslim World, language reformers in both the Soviet Union and Turkey strove to push for 
Latinization, which they both held would break the Turkic languages from their Islamic 
past and free them to develop within a new era of national consciousness. For the Soviets, 
language reform buttressed their Nationality Policy which held that non-Russian groups 
should form ‘national republics’ and disseminate the communist message through local 
languages.  
For the Kemalists language reform freed the Turks from the Ottoman imperial past 
and the multiethnic considerations of the late Ottoman period. Instead, the Kemalists 
sought to use language reform to modernize Turkish society and achieve the status of being 
a nation-state in the mold of Europe. In order to achieve this, the Kemalists—like their 
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Bolshevik counterparts—argued that Turkish had to be freed from Arabic and Persian 
vocabulary and alphabet and, in its place, develop its own unique linguistic components. 
Like the Soviets, the Kemalists settled on the Latin alphabet as the best reflection of 
Turkish orthography.  
This dissertation, I hope, will contribute to the study of linguistic nationalism by 
focusing on how the Turkic languages underwent widespread and similar reforms in 
roughly the same period. This meant that reformers and nationalists in both Turkey and the 
Soviet Union had reached similar conclusions about the connection between modernization 
and nationhood. In their minds, the two would reinforce each other. They both also spoke 
to each other through the press and conferences to push for Latinization and for the 
purification of grammar and vocabulary. It was modernizing ideologies, especially 
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